People v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 17 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 90706., No. 90693, No. 90678
• Citation: 208 Ill.2d 53,281 Ill.Dec. 1,803 N.E.2d 405
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. DeAngelo JOHNSON, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Clyde Cowley, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jimmie Parker, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

803 N.E.2d 405

208 Ill.2d 53

281 Ill.Dec. 1

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. DeAngelo JOHNSON, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Clyde Cowley, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jimmie Parker, Appellee.

Nos. 90678, 90693, 90706.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 17, 2003.

As Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing January 26, 2004.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Janet Powers Doyle, Alan J. Spellberg, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People in No. 90678.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee in No. 90678.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People in No. 90693.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Alison Edwards, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee in No. 90693.

James E. Ryan and Lisa Madigan, Attorneys General, Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (William L. Browers and Linda Woloshin, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, Alan J. Spellberg, Janet Powers Doyle, Susan Schierl Sullivan, Michael J. Howlett, Jr., and Annette Collins, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People in No. 90706.

Darrell Widen, Chicago, for appellee in No. 90706.

Justice RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

These consolidated cases come before us in the wake of our decision in People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 138-39, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000), wherein a unanimous court held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and trial error had deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial and thus warranted reversal notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. In Blue, this court recognized that a pervasive pattern of error, engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct, had divested defendant of his right to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial, a substantial right that inures to a criminal defendant" "whether guilty or innocent.'" Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 138, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920, quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill.2d 179, 214, 235 Ill.Dec. 641, 705 N.E.2d 824 (1998). In Blue, where the trial was permeated by the presentation of emotionally charged evidence, and the prosecutors "encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts" (Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 139, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920), the members of this court, acting "as guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system" (Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 139, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920), reversed and remanded for a new trial. Disposition of the instant cases requires that we further delineate the dimensions of Blue, applying the principles and standards of review utilized in that case.

Consolidated for purposes of appeal are the cases of People v. Johnson, No. 90678, People v. Cowley, No. 90693, and People v. Parker, No. 90706.

Defendants Cowley and Parker were codefendants of Murray Blue, and their trials involved the same prosecutors. Cowley's case was severed from Blue's and the two were tried simultaneously, but with separate juries. Parker's jury trial took place several months later. Ultimately, Parker and Cowley were each convicted of first degree murder and two counts of attempted, murder. In addition, Cowley was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; Parker was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

The appellate court reversed the convictions of both defendants, relying upon our decision in Blue. In Cowley, the appellate court noted the errors this court had identified in Blue, and the bases of this court's disposition in that case, concluding, "Our supreme court reviewed the exact record before us, and we are bound by its findings of error." Cowley, 317 Ill.App.3d 834, 842, 251 Ill.Dec. 411, 740 N.E.2d 492. The appellate court "reverse[d] in accordance with" Blue. Parker, 317 Ill.App.3d 845, 853, 251 Ill.Dec. 404, 740 N.E.2d 485

. In Parker, the court similarly stated:

"Because the supreme court reviewed a similar record and found error as to identical evidence and similar tactics as evidence[d] in this record, and found that Blue did not receive a fair trial despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt, we are bound by the findings of the supreme court that the errors were so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process and of such magnitude that the accused here was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, this defendant's convictions should be reversed as he was denied a fair trial." Parker, 317 Ill. App.3d at 850, 251 Ill.Dec. 404, 740 N.E.2d 485.

The records in Parker and Cowley are indeed similar to that of Blue; they are not identical.

Defendant Johnson was tried before a jury and convicted of first degree murder and three Counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm. The appellate court reversed and remanded, stating:

"The defendant claims he was the victim of prosecutorial excess during his murder trial before a jury. He was. He was inaccurately described at trial as a convicted narcotics salesman and a convicted felon. In addition, his failure to testify was argued by inference and his lawyer was referred to as `a professional criminal defense lawyer.'

* * * We conclude that serious trial errors, taken in combination, were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 317 Ill.App.3d 666, 667-68, 251 Ill.Dec. 376, 740 N.E.2d 457.

The appellate court also concluded that it was not required to decide whether any one error would result in reversal. Johnson, 317 Ill.App.3d at 676-77, 251 Ill.Dec. 376, 740 N.E.2d 457. The court quoted from Blue: "`Cumulatively, we find that the errors created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant's case.'" Johnson, 317 Ill.App.3d at 677, 251 Ill.Dec. 376, 740 N.E.2d 457, quoting Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 139, 244 Ill.Dec. 32., 724 N.E.2d 920.

Thus, the common threads that bind these cases for purposes of appeal are alleged patterns of prosecutorial misconduct and related trial error, the utilization of cumulative-error analysis, and reliance upon this court's opinion in Blue.

The State raises multiple issues, only some of which are actually germane to our disposition of these consolidated cases. Among these are the following arguments. The State contends, "under due process analysis there was no cumulative error that justified the reversal of DeAngelo Johnson's convictions." With respect to defendants Cowley and Parker, the State argues that the appellate court misapplied Blue, as there was "no pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct" in either case and the juries were called upon to return verdicts "based on a dispassionate evaluation of the facts and the complex rules of accountability rather than emotion and sympathy for the victim."

Other issues raised by the State are, in the context of this appeal, little more than requests for abstract pronouncements from this court. For example, the State in oral argument requested that we declare the plain error rule to be a standard of review rather than an exception to the "waiver doctrine." The State also claims that "the closely balanced evidence test applied to Supreme Court Rule 615(a)'s plain error clause is * * * confusing and unworkable, it creates an internal conflict with Rule 615(a)'s harmless error clause, and should therefore be abandoned and replaced by the test used in the federal system to identify plain error." The State urges us to abrogate our long-standing formulation of plain error analysis and adopt the "federal test," as set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518 (1993). Application of the Olano standard, the State submits, would result in reversal of the appellate court's judgment in defendant Johnson's case.

We have considered these issues; however, for reasons which will become manifest in the course of our discussion, we decline to address them, as they are not pertinent to our resolution of these cases. Although the second prong of plain error analysis does figure in our resolution of Cowley's and Parker's cases, the closely balanced evidence component of plain error analysis is not a factor in our disposition. Since defendants did not object to some of the claimed errors in these cases, we begin with a discussion of basic principles of plain error analysis.

Illinois reviewing courts, faced with allegations of plain error, examine, substantively, on a rudimentary level, the records before them to determine if the claimed errors constitute "plain" and "reversible" errors. People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 17, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill.2d 467, 526, 236 Ill.Dec. 723, 708 N.E.2d 309 (1998) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.).

Our plain error rule is set forth in Supreme Court Rule 615(a), which states as follows:

"Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a).

Our prior decisions make clear that this court may invoke the plain error rule to review alleged errors not properly...