People v. Jonas
| Decision Date | 23 April 1908 |
| Citation | 234 Ill. 56,84 N.E. 685 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. JONAS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Thomas G. Windes, Judge.
Rudolph Jonas was convicted of manslaughter, and brings error. Judgment reversed, and prisoner discharged.
John E. W. Wayman, for plaintiff in error.
W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and John J. Healy, State's Atty. (Benedict J. Short and James J. Barbour, of counsel), for the People.
The plaintiff in error prosecutes this writ to reverse his conviction of the crime of manslaughter. He was arrested July 20, 1906, and at the July term, 1906, of the criminal court of Cook county was indicted for the murder of Albert Worckel. He was tried at the January term, 1907, of that court, but the jury disagreed. Thereupon the cause was transferred, against his objection, on motion of the state's attorney, to the municipal court of Chicago, where on February 6, 1907, he was found guilty of manslaughter, and on March 30, 1907, his motion for a new trial was overruled and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary. No effort was made by the sheriff to execute the mittimus issued upon this judgment of conviction by delivering the prisoner to the warden of the penitentiary, but the plaintiff in error remained in the custody of the sheriff and in the county jail of Cook county until October, 1907. At the last October term of this court, on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it was held that the municipal court was without jurisdiction to try the plaintiff in error on the indictment certified to it by the criminal court, and that its judgment, and the mittimus issued thereon, were void, but that the sheriff had the right to retain the plaintiff in error in his custody by virtue of the order of the criminal court remanding the prisoner to the custody of the sheriff after the jury had failed to agree on the trial in that court. The plaintiff in error was therefore discharged from imprisonmentunder the judgment of the municipal court, but remanded to the custody of the sheriff under the process of the criminal court. People v. Strassheim, 228 Ill. 581, 81 N. E. 1129. On motion of the state's attorney the cause was reinstated on the trial docket of the criminal court on October 14, 1907. Thereafter on November 18, 1907, at the November term of the criminal court, the plaintiff in error moved for his discharge from imprisonment on the ground that he had not been tried within the time required by law. This motion having been overruled, he was placed on trial, again found guilty of manslaughter, and sentenced to the penitentiary.
The motion to discharge the plaintiff in error should have been sustained. Section 18, div. 13, c. 38, Rev. St., confers upon all persons imprisoned on a criminal charge the absolute right to be set at liberty unless tried within the time fixed by that statute, except under the circumstances mentioned in the section itself. Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166, 77 N. E. 529;People v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N. E. 291,11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257. Here the only court having jurisdiction to try the plaintiff in error was the criminal court of Cook county. At the time the plaintiff in error moved for his discharge more than four months and many terms of that court had elapsed after the trial which resulted in a disagreement of the jury. It is answered on behalf of the people that the requirement of the statute is satisfied by a trial within the time limited, even though the jury fails to agree. This is true, but it does not relieve the prosecution of the duty of giving the prisoner, after his remandment to prison upon the failure of the jury to agree, another trial within the same limit of time, beginning to run from the date of the disagreement of the jury. By section 9 of article 2 of the Constitution every person accused of crime is guaranteed a speedy public trial, and this guaranty is made effective by the section of the statute under consideration. The object of a speedy trial is to...
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People v. Williams
...a criminal court that is organized in accordance with law and having power to proceed to determine his guilt or innocence. (People v. Jonas, 234 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 685.) My knowledge of the law tells me that in this system, a criminal court cannot proceed to try an indigent defendant for arme......
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People v. Hudson
...it was the rule that the statutory four-month period commenced to run anew from the date of the disagreement of a jury. (People v. Jonas, 234 Ill. 56, 60, 84 N.E. 685.) However, in Gilbert, where we held that the defendant's right to a speedy trial had not been violated, we stated that 'Our......
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People v. Dixon
... ... We do not agree. It was formerly the rule that in cases where a retrial was necessitated by declaration of a mistrial, a new statutory period commenced on the day the mistrial was ordered. (People v. Jonas (1908), 234 Ill. 56, 84 N.E. 685.) The rule has been altered by more recent decisions, however, wherein our supreme court has noted that under the former statute the declaration of a mistrial does not, in all cases, start the running of a new statutory period. (People v. Bazzell; People v ... ...
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People v. Daniels
... ... Gillespie v. People, 176 Ill. 238, 242, 52 N.E. 250, 251 (1898). This, of course, does not mean that the accused is not entitled to a speedy retrial. See People v. Jonas, 234 Ill. 56, 60, 84 N.E. 685, 686 (1908) ... The statute does not, by its terms, deal with a mistrial situation. In Jonas, the court held that the statutory period begins to run anew from the date of the disagreement of a jury. However, in People v. Gilbert, 24 Ill.2d 201, 204, ... ...