People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 21 November 1984 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Christina JONES, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Richard McMILLAN, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Harold MOODY, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Stanley OKRASIWSKI, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Angel PEREZ, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Lisa GRIFFIN, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Linda DAVIS, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Kim ROMANO, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Robert HARRIS, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Carrol FAUST, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Shaka LAEEL, Defendant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Robert CARTER, Defendant. |
| Court | New York City Court |
Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County (Susan Corkery and Cornett Lewers, New York City, of counsel), for the People.
Caesar D. Cirigliano, Legal Aid Society, New York City (Ivar Goldart, James Vinci, Anthony Michaels and Elliot Cook, New York City, of counsel), for defendants.
At this juncture in the history of the New York City Criminal Court, there is scarce room for argument that the single-most important recent decision to impact on the criminal justice system has been People v. Douglass, 60 N.Y.2d 194, 469 N.Y.S.2d 56, 456 N.E.2d 1179. In seven cases with similar procedural facts, all originating in the Criminal Court of New York County, the Court of Appeals held, in a single opinion, that dismissal of a pending criminal prosecution can only come about as a result of a limited number of grounds specifically codified in the Criminal Procedure Law. This decision underscored that dismissal as a sanction for the People's failure to prosecute or, in the language of the Court of Appeals, a "calendar" dismissal, was reversible error unless the so-called "speedy trial" time specified by CPL 30.30 () had elapsed, 1 or the facts rose to an "interests of justice" standard under CPL 170.40 and 210.40.
At the very least, the application of Douglass has been vexing. A distinct perception of Bar and Bench exists to the effect that prosecutors too often rely upon it to forestall sanctions in situations where no pretense at being ready has been made. At the same time, defendants and their lawyers have been compelled to make their bi-weekly trek to the calendar parts, often losing a day's earnings while waiting for their case to be called amidst some 200 other cases, a total which keeps mounting week-by-week.
To illustrate the impact of Douglass statistically: On November 1, 1983, when it was decided by the Court of Appeals, official statistics show a backlog of pending cases in the New York County branch of the Criminal Court of 6,318. This figure rose to 7,822 as of the week of November 6; to 8,299 as of November 13. By February 5, 1984, the figure was above 9,000 (9,064); and, but two weeks later on February 19, stood at 10,056. On October 21, 1984, while the proceedings which concern us in this decision were awaiting final submissions, it had risen to 11,382.
SUGGESTED AND IMPLEMENTED SOLUTION:
Ironically, a dictum by the Douglass court specifically indicated that the Court of Appeals was sensitive to the staggering problems of calendar control and that it had no intention of emasculating trial courts with respect to their power of responding to prosecutorial delay or inaction. Because this dictum and its interpretation assume major importance not only in proceedings before us, but in the very functioning of the court itself, it is in order to quote it verbatim (60 N.Y.2d p. 200, 469 N.Y.S.2d 56, 456 N.E.2d 1179):
We note at the outset, however, that trial courts are vested with substantial power to control their calendars and our opinion today should not be read as holding, for example, that a court is obligated to grant every adjournment requested by a prosecutor simply because statutory or constitutional time limitations have not expired. Indeed, to so hold would not only place unnecessary burdens on the defendant and his attorney who would have to make unnecessary appearances, but would also be wasteful of judicial resources and would contribute to calendar congestion at a time when the volume of matters legitimately on the court calendars threatens to impair the proper administration of criminal justice. A system of open or reserved dockets is an example of how cases of unwarranted delay in prosecution can be dealt with properly. The cases are marked off the active calendar, subject to the right of the prosecutor upon oral application to have a case restored after filing the document, the absence of which led to the case being placed on the reserve calendar, or in other situations, after becoming ready to proceed, and so informing the court and the defendant.
Relying on this language, the Office of Court Administration has in fact sanctioned a system of reserve calendars for the Criminal Court of New York County. Its mechanics are not substantially different from those of other civil or criminal courts. When a case is not ready for any reason other than a legally sufficient one, it may be marked off the active calendar, adjourned to an unspecified date (AUD) in limbo until restored by the prosecution via a statement of readiness or by curing the original default; or, in the alternative, dismissed by the court upon defense motion after expiration of "30.30" (speedy trial) time.
THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS:
A) Background:
On May 30, 1984, the People moved to restore a group of 57 cases which had been marked off the calendar by the Honorable Jay Gold, then presiding in Part AP3 in which the undersigned now presides. These cases had been marked off for a variety of reasons (failure of People to produce corroborating depositions of complainant as required by CPL 170.65; failure to produce lab reports in drug cases; failure to serve copies of police reports; failure to comply with disclosure orders, etc.). The minutes of that day indicate that three cases were called into the record. In each of these cases, none of which are at issue here, the People moved to restore by offering to furnish the specific document, the absence of which had first occasioned the "off" marking. Judge Gold refused to restore these three cases unless and until the People were in a position either to announce their readiness for trial, or to furnish all documents upon which a meaningful dispositional conference might be held. Based upon these rulings, the People did not press applications to restore the other 54 cases so affected. The defense has moved to dismiss these cases upon speedy trial grounds. A number of these motions have been granted on consent of the People. The twelve cases which are contested fall into a special category which will be further elaborated in detail herein. 2
B) CPLR Article 78 Proceeding:
In collateral related litigation, the People have commenced a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR in the Supreme Court, New York County for a writ of mandamus against Judge Gold directing him to discharge what is claimed to be his ministerial duty of restoring the cases in question to the active calendar. This action entitled Morgenthau v Gold, 126 Misc.2d 856, 484 N.Y.S.2d 456, is pending as of this writing. 3 The undersigned, who is named in the caption of said proceeding as "The Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, County of New York, presiding in All-Purpose Part 3," was served as a party-respondent therein. No stay was requested by the People nor was any issued. This Article 78 proceeding involves 21 of the original 57 cases and includes the 12 cases now before us. Aside from a number of the original 57 cases which were dismissed on consent as heretofore set forth, other cases of this number were not made the subject of the Supreme Court proceeding because the People claim they could not obtain minutes thereof prior to the four month period of limitations applicable under Article 78, the inception of which the People claim, dated from Judge Gold's refusal to restore on May 30, 1984.
C) The Instant Motions:
Relying upon the fact that Special Term has not stayed proceedings in this court, the defense has filed motions for dismissal on speedy-trial grounds in over 200 cases to date. The twelve motions which are the subject of this decision are the only ones being contested by the People because they apparently were among the 57 cases in question which the People claim Judge Gold refused to restore. As alternate grounds, the defense also urges dismissal in the interests of justice pursuant to CPL 170.40. D) Discussion:
It is beyond dispute that the applicable time specified in CPL 30.30 has expired in each of these 12 cases. Once this situation is shown to exist, it is the People's burden to establish any periods of time they claim to be excludable (People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783). It is the People's contention that as of the time Judge Gold denied their applications to restore on May 30, he effectively foreclosed them from any further remedy and, accordingly, "30.30 time" was tolled as of that date. Supplementing this claim the People submit that the Article 78 proceeding now pending which is addressed to this refusal is a related proceeding under CPL 30.30, subdivision 4(a) and hence excluded. This statute reads, in relevant part:
4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following periods must be excluded:
(a) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for the determination of competency and...
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