People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 08 June 1976
• Citation: 39 N.Y.2d 694,350 N.E.2d 913,385 N.Y.S.2d 525
• Parties: , 350 N.E.2d 913 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Winnie JONES, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 525

385 N.Y.S.2d 525

39 N.Y.2d 694, 350 N.E.2d 913

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Winnie JONES, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 8, 1976.

Philip L. Weinstein and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Barry L. Kluger, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, a 'millhand' in a large-scale heroin packaging and distribution operation, was convicted after a jury trial of criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree, a class A felony at the time of the offense on January 23, 1970. Under the mandatory provisions of section 70.00 of the Penal Law, she was sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 15 years to life imprisonment. Twelve other persons, arrested in connection with the same operation and initially charged with the same crime, were permitted under then existing law to plead to the lesser charges of attempted criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree, criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree and attempted criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the fourth degree. They received sentences of 8 1/3 to 25 years, 5 years and 3 years, respectively, depending on the crime to which they pleaded guilty.

Appellant urges that the disparity in sentencing between that meted out to her and that given to her codefendants, under the facts of this case, amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Although the Court of Appeals is not permitted to review the appropriateness of a sentence, a question of law reviewable by it is presented where the issue is one of the power of the court below to impose the particular sentence (see N.Y.Const., art. VI, § 3; Cohen and Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals, § 198, pp. 745--746; see, also, CPL 470.30, subd. 1). Appellant was sentenced within the provisions of section 70.00 of the Penal Law in force at the time in question and the constitutionality of that statute cannot be seriously questioned (see People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338).

It cannot be said, under the equal protection clause of either the State Constitution (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 11) or the United States Constitution (U.S.Const., 14th Amdt.), that on the facts of this case that the statutes have been unconstitutionally applied (see People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 119, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 482, 332 N.E.2d 338, 347 Supra). Equal protection requires 'that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances * * * and that in the administration of criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses' (Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31, 5 S.Ct. 357, 359, 28 L.Ed.2d 923). Here, the circumstances were not the same since defendant was convicted of a crime different than that of her codefendants, for which crime there was a mandatory minimum sentence not applicable to the codefendants.

Regardless of its severity, a sentence of imprisonment which is within the limits of a valid statute ordinarily is not a cruel and unusual punishment in the constitutional sense (United States v. Martell, 4 Cir.,335 F.2d 764, 766; United States v. Coduto, 7 Cir., 284 F.2d 464, 469, cert. den. 365 U.S. 881, 81 S.Ct. 1027, 6 L.Ed.2d 192; Black v. United States, 9 Cir., 269 F.2d 38, 43, cert. den. 361 U.S. 938, 80 S.Ct. 379, 4 L.Ed.2d 357; Hagan v. United States, 5 Cir., 256 F.2d 34, cert. den. 358 U.S. 850, 79 S.Ct. 77, 3 L.Ed.2d 84; Tincher v.United States, 4 Cir., 11 F.2d 18, 21, cert. den. 271 U.S. 664, 46 S.Ct. 475, 70 L.Ed. 1139). There were present here no exceptional circumstances which would justify a variance from this general rule. Under the recent holding in People v. Broadie (37 N.Y.2d 100, 110, 117, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 474, 480, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341, 345, Supra), it cannot be said that the sentence in this case was so grossly disproportionate to the offense as to amount to an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, the facts (convictions for different crimes and the mandatory statute) justified, if not compelled, an inequality of sentences between that of appellant and her codefendants (cf. Hedrick v. United States, 10 Cir. 357 F.2d 121, 124; State v. Coutcher, 198 Kan. 282, 424 P.2d 865; Perkins v. State of North Carolina, D.C., 234 F.Supp. 333, 337; see Cruel Punishment--Length of Sentence, Ann., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, 359--365, 376--377).

In United States v. Wiley, 7 Cir., 278 F.2d 500, sentence was set aside, not due to the severity of punishment, but because it was disclosed by the District Court that in sentencing Wiley a harsher sentence was imposed because he pleaded not guilty and stood trial while codefendants, more deeply involved, pleaded guilty and were dealt with more leniently. Here, it cannot be inferred that appellant was punished or further penalized by the sentencing Justice because she pleaded not guilty and insisted upon he right to a trial. She received the minimum punishment prescribed by law for the crime of which she was found guilty which crime was different from the ones to which the others chose to plead.

Appellant's brief concedes that, like the other 'millhands', she was offered a three-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Thus, there was no discrimination practiced against appellant in this regard and the prosecution attempted to avoid the imposition of a harsh sentence upon her. In People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227 at page 233, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, at page 629, 318 N.E.2d 784, at page 788, it was stated: 'Perhaps most important, plea negotiation serves the ends of justice. It enables the court to impose 'individualized' sentences, an accepted ideal in criminology, by avoiding mandatory, harsh sentences adapted to a class of crime or a group of offenders but inappropriate, and even Draconian, if applied to the individual before the court'.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

BREITEL, Chief Judge (dissenting).

The mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, really lifetime parole, imposed in this case is unconscionable and barbaric because of the gross inequality of treatment of like persons involved in the identical crime. Since the earliest conscious evolution of justice in western society, the dominating principle has been that of equality of treatment of like persons similarly situated, a principle at the root of any rational system of justice (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (Ross ed.), book V, pars. 1129a, 1131a; see Friedmann, Legal Theory (5th ed.), at p. 416; Bodenheimer, Treatise on Justice, § 10, at p. 84; Hart, Concept of Law, pp. 153--163, especially pp. 155, 158--159; Cahn, Sense of Injustice, pp. 14--15; Paton, Jurisprudence (3d ed.), at p. 95). That principle is ravished in this case by force of a mandatory statute.

Defendant, a 37-year-old woman with no prior convictions, was a 'millhand' in a heroin processing 'mill'. She and 14 other participants in the operation were indicted for acting in concert to possess over four pounds of heroin seized in a police raid on the 'mill' (criminal possession of a dangerous drug in the first degree, Penal Law, former § 220.23).

After reversal of a hearing court's order suppressing the heroin, 12 of the codefendants, including eight 'millhands', three 'lieutenants' and the 'principal' of the operation, were permitted, as the statute law then allowed, to plead guilty to lesser included offenses. The 'principal' received 8 1/3 to 25 years; the 'lieutenants' received indeterminate sentences of 5 years, the other 'millhands', whose crimes were identical to that committed by defendant, received indeterminate sentences of 3 years.

Although offered the same opportunity to plead as the other 'millhands', defendant, claiming innocence, instead exercised her right to trial. Upon her conviction by a jury, the sentencing court, against its conscience and judgment, but because it was mandated by statute, sentenced defendant to life imprisonment, with a minimum of 15 years (Penal Law, § 70.00, subd. 2, par. (a); subd. 3, par. (a)).

Moved by the recommendations of the trial court, the District Attorney noted for his prosecutorial zeal, and the Appellate Division, all of whom believed the sentence to be excessively harsh, the Governor commuted defendant's sentence to 3 years, 3 months and 10 days to life, the minimum term expiring on January 5, 1976. The commutation has a number of conditions, most notably, that defendant remain on parole for life. Of course, in considering the constitutionality of punishments, the maximums must be examined (People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 111, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 475, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341). Here, the maximum was unaffected by the commutation.

I would suggest that the revulsion felt by the trial court, the prosecutor, the Appellate Division, and the Governor, at this gross inequality of sentencing is shared by all of the members of this court, except that the majority is unable to wrest itself from what it accepts as the command of a statute. But there is a Consitution, a law higher than that of the Legislature and the courts.

Defendant contends that, under the circumstances, the mandatory life sentence, as applied to her, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitutional limitations (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 5; U.S.Const., 8th Amdt.).

It is of critical importance to recognize that defendant was not convicted under the statutory scheme mandating life imprisonment sustained in People v. Broadie (37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338, Supra). The difference is that, under the current statutory scheme, involved in the Broadie case, a defendant is permitted to plead to a lesser included offense, but only to one carrying a mandatory life sentence (CPL 220.10, subd. 6, par. (a)). Under the former statutory scheme,...