People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 10 January 1883
• Citation: 14 N.W. 573,49 Mich. 591
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JONES.

14 N.W. 573

49 Mich. 591

PEOPLE v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 10, 1883

Whether an information for horse-stealing should not expressly refer to act 102 of 1877 to justify the infliction of the special penalty authorized by that statute, quaere. But the statute itself, as it presents a heavier punishment for horse-stealing than the laws allow for manslaughter is an outrage on justice and ought to be repealed

Error to Hillsdale.

J.J. Van Riper, for plaintiff.

William B. Gildart, for defendant and appellant.

MARSTON J.

The respondent pleaded guilty to an information charging him with "one pair of horses of the value of $300 of the goods and chattels and property of one Abner Cornell, then and there being found, feloniously did steal take and drive away, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided," and was thereupon sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison at Jackson at hard labor for the period of seven years. The general statute provides that "any person who shall commit the offense of larceny, by stealing of the property of another, any money, goods, or chattels, etc., *** if the property stolen exceeds the value of $25, shall be punished in the state prison not more than five years, or by fine not exceeding $500 and imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year.' 2 Comp.Laws, � 7569. In 1877 an act was passed by the legislature "to provide for the prevention and punishment of horse-stealing," which provides that every person who shall steal any horse *** shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, not less than three years nor more than fifteen years." And in cases of first offense the conviction might be to the state house of correction for a term not exceeding two years. Laws 1877 p. 80. The sentence in this case was under this statute.

The information in this case is in the exact form and language it would have been prior to the passage of this act of 1877, and there is nothing in it that would in any way direct special attention to this act. Every information must set forth, in at least general language, a description or designation of the property stolen. Admitting the larceny of the horses, it was necessary, before the passage of this act of 1877, to have charged in the information the stealing and taking of one span of horses, so that this information does not by any new charge, averment or reference, in any way direct attention to the special act or punishment therein provided. The general reference that the act committed was "against the form of the statute in such case made and provided," while unnecessary, is so commonly used in all informations, that it cannot be held sufficient to bring the offense charged within a special act providing more severe punishment.

Whenever a person charged with the commission of a criminal offense pleads guilty thereto, or has been convicted by a jury, all doubts arising thereafter as to the exact offense charged in the information, must be decided in favor of the accused otherwise he might be punished for an offense not charged, and which he did not by his plea of guilty, intend to admit that he had committed. In other words it must appear that the plea of guilty, taken with the information, leaves no...