People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 01 July 1886 |
| Citation | 28 N.W. 839,62 Mich. 304 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. JONES. |
Error to Shiawassee.
G.R Lyon, for defendant and appellant.
Respondent was convicted under section 19, c. 153, Rev.St., (being section 9093, How.St.,) which provides that if any person shall verbally, or by written or printed communication "maliciously threaten to accuse another of any crime or offense," or "maliciously threaten any injury to the person or property of another, with intent thereby to extort money, or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with intent to compel the person so threatened to do any act against his will," he shall be punished, etc. The information contains but one count, which avers that respondent, on January 19, 1886, "did verbally and maliciously threaten to accuse one Ellen Roosa of an offense, to-wit, of the violation of the internal revenue laws of the United States of America, relating to the sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors; and he, the said B.F. Jones, did then and there verbally and maliciously threaten injury to the person and property of the said Ellen Roosa, and that the said B.F. Jones did then and there verbally and maliciously threaten her, the said Ellen Roosa to accuse her of such crime and offense as would cause her, the said Ellen Roosa, to be imprisoned in the state's prison at Jackson, in the state of Michigan,--all with the intent to extort money from her, the said Ellen Roosa, also certain pecuniary advantage, and with further intent of him, the said B.F. Jones, to compel her, the said Ellen Roosa, to do an act against her will, to-wit, to make a sale and transfer of all her right, title, and interest in and to certain personal property, goods, and chattels then owned and possessed by her, the said Ellen Roosa, in the city of Owasso, in the county and state aforesaid, to-wit, a one-half interest in and to the business, furniture, fixtures, and articles used in carrying on the business of running a saloon located on Washington street," etc., "of the value of $700."
It will be observed that in this single count are included all of the possible violations of the section, with all of the possible intents, and all are connected together in a single charge. It will also appear that no offense is specified, no threatened injury to person or property is specified, no averment is made of actual injury, or its nature, and the only distinct evil purposed, as described, is compelling Mrs. Roosa to sell out her interest in the saloon. On the trial, objections of various kinds pointed out the defects, and the court refused to require the people to elect what grievance to prosecute. Several exceptions were taken, and we are also asked to set aside the whole proceedings for these defects.
These statutory provisions have been in force, in form or substance, for a long time. The object is to put threats of criminal...
To continue reading
Request your trial