People v. Jones

• Decision Date: 05 February 1954
• Docket Number: Cr. 5464
• Citation: 42 Cal.2d 219,266 P.2d 38
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JONES.

Page 38

266 P.2d 38

42 Cal.2d 219

PEOPLE v. JONES.

Cr. 5464.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Feb. 5, 1954.

Rehearing Denied March 3, 1954.

Bertram H. Ross, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., William E. James and Lester Ziffren, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

EDMONDS, Justice.

Rayburn Jones was convicted by a jury upon each of two counts of an information which charged him with having violated section 288 of the Penal Code. His motion for a new trial was denied and he was placed on probation for five years, subject to certain conditions, one of which is that he serve one year in the county jail. The principal point presented upon his appeal from the order denying his motion for a new trial concerns rulings rejecting certain evidence.

At the time of the alleged offenses, Carol, nine years of age, was living with Jones and his wife, her uncle and aunt. Carol described the conduct of Jones upon the two occasions specified in the information, and it clearly was a violation of the statute. In addition, she testified that Jones indulged in similar acts 'lots of days'. Upon one occasion, Carol told the jury, Jones, prior to his lewd and lascivious conduct, showed her four books containing pornographic pictures and writing. Another time, she said, Jones attempted to persuade her to engage in acts denounced by section 288a of the Penal Code.

Briefly stated, what Jones did, as related by Carol, amounted to sexual relations without penetration. Her testimony was that the acts commenced approximately one month after she arrived at the jones' home, and continued for about a year. She then moved to the residence of another aunt and uncle, Mr. and Mrs. Scrivner.

Although Carol had stayed with the Scrivners upon two occasions for as long as four to six weeks during the time of her residence with Mr. and Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Scrivner testified that Carol had not informed her or her husband of any wrongful conduct of Jones. According to Carol, and Mrs. Scrivner corroborated her, she told the Scrivners about it a few days after she went to live with them. She made no complaint at the time she was living in the Jones' home, she testified, because he said that if I did 'he would spank me'. She told the jury that after moving to the Scrivner home Jones 'wasn't around and I thought it was safer'.

Jones denied having committed any of the acts related by Carol. He testified that he did not show Carol any pornographic books but he admitted having had eight or nine pictures of nude women in his bedroom. Jones testified, and his wife agreed, that their sexual relationship was mutually satisfactory. To the contrary, the mother-in-law of Jones told of complaints by him that his wife did not satisfy him sexually. There was character evidence that Jones had a good reputation for morality in the community in which he resided. Mrs. Jones said that Carol's reputation for truth and veracity was bad.

Jones does not claim that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts of the jury. He urges that because it is directly conflicting and evenly balanced, errors of law occurring at the trial compel a reversal.

The principal ground relied upon is the refusal of the trial court to admit certain expert opinion evidence. Specifically, Jones' offer of proof in this connection was as follows: 'If produced as a witness, Dr. Solomon (a psychiatrist) will testify that at my request he examined Mr. Rayburn Jones on two occasions, one without the use of drugs and on the second occasion with the aid of a drug known as sodium pentathol; that as a result of those examinations he reached the conclusion that Mr. Jones is not a sexual deviate and he is incapable of having the necessary intent to be lustive, either for himself or to satisfy the lusts of a child of nine and a half years of age.' The trial judge commented, 'I take it the purpose of producing the evidence would not be to show an abnormal mental state which would preclude the defendant from having a particular specific intent; in fact, your evidence would be offered to show what is a normal state of mind of a person who would not be prone to commit such an act.' Counsel for Jones agreed with that statement of his position.

'All facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific rule forbids.' 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., 1940, § 10, p. 293; and cf. Code Civ.Proc. § 1868. The general test of relevancy of indirect evidence is whether it tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove a material issue. Code Civ.Proc. § 1832; People v. Eldridge, 147 Cal. 782, 784, 82 P. 442; People v. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 398, 77 P. 177; cf. People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 315, 169 P.2d 924.

Jones contends that the offered evidence was admissible upon the question of specific intent. Relying upon People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330, 202 P.2d 53, he takes the position that a defendant charged with having committed an act which requires a particular intent to make it a crime, is entitled to present any evidence, not amounting to proof of legal insanity, which tends to disprove the specific mental state.

Section 288 of the Penal Code provides: 'Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act * * * upon or with the body * * * of a child under the age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony * * *.' Unquestionably the statute defines a crime requiring the proof of the stated intent. People v. Booth, 111 Cal.App.2d 106, 108, 243 P.2d 872; People v. Hamey, 23 Cal.App.2d 689, 73 P.2d 1254. Here such intent was clearly established by the circumstances connected with the offenses. See Penal Code, § 21; People v. Booth, supra, 111 Cal.App.2d at page 109, 243 P.2d 872; People v. Hobbs, 109 Cal.App.2d 189, 192, 240 P.2d 411.

However, Jones did not base his defense upon the lack of specific intent and for that reason the decisions he relies upon are inapplicable. His sole purpose in offering in evidence the doctor's opinion, as is shown by his agreement with the trial court's statement of his position, was to prove that he did not engage in the acts for which he was on trial. Necessarily the required specific intent must have been present if his conduct was such as described by Carol.

Jones claims that the rejected evidence had probative value for the purpose of determining whether or not he is a 'sexual deviate' and was admissible for such purpose. As support for his position, he cites the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code relating to sexual psychopaths, §§ 5500-5521.

In the determination of probabilities of guilt, evidence of character is relevant. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 55, p. 449. 'The purpose of the evidence as to the character of the accused is to show his disposition, and to base thereon a probable presumption that he would not be likely to commit, and, therefore, did not commit, the crime with which he is charged.' State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407, 409. Proof of the good character of the defendant may be considered as a fact tending to rebut the truth of testimony of an incriminatory character which is sufficient to establish the truth of the charge against him. People v. Green, 217 Cal. 176, 183, 17 P.2d 730; People v. Ashe, 44 Cal. 288, 291-294; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, supra, § 56, pp. 450-451. Character is proved by evidence of the accused's general reputation in the community for the traits which are in issue. People v. Gordan, 103 Cal. 568, 573-574, 37 P. 534; People v. Neal, 85 Cal.App.2d 765, 771, 194 P.2d 57; People v. McMillan, 59 Cal.App. 785, 787, 212 P. 38. Such evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of guilt. People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485, 489.

Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, a sexual psychopath may be dealt with as a person who is a menace to the health or safety of others. When one is convicted of a sex offense involving a child under 14 years of age and the crime is a felony, there shall be a subsequent proceeding to determine whether the person is a sexual psychopath, § 5501(c); and cf., also, Welf. & Inst. Code § 5501(b), providing for a similar procedure where a second offender is convicted of a misdemeanor. The Legislature has concluded that a person who engaged in such conduct upon one...