People v. Jones

• Citation: 52 Cal.2d 636,343 P.2d 577
• Decision Date: 28 August 1959
• Docket Number: Cr. 6409
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Jimmie Lee JONES and Phillip Henry Hamilton, Appellants.

Page 577

343 P.2d 577

52 Cal.2d 636

PEOPLE of the State of California, Respondent, v. Jimmie Lee JONES and Phillip Henry Hamilton, Appellants.

Cr. 6409.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Aug. 28, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1959.

Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, Ralph R. Rubin, San Francisco, and Maurice H. Hardeman, San Jose, for appellants.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., and John S. McInerny, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

Defendants pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree, waived a jury trial on the issue of punishment, and, after a five-day hearing on that issue, were sentenced to death. The appeals are automatic. Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b).

On April 6, 1958, Ruth Swanson Rivers, a woman of advanced middle age, was found dead on her bed in her apartment on Geary Street in San Francisco. The body was nearly nude and had a knotted rag around and embedded in its neck. In the opinion of the autopsy surgeon and the chief pathologist of the coroner's department, the cause of death was strangulation effected by force. The authopsy also revealed that there were spermatozoa in the victim's vaginal area. The victim's empty coin purse was found on the floor beside her bed.

Defendants Jones and Hamilton were arrested on April 9, 1958. At first they denied any connection with the crime, but finally each confessed to the robbery of Mrs. Rivers. Jones, in his statement to the police, admitted both raping and robbing the victim, but he insisted that at the time he left the apartment Mrs. Rivers was still alive. Hamilton also admitted to the police that he had robbed Mrs. Rivers. He denied that he had raped her, and insisted that she was alive when the two men left the apartment. Jones also declared that Hamilton entered the apartment first, grabbed Mrs. Rivers, and was choking her with a rag around her throat when he, Jones, entered.

The amended indictment, among other things, charged Jones and Hamilton with the murder of Ruth Swanson Rivers. To this charge the defendants pleaded guilty, and specifically pleaded guilty to first degree murder. Before the plea was taken, the trial judge told the defendants that there had been no promise on his part, nor would he make any promise, as to the penalty that he would impose. 'I want each of you to understand that the Court did not indicate in any way what the penalty would be should it be left up to the Court. Nor did the Court make any promise. There was just a general discussion.

'If your counsel inferred anything from that, or communicated that to you, I want you to know that it is their own inference and the Court does not intend to be bound by anything that your counsel might have inferred. I will judge the case on the evidence presented to me on the question of penalty and make my decision.

'I have no preconceived ideas as to what it would be at this time. I will have to wait until I hear all of the charges, that is, hear the evidence presented. So, if any representation was made to you that you are likely to get life imprisonment instead of death, I want you to know that I don't feel they have been warranted by the conversation that was held here.'

Upon being arraigned on the amended complaint the clerk first asked Jones 'what is your plea to Count 1, to wit: the crime of murder in the first degree?' Before the question was answered, the Court stated:

'Now, Jimmy Lee Jones, before you enter your plea to that charge, I want to ask you: You have talked this over with your counsel, have you?

'Defendant Jones. Yes.

'The Court: And with your parents and relatives, and you have had ample time to consider this?

'Defendant Jones: Yes.

'The Court: And you are ready at this time to enter your plea?

'Defendant Jones: (Nodding affirmatively.)

'The Court: And your plea is a voluntary one on your part?

'Defendant Jones: Yes.

'The Court: And not induced by any promise as to what the penalty might or might not be?

'Defendant Jones: No. * * *

'The Clerk: What is your plea to Count 1, to-wit: the crime of felony, violation of Section 187 of the Penal Code, murder in the first degree?

'Defendant Jones: Guilty.'

Essentially the same procedure was followed with the defendant Hamilton, except that he entered his plea before the judge had a chance to ask the questions. The judge, however, before he would accept the plea, inquired as to whether it was voluntary, whether it had been well-considered with counsel and family, and whether or not it had been induced by any promise of a lighter punishment.

Defendants then waived a jury trial on the question of penalty. Counsel for each defendant first requested the waiver and then the trial court asked each defendant personally if he waived a jury trial. Each responded affirmatively.

The trial court next proceeded to try the penalty issue. The hearing lasted for five days.

This procedure was correct.

Section 190.1 was added to the Penal Code in 1957. (Stats. of 1957, p. 3509, Chap. 1968, § 2.) Where the death penalty is possibly involved it provides for a separate trial of the guilt issue and of the penalty issue. The section provides, in part: 'If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact shall be a jury unless a jury is waived.' (Emphasis added.) The first portion of the section reads: 'The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been found guilty of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.' (Emphasis added.) See People v. Glatman, 52 Cal.2d 283, 340 P.2d 8.

The law also requires (Pen.Code, § 1192) that, upon a general plea of guilty to an offense divided into degrees, the trial court must fix the degree of the crime. Under the former procedure in a case involving murder, the court would take evidence concerning the degree of the crime, and also to determine by such evidence what the penalty was to be. 'It (the degree of the offense) is a matter, together with the penalty to be imposed, which must be determined by the court on competent evidence before passing sentence under a plea of 'guilty' Pen.Code, § 1192 * * *' People v. Mendez, 27 Cal.2d 20, 23-24, 161 P.2d 929, 931. Thus, under former practice, defendant did not have a right to a trial by jury on the issue of the degree and penalty after a plea of guilty. This procedure was held constitutional. People v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 618, 160 P.2d 549, certiorari dismissed, 326 U.S. 691, 66 S.Ct. 232, 90 L.Ed. 407. Now, under the 1957 provision (Pen.Code, § 190.1) the defendant does have a right to a jury hearing on the issue of penalty, but by the section the right may be waived, as was done in the instant case.

The procedure to be followed in fixing the degree of the crime need not be here determined because in the instant case both defendants expressly pleaded guilty to the crime of murder in the first degree. Under the old law, even in such a case, the trial court was required to fix the degree of the offense after a plea of guilty. People v. Paraskevopolis, 42 Cal.App. 325, 183 P. 585. But, under the new law, the trial court is apparently empowered to accept a plea of guilty to a particular degree of an offense.

Section 1192.1 of the Penal Code, added in 1955, and amended in 1957, provides: 'Upon a plea of guilty to an information or indictment accusing the defendant of a crime divided into degrees when consented to by the prosecuting attorney in open court and approved by the court, such plea may specify the degree thereof and in such event the defendant cannot be punished for a higher degree of the crime than the degree specified.'

In the instant case the defendants pleaded guilty to the offense of murder in the first degree. These pleas were accepted by the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge. Therefore the only issue to be determined at the hearing was which penalty was to be imposed, that is, life imprisonment or death. But, even though not required to do so, at the close of the penalty hearing, the trial court determined that the murder was of the first degree. Thus, there was no error in the procedure followed by the court in fixing the penalty.

Defendants were originally indicted on seventeen counts: one count of murder, four counts of burglary, four counts of robbery, and eight counts of rape. In a conference before the trial court with the defendants present, the district attorney and defendants' council stipulated that if the defendants pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, the other 16 counts of robbery, rape and burglary would be dismissed. The prosecuting attorney then stated his position as follows:

'* * * if each of the defendants pleads guilty to first-degree murder, that is, Count 1 of the amended indictment * * * the District Attorney's Office will move to dismiss each of the remaining counts of the amended indictment and also the two other indictments that are now pending before this Court for trial. However, the District Attorney's Office has given no assurance of any kind as to its that it will in any way move or seek to lessen the penalty, but instead indicates very clearly now that it is the position of the Office that this is a capital case and that the extreme penalty should be inflicted.

'Mr. Rubin (Defendant Jones' then counsel): We understand, yes.

'Mr. Elkington: We also, if the defendants plead to first-degree murder, then on the question of penalty we propose to introduce evidence, not only with regard to Count 1, the...