People v. Jones

Decision Date25 August 1988
Docket NumberCr. N
Citation758 P.2d 1165,46 Cal.3d 585,250 Cal.Rptr. 635
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 758 P.2d 1165 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Timothy JONES et al., Defendants and Appellants. o. 25455.

Handy Horiye, San Diego, Laurance S. Smith, Fair Oaks, and Christopher Blake, San Diego, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and Bruce Daniel Rosen, San Diego, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendants and appellants.

Frank O. Bell, Jr., State Public Defender, and Philip M. Brooks, Deputy State Public Defender, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant Jones.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Jay M. Bloom, Maxine Cutler, Pat Zaharopoulos and Gil P. Gonzalez, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Christopher N. Heard, San Jose, as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

KAUFMAN, Justice.

This case raises two principal questions: (1) whether a person convicted of multiple felonies, of which only one is a violent sex offense enumerated in Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c), may receive a full, consecutive sentence for that sex offense pursuant to that subdivision; and (2) the weight to be accorded by a sentencing court to a California Youth Authority (YA) amenability determination under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 as amended by the Legislature in 1982.

As will appear, we conclude a single conviction of an enumerated sex offense is sufficient to trigger the sentencing court's discretion under Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c), to impose a full, consecutive sentence for that conviction. We also conclude that the 1982 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 broadened the sentencing court's discretion to impose a state prison term notwithstanding a positive YA amenability determination. Under this broader standard, the court in this case did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendants Timothy Jones and Arnell Williams to state prison terms.

I Factual and Procedural Background

One evening near midnight Davina B. heard a knock on her door and opened it, thinking it was her roommate. Three young men forced their way in, one holding a gun. The men covered their faces, drank, and searched the house for drugs and valuables. Davina's roommate Robin S. came home around 1 a.m. Each victim was asked at gunpoint to perform a sex act but refused. The men eventually left, taking various items with them and driving away in the pickup truck Robin had been driving.

Two days later Elizabeth and Ricardo C. were asleep in their bed when they were awakened after 1 a.m. by five young men, one of whom had a gun. The men tied and gagged Ricardo and left him in another room. They then took turns raping and sodomizing Elizabeth and holding her down. One attacker put the barrel of the gun into her rectum. The intruders ransacked the house, took various items, and drove away in the victims' car.

Defendants Timothy Jones, Raymond Brooks and Arnell Williams were charged with multiple crimes in connection with these incidents. As a result of a plea bargain, each defendant pleaded guilty to multiple crimes. Jones pleaded guilty to one rape and one robbery count in connection with the second incident. Brooks and Williams each pleaded guilty to two rape counts in connection with the second incident and one robbery count in connection with the first. Defendants were minors when they committed these offenses: Jones and Brooks were 17 and Williams was 16. Notwithstanding determinations by the YA that Jones and Williams were amenable to YA commitment, the court imposed state prison sentences of 17 years for Jones and 23 years each for Williams and Brooks.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Brooks and Williams judgments. It reversed the Jones judgment for purposes of resentencing only, holding that in his case the lower court had erred in imposing a full and consecutive sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c), 1 for his single violent sex conviction.

The People petitioned for review, contending the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that multiple enumerated sex offense convictions are required before the sentencing court may impose a full, consecutive term under section 667.6, subdivision (c). Defendants Jones and Williams also petitioned for review, arguing the sentencing court had accorded the YA's amenability determinations too little weight and thus abused its discretion in sentencing them to state prison.

This court granted review and appointed counsel for each of the three defendants. Defendant Brooks resubmitted his Court of Appeal brief contending the sentencing court abused its discretion in declining to commit him to YA. Brooks also challenges the sufficiency of the court's stated reasons for imposing full, consecutive sentences for his two rape convictions.

With our permission two amicus curiae briefs have been filed. In support of defendant Jones, the State Public Defender urges that the legislative history of section 667.6 indicates subdivision (c) was intended to authorize full, consecutive sentencing only when a defendant is convicted of more than one of the enumerated sex offenses. The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation supports the People in its amicus curiae brief, urging the legislative history of the 1982 amendment to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 demonstrates the Legislature's intent to enlarge the sentencing court's discretion to impose a state prison term notwithstanding an affirmative YA amenability determination.

II

Section 667.6, Subdivision (c)

Defendant Jones was convicted of one count of rape and one count of robbery. His rape conviction was for a violation of section 261, one of the violent sex offenses enumerated in section 667.6, subdivision (c). 2 Jones contends the court erred in sentencing him pursuant to subdivision (c) because that provision should apply only when a person stands convicted of more than one of the enumerated sex offenses. 3 The People, on the other hand, maintain that one such conviction is sufficient to trigger the sentencing court's discretionary authority to impose a full, consecutive term for that conviction.

The Legislature enacted section 667.6 in 1979 to provide longer prison terms for certain sex offenders. (Stats.1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258.) Before then, the principal provisions governing the sentencing of persons convicted of multiple felonies were sections 669 and 1170.1. Section 669 authorizes the court to decide whether sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. Subdivision (a) of section 1170.1 establishes a formula for computing the length of the aggregate term should the court impose consecutive sentences. Under that formula, the longest term for one offense, including enhancements, becomes the "principal term," and to it are added any "subordinate terms" for the other offenses, limited to one-third of the middle term for each such offense. ( § 1170.1, subd. (a).)

As a more severe consecutive sentencing alternative to the section 1170.1 formula, section 667.6, subdivision (c), permits the imposition of a full, separate, and consecutive term "for each violation of" the enumerated sex offenses. Of course, the occasion for consecutive sentencing under subdivision (c), under section 1170.1, or otherwise, only arises when a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes. The issue here is whether subdivision (c) permits the imposition of a full, consecutive term when only one of the multiple crimes of which the defendant stands convicted is an enumerated sex offense. 4

The operative language of subdivision (c) is as follows: "In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction."

Aside from the final clause, "whether or not etc.," this language is plain and unambiguous. It clearly states that, when a defendant has been convicted of multiple felonies, the court has a sentencing choice as to each ESO conviction among those felonies. The court may impose a full, consecutive sentence under subdivision (c) for each such conviction or, instead, it may apply the standard consecutive sentencing formula in section 1170.1. It is contended, however, that the final clause's reference to "the crimes," a comparison with the language of subdivision (d), and the legislative history of subdivisions (c) and (d) establish that subdivision (c) was intended to be inapplicable when only one of the multiple crimes is an ESO or at least create an ambiguity in that regard which must be construed in defendant's favor. None of these contentions is sound.

A. The Word "crimes" in Subdivision (c)

Turning first to subdivision (c)'s provision that a full, consecutive term may be imposed for each ESO conviction "whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction," it is at once apparent that the "whether or not" language was intended to broaden the scope of subdivision (c)' § effect not to restrict it. Thus, it is highly illogical to suppose that the reference to "the crimes" in the broadening clause was intended to alter the express applicability of the court's discretion to "each violation." Further, throughout California's Penal Code, "the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular...." ( § 7, italics added; People v. Jamison supra, 150 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1175, 198 Cal.Rptr. 407.) The rule of construction enunciated in section 7 is no mere rubric--it is the law. Therefore, to the extent practicable, we must interpret the plural word "crimes" in subdivision (c) to be...

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