People v. Jones

Decision Date28 November 1972
Docket NumberNo. 55838,55838
Citation291 N.E.2d 305,8 Ill.App.3d 849
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James D. JONES, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant, Elmer C. Kissane, James S. Veldman, Chicago, of counsel.

SCHWARTZ, Justice.

This is an appeal by the State from an order sustaining the motion of defendant James D. Jones to suppress statements alleged to have been made by him to an assistant State's Attorney and subsequent testimony which he gave before the grand jury. To fully understand the issue involved it is desirable to set forth facts relating to the crime and subsequent events.

James Jones and Robert Banks were charged on Janaury 27, 1970, with the murder of a security guard at a restaurant known as Burger King, located at 103rd and Forest Streets in Chicago. Jones was identified as the man who accompanied Banks to the restaurant where the two ordered soft drinks and seated themselves at a table next to one at which two security guards were sitting. The restaurant manager testified that Banks left Jones and sat down at the table with the guards. After a few minutes conversation Banks pulled a gun and shot Mason, one of the guards. Both defendants ran out, followed by Mason who fired two shots, wounding Jones. Mason then collapsed and died. The defendants were arrested, indicted by the grand jury, and the case set for trial.

On November 9, 1970, the first day of trial, the State requested and was granted leave to amend its list of prospective witnesses to include three who had been witness to statements made by Jones to an assistant State's Attorney named Robert Beranek. Seymour Fishman, Jones' attorney, was then asked by the assistant State's Attorney if he intended to file a motion to suppress these statements and Jones' testimony before the grand jury. Fishman stated that he would wait to see how the prosecution developed before making a final decision on this point. After several witnesses had testified for the State the case was continued to November 16, 1970. Upon reconvening, the State sought to introduce in evidence statements made by Jones to Beranek on April 15, 1970 and the grand jury testimony. Fishman moved to suppress both on the grounds that they were made as a result of a promise of leniency made by Beranek and hence were not made voluntarily. The trial judge ordered a preliminary hearing on the matter.

At the hearing Beranek testified that Fishman had first suggested to him that Jones might testify for the State, and he had told Fishman that upon such testimony being given he would not oppose a motion to sever, and would be inclined to recommend leniency for Jones. Beranek testified that at no time did he state what this more lenient recommendation would be. Beranek further stated that Fishman had agreed that he and Jones would meet in Beranek's office on April 15, 1970 to hear Jones' statement. Fishman did not attend the meeting but spoke to Jones and Beranek that day by telephone and, prior to any questioning, Jones was allowed to use Beranek's telephone to talk to Fishman.

Beranek also testified that he informed the defendant of his constitutional rights; that he heard Jones tell Fishman he wanted to give the statement; that Jones told him Fishman had agreed; and Beranek then informed Fishman that Jones would be taken before the grand jury that day, to which Fishman had no objection. He testified that after the grand jury appearance he processed Jones' request to be transferred to another penal institution.

Fishman testified that Beranek had instigated inquiries as to Jones' testifying for the State, and that on April 9, 1970, Beranek offered Fishman severance and probation if Jones pleaded guilty and testified for the State. Fishman introduced his trial jacket on the Jones case, and translated a shorthand notation contained thereon as stating the State's Attorney's office had called and offered severance and probation. Fishman further testified that during the conversation on April 15 he had asked Beranek if the 'deal' was still on and Beranek replied that it was. He stated that was the reason he agreed to have Jones give a statement and appear before the grand jury. On cross-examination Fishman admitted that he rarely made notations on his criminal file jackets and that he knew probation could not be given for murder. On redirect, however, he testified that he knew it to be a common occurrence for a murder charge to be lowered to a lesser offense to which probation could be given.

Defendant Jones testified that on about April 10, 1970, Fishman told him that Beranek had offered probation if he testified for the State. He further testified that on April 15 Beranek told him that if he testified he would get probation, or if he did not he could get 40 to 50 years; that Fishman had told him that day that the 'deal' was still on; and that he gave the statement because he did not want to go to the penitentiary for 40 to 50 years. On cross-examination he admitted that he was advised of his constitutional rights prior to making the statement and before his grand jury appearance.

The trial court found that Beranek's testimony showed a promise of...

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24 cases
  • People v. Boyd
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 11 Septiembre 1980
    ...to render a statement involuntary. People v. McCue (1977), 48 Ill.App.3d 41, 6 Ill.Dec. 125, 362 N.E.2d 760; People v. Jones (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 849, 291 N.E.2d 305. In the instant case, the evidence defendant presented did not rebut the police officer's testimony concerning the circumstan......
  • People v. Daniel, 1-91-0845
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 30 Septiembre 1992
    ...evidence as a whole shows that a statement was made voluntarily and is therefore admissible in evidence." (People v. James Jones (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 849, 853, 291 N.E.2d 305, 308.) It was within the province of the trial court to judge the credibility of defendant and the other witnesses. ......
  • People v. Rhonda F.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 20 Junio 1997
    ...562, 608 N.E.2d 635 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, 158 Ill.2d 260, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692 (1994); cf. People v. Jones, 8 Ill.App.3d 849, 852, 291 N.E.2d 305 (1972). In sum, the evidence shows that defendant was questioned during the middle of the day in the absence of a concerned......
  • People v. Sellars
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 27 Febrero 1981
    ...v. Peck (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 112, 309 N.E.2d 346 (promise to defendant he would be "cut loose" if he cooperated); People v. Jones (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 849, 291 N.E.2d 305.) The facts in the present case, at most, are that the police promised to advise the State's Attorney defendant coopera......
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