People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 22 May 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 93511.,93511. |
| Citation | 797 N.E.2d 640,207 Ill.2d 122,278 Ill.Dec. 45 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Esmon Vinci JONES, Appellant. |
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Jenifer L. Johnson, Keleigh L. Biggins, Assistant Defenders, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, Lawrence R. Fichter, State's Attorney, Decatur (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers, Lionel W. Weaver, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
The State charged defendant, Esmon Vinci Jones, with three counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), (b)(8), (b)(10) (West 2000)), one count of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2000)), and one count of mob action (720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(1) (West 2000)). A jury acquitted him of aggravated battery, convicted him of mob action, and could not reach a verdict on robbery. The circuit court of Macon County vacated the mob action conviction as inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals and set the case for retrial on the mob action and robbery counts. The case was assigned to a different trial judge, and defendant moved to bar further prosecution on collateral estoppel grounds. The circuit court denied defendant's motion and ruled that the previous judge had erred in setting aside the mob action conviction because the verdicts were not inconsistent. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. No. 4-01-0078 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.
Sixty-four-year-old Patricia Wheeler-Ward testified that, on May 21, 2000, she was walking home from a pub where she had been socializing. She was walking north on Van Dyke street when she noticed three men walking towards her. One of them, who was wearing a grey sweatshirt, separated from the group and said to her, "Know what we want?" Wheeler-Ward responded, The man who had spoken to her asked for her purse and tried to take it from her. Wheeler-Ward identified defendant as the person who had tried to take her purse.
Wheeler-Ward began to run away, and someone pushed her from behind. She fell forward on her face and hurt her knee. The man in the gray sweatshirt and one of the others tried to take her purse. The third one went through her pockets and then said, "Shut up bitch!" and hit her in the mouth. The men made off with her purse, and she later recovered it at the police station.
The defense did not deny that defendant was present when Wheeler-Ward was attacked, but denied that he was criminally responsible for the attack. Defendant's attorney impeached Wheeler-Ward with contradictory statements that she gave the police on the night of the attack. Additionally, defendant testified to his version of the incident in question. According to defendant, he was walking down Van Dyke Street with Demetrius Reed and Anthony Johnson, a/k/a Knockout. The three had met up earlier at an apartment complex. When they were on Van Dyke Street, defendant was on his way home, while the other two were going to a girl's house. At some point, defendant noticed an elderly woman walking towards them on the other side of the street. Reed and Knockout crossed the street and got behind her. They did not tell defendant what they were doing.
Knockout told the woman that they wanted her purse. She began to run, and Knockout shoved her in the back. Defendant claimed that he never touched her. He could see Knockout taking the purse away from her. When defendant saw what Reed and Knockout were doing, he tried to run away. Reed ran after him and tackled him to the ground. Reed had the victim's purse with him. Reed threw items out of the purse until he found the victim's wallet. Knockout caught up with defendant and Reed, and Reed and Knockout made defendant take some of the victim's money. Defendant did not take the money willingly. Reed and Knockout did not want defendant to tell what happened, so they threatened him with an "a-whipping" if he did not take some of the money. Defendant interpreted "a-whipping" as meaning that he would be beaten if he did not take some of the money. Defendant acknowledged that he was wearing a gray sweatshirt on the night in question. He explained that he ran from the police because he did not want to "go down" for something he did not do.
The jury convicted defendant of mob action and acquitted him on all three counts of aggravated battery. The jurors could not reach a verdict on the robbery charge. A few days later, following an oral motion by defendant, the trial court set aside the mob action conviction as inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals. The court entered an order stating that the cause was "realloted for pre-trial" on the mob action and robbery counts.
Defendant moved to bar reprosecution, arguing that the State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether defendant had used force against the victim. Defendant pointed out that the mob action and aggravated battery counts both alleged that he pushed and struck the victim. The robbery count alleged that he took the victim's purse by the use of force. Defendant argued that, because he was acquitted of pushing and striking the victim, the State was estopped from prosecuting him on the mob action count as it was also based on his pushing and striking the victim. Similarly, the State could not prosecute him for robbery predicated on the use of force because a jury had found that he did not push or strike the victim.
This motion was considered by a different trial judge, who ultimately ruled that the previous judge had erred in vacating the mob action conviction. The second judge found that the verdicts were not inconsistent. Mob action does not require the infliction of injury, and the allegations of infliction of injury in the mob action charge were surplusage. The jury was properly instructed on the essential elements of mob action. The court specifically found that "the verdicts were not legally inconsistent as the jury was instructed and would not have been legally inconsistent if the jury had been instructed with all elements in the information." Accordingly, the court ruled that collateral estoppel did not bar retrial.
Defendant appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(f)), and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the mob action conviction was not inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals. The court held that the essential elements of mob action and aggravated battery were different and that it was not inconsistent for the jury to acquit on one and convict on the other. According to the appellate court, the State would not have to prove on retrial that defendant pushed and struck Wheeler-Ward to obtain a mob action conviction. Although the court found that the first trial judge had erred in vacating the mob action conviction, the court found that it had no authority to reinstate the conviction because the appeal was from the grant of defendant's motion to bar retrial.
As to the robbery charge, the court noted that the elements of robbery and aggravated battery are different. To obtain a conviction on the robbery charge, the State would have to prove that defendant took property from Wheeler-Ward by the use of force. It would not be necessary for the State to relitigate the issue of whether defendant pushed or struck Wheeler-Ward. The testimony showed that Wheeler-Ward's purse was pulled from her by the use of force, and a robbery conviction could stand based on this use of force. Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not bar retrial on the robbery count either.
Defendant argues that the appellate court erred in holding that he could be retried on the mob action and the robbery counts. Defendant broadly asserts that the jury's acquittal on the aggravated battery counts shows that the jurors believed that he was not involved in the incident at all. More specifically, defendant contends that the mob action conviction was inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals because the aggravated battery and mob action counts all included allegations that defendant pushed and struck Wheeler-Ward. Considering the evidence before the jurors, their acquittal on the aggravated battery counts could have been based only on their belief that defendant did not push or strike Wheeler-Ward, and likewise he was not accountable for the actions of whoever did do so. Similarly, defendant contends that the jury's finding in this regard should prevent a retrial on the robbery charge, which would require the jury to find that defendant took property from Wheeler-Ward by the use of force.
The State responds that the mob action conviction was not inconsistent with the aggravated battery acquittals. Alternatively, the State contends that this court should overrule People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill.2d 270, 216 Ill.Dec. 813, 665 N.E.2d 1370 (1996), in which this court reaffirmed its view that inconsistent verdicts are unreliable and declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). The State argues that Powell supplies the better rule and that this court should follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court. As to the robbery count, the State contends that collateral estoppel does not bar retrial because the jury would not be asked to resolve an issue decided by the previous jury.
We agree with the State that we erred in Klingenberg when we declined to follow Powell. We thus do not need to reach the issue of whether the mob action conviction was inconsistent with the aggravated battery...
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