People v. Jones, 4-93-0523
| Citation | 647 N.E.2d 598,271 Ill.App.3d 264,207 Ill.Dec. 367 |
| Decision Date | 10 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-93-0523,4-93-0523 |
| Parties | , 207 Ill.Dec. 367 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Zettie JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Lawrence J. Essig, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Zettie Jones.
Michael D. Clary, State's Atty., Vermilion County Courthouse, Danville, Norbert J. Goetten, Director State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Leslie Hairston Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, for the People.
In March 1992, defendant, Zettie Jones, pleaded guilty to attempt (first degree murder) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, pars. 8-4, 9-1(a)), armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)), and aggravated battery with a firearm (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12-4.2). In September 1992, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years in prison on both the attempt (first degree murder) and armed robbery convictions and ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
In October 1992, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, and in January 1993, the trial court vacated defendant's sentence and resentenced him to 30 years in prison on the attempt (first degree murder) conviction. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the 30-year sentence for the attempt (first degree murder) conviction was excessive, and (2) the trial court improperly increased that sentence from 25 to 30 years in prison.
We affirm.
In September 1991, defendant robbed a service station, during which he shot and injured the store clerk. In March 1992, he pleaded guilty to three charges arising out of that robbery. The trial court accepted the plea and admonished him that the sentencing range for each count was 6 to 30 years in prison. In September 1992, the court entered judgments of conviction on the attempt (first degree murder) and armed robbery charges, finding that the aggravated battery with a firearm count merged with the attempt (first degree murder) conviction. The court then imposed consecutive sentences of 25 years in prison for the attempt (first degree murder) and armed robbery convictions.
Defendant subsequently filed motions to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider sentence, and in January 1993, the trial court held a hearing on both. At that hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, but allowed the motion to reconsider sentence because the court failed to admonish defendant as to the possibility of consecutive sentences when he pleaded guilty. The trial court then resentenced defendant to 30 years in prison on the attempt (first degree murder) conviction and vacated the armed robbery sentence.
In February 1993, defendant filed a supplemental motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that the 30-year sentence was excessive and improperly increased from the original 25-year sentence. In May 1993, the trial court considered this motion and denied it, specifically finding as follows:
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in increasing his sentence upon resentencing from 25 years to 30 years in prison for the attempt (first degree murder) conviction. We disagree.
The effect of defendant's initial sentence in September 1992 was--as the trial court intended--that he serve 50 years in prison. Upon resentencing, defendant received only 30 years in prison for the same criminal behavior. As a result, defendant's total sentence was significantly reduced. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in resentencing defendant. See People v. Todd (1994), 263 Ill.App.3d 435, 438, 200 Ill.Dec. 923, 925, 636 N.E.2d 114, 116 ().
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 30 years in prison for attempt (first degree murder), a Class X felony (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 8-4(c)(1)), the maximum permitted under section 5-8-1(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1992)). He contends that this sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion in light of his youth and "rehabilitative potential." He also argues that he was under the influence of drugs at the time he committed this offense and that others suggested he commit the crime. We disagree.
Defendant requests this court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4), to vacate the sentence imposed by the trial court and to resentence him to the minimum sentence permitted by law or some lesser sentence than that imposed by the trial court. (See 134 Ill.2d R. 615(b)(4).) In view of that request, we must determine whether Rule 615(b)(4) authorizes this court to act as defendant requests. For the reasons that follow, we hold that it does not.
Prior to 1963, courts of review lacked the power to modify a sentence imposed by the trial court. (See People v. Calhoun (1961), 22 Ill.2d 31, 36, 174 N.E.2d 166, 168.) The authority to do so was first conferred by section 121-9(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedural Code) (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 38, par. 121-9(4)). (People v. Ledferd (1968), 94 Ill.App.2d 74, 81, 236 N.E.2d 19, 23.) However, the 1964 amendment to the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 placed authority over appeals in the Supreme Court of Illinois. (See Ill. Const.1870, art. VI (1964), §§ 1 through 21.) In response, the supreme court in 1967 promulgated Rule 615 (see 36 Ill.2d R. 615), which makes clear that courts of review possess no inherent authority to modify a sentence imposed by a trial court and instead possess only such authority as Rule 615(b)(4) provides.
While Rule 615(b)(4) grants reviewing courts the power "to reduce a sentence" imposed by the trial court (People v. Tucker (1993), 245 Ill.App.3d 722, 726, 185 Ill.Dec. 580, 583, 614 N.E.2d 1265, 1268), it does not specify the scope of that power or the circumstances under which it can be exercised. In People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill.2d 149, 153, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 275, 368 N.E.2d 882, 883, the supreme court addressed the proper standard of review under--and scope of--Rule 615(b)(4).
In Perruquet, the trial court had sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term of one to 20 years in prison. On appeal, the appellate court invoked Rule 615(b)(4) and reduced the sentence to one to five years. In doing so, however, the appellate court failed to indicate how the trial court had erred and simply stated that after "carefully considering the seriousness of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, we believe the maximum sentence in this case should be reduced to five years." People v. Perruquet (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 543, 549, 355 N.E.2d 112, 117.
Pointing out that Rule 615(b)(4) does not specify the degree of deference to be accorded the trial court's judgment, the defendant argued before the supreme court that a court of review may exercise its authority under Rule 615(b)(4) even absent a finding the trial court abused its discretion. However, the supreme court rejected this argument and noted that "our decisions have firmly established that the imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion." (Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 153, 11 Ill.Dec. at 275, 368 N.E.2d at 883.) The supreme court held that before a reviewing court exercises its authority pursuant to Rule 615(b)(4), it must first conclude that the trial court's sentence constituted an abuse of discretion. Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154, 11 Ill.Dec. at 276, 368 N.E.2d at 884.
In explaining its decision, the court first observed that a well-reasoned judgment as to the proper sentence must be based upon the particular circumstances of each case. The supreme court held that such a judgment depends upon factors, including the defendant's credibility, demeanor, and general moral character, that the trial court, "in the course of the trial and the sentencing hearing, has an opportunity to consider * * * 'which is superior to that afforded by the cold record in this court.' " (Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154, 11 Ill.Dec. at 276, 368 N.E.2d at 884, quoting People v. Morgan (1974), 59 Ill.2d 276, 282, 319 N.E.2d 764, 768.) The court therefore held that "the trial court is normally the proper forum in which a suitable sentence is to be determined and the trial judge's decisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great deference and weight." Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154, 368, 11 Ill.Dec. at 276, N.E.2d at 884.
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People v. Christy, 4-93-1084
... ... If the sentence imposed is so out of proportion to the offense as to beget public indignation, it is counterproductive. We conclude that this sentence is in that category." Odom, 82 Ill.App.3d at 855, 38 Ill.Dec. at 211, 403 N.E.2d at 299 ... In People v. Jones, 271 Ill.App.3d 264, 265-75, 207 Ill.Dec. 367, 369-76, 647 N.E.2d 598, ... [208 Ill.Dec. 743] 600-07, this court considered the defendant's claim that his sentence of 30 years in prison for attempt (first degree murder) was excessive, and we reviewed at length the law applicable to such claims ... ...