People v. Jones
| Decision Date | 31 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-91-0169,3-91-0169 |
| Citation | 168 Ill.Dec. 779,226 Ill.App.3d 1054,590 N.E.2d 101 |
| Parties | , 168 Ill.Dec. 779 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Russell JONES, Defendant-Appellant. Third District |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Peter A. Carusona, Office of State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, Michael Phillips, Trial Counsel, for Russell Jones.
Gary F. Gnidovec, States' Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Edward Burmila, Jr., Will County State's Atty., Joliet, for the People.
A jury convicted the defendant, Russell Jones, of first degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1). He was thereafter sentenced[226 Ill.App.3d 1055] to 80 years of imprisonment. He appeals his sentence. We affirm.
The record shows that the defendant, a gang member, killed the victim in a drive-by shooting. At the sentencing hearing, it was established that in November of 1988 the defendant had pled guilty to the offense of aggravated battery. The aggravated battery conviction was based upon his causing bodily harm to an individual while armed with a handgun (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(1)). The victim of the aggravated battery suffered numerous lacerations to the front, back, and side of his head, as well as to his cheek.
Based on the 1988 conviction, the trial court found that the defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence in the case at hand. The court also found, as aggravating factors, that the defendant had a history of prior criminal activity, and that the sentence to be imposed was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. Therefore, the court sentenced the defendant to an extended-term sentence of 80 years.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an extended-term sentence. Specifically, he contends that his prior conviction for aggravated battery was not a forcible felony upon which the extended-term sentence could be based.
The statutory scheme under which the defendant was sentenced provides that a person convicted of first degree murder is eligible to be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment if he has been convicted within the past ten years, excluding time spent in custody, of any one of various offenses, including a "forcible felony" which was related to the activities of an organized gang. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005-5-3(c)(2)(J), 1005-5-3.2(b)(7).) "Forcible felony means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 2-8.
The defendant argues that by limiting aggravated batteries to those based on causing great bodily harm, the legislature intended to exclude all other types of aggravated battery convictions from being considered as a basis for imposing an extended-term sentence. As such, he contends that his aggravated battery conviction, which was based on harm occurring while using a deadly weapon, should not have been used to impose an extended-term sentence. We disagree.
A primary purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. In seeking the intent of the legislature the courts will not only consider the language used but also the evil to be remedied and the object to be obtained. People v. Dednam (1973), 55 Ill.2d 565, 304 N.E.2d 627.
Here, we do not think the legislature was concerned with the type of aggravated battery the defendant was charged with, but rather was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Harmon
...which the use of deadly force is justified, and argues that we should follow the holdings of these cases: People v. Jones, 226 Ill.App.3d 1054, 168 Ill.Dec. 779, 590 N.E.2d 101 (1992) ; People v. Hall, 291 Ill.App.3d 411, 225 Ill.Dec. 611, 683 N.E.2d 1274 (1997) ; and People v. Thomas, 407 ......
-
The People Of The State Of Ill. v. Schmidt
...is what the legislature intended, we would welcome further clarification by the legislature.” People v. Jones, 226 Ill.App.3d 1054, 1056, 168 Ill.Dec. 779, 590 N.E.2d 101 (1992).B. Felony Murder of Alexander Diaz Defendant alternatively argues that his conviction for first-degree murder sho......
-
U.S. ex rel. Hampton v. Detella
... ... See People v. Hampton, 249 Ill.App.3d 873, 189 Ill.Dec. 344, 620 N.E.2d 3 (1993) ... On remand, both defendants pled not guilty and ... ...
-
In Re Rodney S.
...batteries that result in great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement); compare People v. Jones, 226 Ill.App.3d 1054, 1056, 168 Ill.Dec. 779, 590 N.E.2d 101, 103 (1992) (Third District, holding that the legislature intended to include any aggravated battery in the definition of......