People v. Jones

• Docket Number: SC 164110,COA 353209
• Decision Date: 30 June 2023
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

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PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH LEE JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. SC 164110

COA 353209

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 30, 2023

Genesee CC: 19-045059-FH

Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice, Brian K. Zahra, David F Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Justices.

ORDER

On May 10, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the January 13, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).

This case raises important questions regarding when a criminal defendant is bound to a guilty or no-contest plea induced by a preliminary sentencing evaluation from a judge (often referred to as a "Cobbs evaluation" or a "preliminary evaluation"). People v Cobbs, 443 Mich. 276 (1993). As in the criminal justice system across the United States, the vast majority of Michigan's felony cases are resolved by a guilty or no-contest plea,^[1] and many of these pleas are induced by a sentencing agreement from the prosecutor or a preliminary evaluation from the judge.^[2] "A no-contest plea or a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights .... For a plea to constitute an effective waiver of these rights, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the plea be voluntary and knowing." People v Cole, 491 Mich. 325, 332-333 (2012).^[3] Given the prevalence of plea-bargaining and the practical significance of guilty pleas for defendants, victims, and the functioning of Michigan's criminal justice system, appropriate guardrails are critical to ensure fairness and transparency. Nonetheless, I concur in denying leave to appeal in this case because, assuming there was error, defendant is not entitled to the relief he seeks from this Court (resentencing consistent with the preliminary evaluation).

I write separately to emphasize that trial judges who provide a preliminary evaluation should clearly advise the defendant of what sentence or range of sentences that judge believes might be appropriate. Specifically, trial judges who provide a preliminary evaluation based on a defendant's correctly scored sentencing guidelines (1) should clearly communicate that any sentencing guidelines discussed at the plea hearing are a preliminary estimate and the final guidelines determined by the court at sentencing might differ, and (2) should avoid vague terms like the "low(er)/upper end" of the sentencing guidelines and instead provide a numerically quantifiable sentence term or range, such as the "lower/upper half" or "lower/upper quarter" of the sentencing guidelines. At a minimum, these are best practices to ensure that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters a plea. The failure to follow these practices should put trial and appellate courts on alert that a defendant may be entitled to plea withdrawal.

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLARITY IN COBBS EVALUATIONS

The Cobbs procedure is familiar to Michigan judges and criminal law practitioners. Under Cobbs, "a judge may state on the record [before accepting a guilty plea] the length of sentence that, on the basis of the information then available to the judge, appears to be appropriate for the charged offense." Cobbs, 443 Mich. at 283 (emphasis omitted).^[4] This preliminary evaluation can either be a "sentence to a specified term or within a specified range ...." MCR 6.310(B)(2)(b). A judge is not required to impose a sentence that is consistent with the preliminary evaluation. Cobbs, 443 Mich. at 283. "However, a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere in reliance upon a judge's preliminary evaluation with regard to an appropriate sentence has an absolute right to withdraw the plea if the judge later determines that the sentence must exceed the preliminary evaluation." Id.; see also MCR 6.310(B)(2)(b).

Although not explicitly stated in Cobbs, a defendant's right to plea withdrawal is clearly premised on principles of due process, which require that a decision to plead guilty be voluntary and knowing. Cf. People v Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 207-210 (1982) (holding that a guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial sentencing agreement or recommendation that the trial court declines to follow is not knowing or voluntary and therefore the defendant has a right to plea withdrawal).^[5] As this Court explained in the related context of prosecutorial sentencing recommendations:

Although the prosecutorial "recommendation" would seem to inform the defendant of the consequences of his plea-that the prosecutor is merely suggesting a sentence and that the judge is not bound to follow the recommendation-the truth is that most defendants rely on the prosecutor's ability to secure the sentence when offering a guilty plea. This is true even when the court specifically admonishes the defendant that it is not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. All disclaimers that the court is not bound are often viewed as ceremonial incantations....

. . . To most defendants, the distinction between a sentence agreement and a sentence recommendation is little more than a variation in nomenclature.

A full understanding of the consequences of a plea is impossible where the defendant, believing that he has negotiated a specific length of sentence, tenders his guilty plea, only to find that he is bound by the act of self-conviction, but the trial judge is free to impose any sentence within the statutory range. [Id. at 208-209.]

The concern that a defendant will be misled into pleading guilty is even greater in the Cobbs context, where the presiding judge is representing the sentence or range of sentences they believe may be warranted. See Cobbs, 443 Mich. at 281 ("The coercive potential of judicial involvement [in plea negotiations] is obvious, and stems from the overwhelmingly advantageous bargaining position of the judge."); Killebrew, 416 Mich. at 202 (noting the "potential coercive effect" where a judge is involved in the plea-bargaining process because "the judge wields the decisive sentencing power to which the defendant must submit"). A defendant's absolute right to plea withdrawal is one safeguard that mitigates the danger that judicial involvement in sentencing negotiations might violate due process by coercing or misleading a defendant into pleading guilty.

The concerns underlying the right to plea withdrawal underscore the importance of clearly communicating the preliminary evaluation. In justifying this limited judicial participation in sentencing discussions, this Court explained:

Coercion is avoided when a judge does not initiate a discussion of the sentence, and when a judge does not speculate on the sentencing consequences of future procedural contingencies. The judge's neutral and impartial role is enhanced when a judge provides a clear statement of information that is helpful to the parties.

The question for the judge is simply, "Knowing what you know today, what do you think the sentence would be if the defendant pled guilty, as charged?" Justice is advanced and not hindered when fair questions are answered honestly. [ Cobbs, 443 Mich. at 284 (emphasis added).]

In other words, a judge's participation in sentencing discussions is only legitimate if their communications are honest and clear. A defendant cannot make a truly knowing or voluntary decision to plead guilty if the plea is induced by a preliminary evaluation they do not understand.

In keeping with these principles, a trial judge must clearly communicate what sentence or range of sentences they are considering. As this Court explained in the context of an improper promise of leniency that induced a plea:

[T]he inquiry in these circumstances is not what an astute lawyer would take as the meaning of the words used. In this situation we do not require that the promise of leniency be established beyond any doubt whatever, or even beyond any reasonable doubt in the mind of one learned in the law and acquainted with judicial administration. The requirement is far less stringent: If the evidence establishes that the prosecutor or the judge has made a statement which fairly interpreted by the defendant (in our case of foreign extraction and with only an eighth-grade education, presumably in court for the first time) is a promise of leniency, and the assurance is unfulfilled, the plea may be withdrawn and the case proceed to trial. [In re Valle, 364 Mich. 471, 477-478 (1961).]

I believe this framework applies equally in the Cobbs context such that a defendant is entitled to plea withdrawal if, from that defendant's perspective, the sentence imposed is inconsistent with a "fair[] interpretation]" of the preliminary evaluation. Id. This framework avoids due-process problems by ensuring that a defendant is not bound unless they are "fully aware of all the consequences of [their] guilty plea." Killebrew, 416 Mich. at 210.

II. PRACTICES TO AVOID IN COMMUNICATING A COBBS EVALUATION

Trial courts often provide a preliminary evaluation that is a range of sentences within the defendant's sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., People v Price, 477 Mich. 1, 6 (2006) (addressing a preliminary evaluation for a sentence not to exceed the sentencing guidelines). This case exemplifies two potential pitfalls that trial judges in this situation should avoid to ensure they are clearly communicating their preliminary evaluation.

First trial courts should clearly explain that the evaluation is not based on the sentencing guidelines as calculated by the parties at the plea stage and that any guidelines range discussed at that stage is not final. ...