People v. Jordan
| Decision Date | 20 September 1984 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 58446,58464,58620,58626,s. 58446 |
| Citation | 82 Ill.Dec. 925,469 N.E.2d 569,103 Ill.2d 192 |
| Parties | , 82 Ill.Dec. 925 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Leamon JORDAN, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Gregory WOODS, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Anthony SPARKMAN, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Arvel ROWE, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Donna Hickstein-Foley, Asst. Public Defender, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Pamela A. Peters, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellant Jordan.
Steven Clark, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Michael J. Pelletier, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellate Woods and Sparkman.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago (Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael E. Shabat, Joan S. Cherry and Lawrence R. Stasica, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
These causes have been consolidated for purposes of appeal since each case asks the court to interpret section 5-8-2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)). The facts of the cases are adequately stated in the appellate court opinions and will be discussed here only to the extent necessary to resolve the issues presented.
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Leamon Jordan, was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of imprisonment of 60 years for felony murder by accountability, and 14 years for kidnaping, a Class 2 felony. The appellate court affirmed the judgments (114 Ill.App.3d 16, 69 Ill.Dec. 777, 448 N.E.2d 237) and we allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).
Defendant argues that the extended-term sentence for the lesser offense, kidnaping, was improper. In addition, he raises two other issues: (1) Did the trial court err in permitting forensic odontologists to testify as to the cause of death? (2) Did the State's failure to preserve the victim's jaw deny him due process?
The record shows that on February 26, 1980, approximately one year prior to defendant's arrest, the victim's skull and several bones were recovered by police investigators. These remains were taken to the Will County coroner, where an autopsy was performed. When the examination was completed, the skull, jaw, and bones were photographed. The remains were then returned to the victim's family in accordance with section 10.7 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to coroners" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 31, par. 10.7), which provides that, as soon as may be consistent with the performance of his duties, the coroner shall release the body of the decedent to the next of kin for burial. At the family's request, the remains were then cremated.
Defendant, in a pretrial motion, moved to exclude dental testimony regarding the cause of death. The basis of the motion was the conclusion of forensic odontologist, Dr. George Morgan, that examination of the victim's jaw revealed that the teeth appeared pink, indicating that the victim was strangled. Defendant argued that the "pink tooth theory" was too conjectural to be probative. He also moved to dismiss the cause against him because the State failed to preserve the jaw which, he claimed, denied him the right to independently examine and rebut the evidence.
At a hearing on defendant's motion, four forensic odontologists testified regarding the "pink tooth theory." The photographs of the victim's jaw were shown to each of the experts. Doctors George Morgan and Lester Luntz testified as experts for the State. Dr. Morgan indicated that he examined the jaw firsthand and that the teeth were actually "pinker" than depicted in the photographs. Both experts agreed that there are numerous causes of "pink teeth," one of which is strangulation. Although Dr. Morgan and Dr. Luntz agreed that forensic dentists were not qualified to determine the cause of death, they could conclude by process of elimination that, in this case, the victim's "pink teeth" were probably caused by strangulation.
Dr. Edward Pavlik, defendant's expert, opined that only one of the photographs showed a "pinkish" tinge. He listed several possible causes for "pink tooth," including vitamins, drowning, decomposition in an open environment, and strangulation. Dr. Pavlik testified that a forensic dentist could not determine the cause of death by examining only a jaw nor could a single probable cause of "pink tooth" be determined.
Dr. Donald Eugene Ore also testified for the defense. He stated that the color variation of the teeth from each photograph was "remarkable." He indicated that such a variance could be caused by distance, light, and the type of film used. Dr. Ore stated that it was possible that none of the photographs accurately depicted the color and that, in any case, he could not make an accurate determination of color because the photographs did not have a balance or color chart, which is routinely included in these types of photographs.
The trial judge denied the motion, holding that the inaccessibility of the physical evidence would not deny defendant the right to confrontation. He reasoned that the question was one of admissibility and that therefore, the test was whether the dental testimony would assist the trier of fact and whether the prejudicial effect outweighed the assistance to the trier of fact. He stated:
Evidence on this issue was introduced at trial through stipulation. In addition, Dr. Charles Warren, a forensic anthropologist; Dr. Rassmusen, assistant to Dr. Morgan; Lieutenant Coroner William Ferguson; and Deputies Nick Figarello and Patrick Barry each stipulated that they observed the skull firsthand and noted a pink color in the victim's teeth.
The court found defendant guilty of felony murder by accountability and kidnaping. After determining that each offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, it sentenced defendant to multiple extended-term sentences, to be served concurrently. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in imposing multiple extended-term sentences. 114 Ill.App.3d 16, 69 Ill.Dec. 777, 448 N.E.2d 237.
Defendants, Anthony Sparkman and Gregory Woods, were charged with the attempted murder, armed robbery, rape, and deviate sexual assault of R.L.; and the attempted murder and armed robbery of M.J., all of which are Class X felonies. We note that a codefendant, not involved in this appeal, Larue Norals, was also charged with the same offenses. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendants were convicted of all offenses. After finding each crime was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the court sentenced both defendants to extended-term sentences for each of their convictions. Specifically, each defendant was sentenced to 35 years for the attempted murder of M.J. and 35 years for the armed robbery of M.J., to be served concurrently. As to the offenses against R.L., they were each sentenced to 50 years for attempted murder, 50 years for armed robbery, 50 years for deviate sexual assault and 50 years for rape, to be served concurrently. In addition, the sentences relating to the M.J. convictions were to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed on the convictions relating to R.L. The appellate court, by order (87 Ill.2d R. 23), affirmed the judgments (113 Ill.App.3d 1165, 75 Ill.Dec. 381, 457 N.E.2d 171), and we granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).
Defendants argue that the imposition of an extended-term sentence for each of their convictions is not permissible. In the alternative, they maintain that the extended terms imposed for the armed robbery, rape and deviate sexual assault of R.L. are improper because those offenses were not accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior.
M.J. and R.L. testified as to the events which took place on April 17, 1980. At approximately 2 a.m. that morning, M.J. and R.L. went to M.J.'s apartment in Chicago. While the two women were in the hallway of the apartment building, they met Sparkman, Woods, and Norals. M.J. and R.L. walked towards M.J.'s apartment, and the three men followed. When they arrived at the apartment, Sparkman asked if they could come inside for a few minutes. Since M.J. had previously met both Sparkman and Norals, she agreed.
M.J. took her guests into the bedroom, the only furnished room in her apartment. The group sat talking and watching television for approximately one hour, after which M.J. asked the men to leave. She escorted them to the door and, at that time, Sparkman grabbed her by the neck and cut her throat with a knife. He then carried her back to the bedroom and dropped her on the floor. He removed and searched her clothing. Woods then...
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