People v. Joyce

• Decision Date: 12 October 1910
• Citation: 92 N.E. 607,246 Ill. 124
• Parties: PEOPLE v. JOYCE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

246 Ill. 124

92 N.E. 607

PEOPLE

v.JOYCE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 29, 1910.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1910.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; R. W. Clifford, Judge.

Joseph A. Joyce was convicted of forgery, and he brings error. Affirmed.Thos. D. Knight, Frank R. Reid, Elwood G. Godman, and Frank L. Hatch (John Byrne and Daniel J. Ward, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., Joel C. Fitch, and Charles E. Woodward (June C. Smith and Wells M. Cook, of counsel), for the People.

CARTER, J.

Plaintiff in error was convicted of the crime of forgery at the November term, 1907, of the criminal court of Cook county, and pursuant to the parole act of 1899, and its amendments, was sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary ‘until discharged by the state board of pardons, as authorized and directed by law, providing such term of imprisonment in the said penitentiary shall not exceed the maximum term for the crime for which the said defendant was convicted and sentenced.’ The record is brought here by writ of error for review.

Plaintiff in error has assigned as error on the record that the verdict, sentence, and commitment are void because the parole act, on which they are based, is unconstitutional and void. The grounds for claiming that the parole act is unconstitutional are that it contains, both in its title and body, more than one subject of legislation, in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution; that it makes appropriation for the salary of officers of the government, in violation of section 16 of article 4 of the Constitution; that it confers judicial powers on the board of pardons; that it violates the ‘due process of law’ clause of the Constitution and encroaches upon the Governor's constitutional powers to commute sentences. The parole act provides (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, pp. 796-799, c. 38, §§ 498-509) that in cases falling within its terms the convicted person shall be sentenced to the penitentiary, but the court shall not fix the term of such imprisonment, which shall not be less than one year nor greater than the maximum term provided by law for the crime of which the prisoner was convicted. It provides for a physical examination and collection and preservation of information in regard to the prisoner's antecedents and present condition. It imposes upon the prison authorities and the state board of pardons certain duties in regard to carrying the act into effect and authorizes the appointment of a parole agent for each of the penitentiaries. It fixes the salary of each parole agent at $1,500 per year, and allows to each member of the board of pardons $1,500 per year for services performed under the act. It provides that such sum shall be paid monthly in the case of parole agents, on the certificate of the board of penitentiary commissioners, and in the case of the board of pardons, on their own certificate, approved by the Governor.

The first parole act was passed in 1895. Laws 1895, p. 158. The constitutionality of this act was sustained in George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 47 N. E. 741. Counsel for the plaintiff in error insist that the present act includes three subjects in both its title and body, viz., the sentence and commitment of prisoners convicted of crime, a system of parole, and compensation for the officers of said system of parole. The general subject dealt with by the act is the manner of carrying into effect the punishment, provided by law, of persons convicted of certain offenses. All of its provisions relate to that subject and are reasonably connected therewith. The principal purpose of the act is to provide a system of parole. Every act must embrace but a single subject, but it may include other provisions which are not foreign to the general subject and legitimately tend to accomplish the legislative purpose with reference to that general subject. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82;Meul v. People, 198 Ill. 258, 64 N. E. 1106;Town of Manchester v. People, 178 Ill. 285, 52 N. E. 964. The act embraces and is concerned with but one subject, viz., the establishment of a system of parole, and the various provisions of the act are connected with and are in furtherance of that subject. The act is not, therefore, in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution.

It is further insisted that the act is in contravention of section 16 of article 4 of the Constitution. That section provides, in part, that the General Assembly ‘shall make no appropriation of money out of the treasury in any private law,’ and that bills making appropriations for the pay of members and officers of the General Assembly and for the salaries of the officers of the government ‘shall contain no provision on any other subject.’ The manifest object of this provision is to separate legislation from appropriation, in order that no officer's salary shall depend upon legislation and no legislation upon the salary of any officer. The ninth and eleventh sections of the parole act fix the salaries of the parole agents and board of pardons, and provide that they shall be paid out of ‘any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.’ It is contended by plaintiff in error that these provisions of sections 9 and 11 are appropriations of money, and therefore in contravention of said section 16 of article 4. It is insisted, however, by counsel for the state that the parts of the act making appropriations for the salary of parole agents and board of pardons are separable from the other provisions of the act, and therefore, even if it be conceded that they make appropriations, they do not render the whole act invalid. Counsel for plaintiff in error reply that, even if this be true, the constitutional prohibition against the inclusion of more than one subject of legislative action applies not only to the act itself but to the title; that when two subjects are mentioned in the title, as well as in the body of the act, the whole act will be void, it being impossible to choose between the subjects and hold one valid and the other void.

Does the title contain two subjects? The act is entitled ‘An act to revise the law in relation to the sentence and commitment of persons convicted of crime, and providing for a system of parole, and to provide compensation for the officers of said system of parole.’ In determining whether this title contains two subjects the meaning of the word ‘provide’ is of controlling importance. Counsel for the state argue that the word ‘provide,’ as used in this title, is synonymous with the word ‘fix’ or ‘establish,’ while counsel for plaintiff in error insist that the usual meaning of the word ‘provide’ is that of ‘supplying’ or ‘furnishing.’ The title must be construed with reference to the language used in it alone, and not in the light of what the body of the act contains. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454,29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315. If ‘provide’ can in this connection be held to mean ‘fix,’ ‘establish,’ ‘determine’ or ‘settle,’ then the clause, ‘to provide compensation for the officers of said system of parole,’ should be construed to mean to fix or determine the compensation of such officers. Webster's New International Dictionary gives as one of the definitions of ‘provide’: ‘To establish as a previous condition, as the contract provides that the work be well done.’ In the Standard Dictionary it is defined: ‘To grant, lay down or stipulate as a condition or provision, as, the contract or statute provided that a certain thing shall be done.’ It is impossible to lay down or establish anything as determining the status or rights of a person without thereby fixing or establishing that thing. The use of the word ‘provide’ or ‘provided’ in the sense of ‘fix’ or ‘establish’ is common. It is used in that sense in the following sections of the Constitution of 1870: Section 13, art. 5; section 20, art. 5; section 7, art. 6; section 12, art. 6; section 16, art. 6; section 21, art. 6; section 28, art. 6; section 32, art. 6; section 4, art. 8; section 6, art. 10; section 11, art. 10; section 13, art. 11; section 3, art. 12; section 21 of schedule. The word ‘provide’ is often used in our statutes in the sense of ‘fix’ or ‘establish.’ See Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 53, § 3, p. 1072; chapter 53, § 7, p. 1073; chapter 53, § 11, p. 1077; chapter 53, § 60b, p. 1100. None of the dictionaries give ‘appropriate’ as a synonym for ‘provide,’ while Fallows on Synonyms and Antonyms gives ‘appropriate’ as an antonym of ‘provide.’

A legislative act providing money is one thing and a legislative act appropriating money is quite a different thing. A legislative appropriation does not provide money, but takes effect upon money already provided. The word ‘provide’ may have the meaning contended for by either counsel, but the universal rule is that when a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it unconstitutional and another construction equally reasonable which will sustain its constitutionality, that construction which will sustain it must be adopted. 1 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. §§ 83-127; 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) p. 640; State v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 104 Tenn. 715, 59 S. W. 1033,78 Am. St. Rep. 941. The presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. The courts will approach the question of the invalidity of the act with great caution, and will never declare it void unless satisfied, beyond all reasonable doubt, of its invalidity. People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217;People v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N. E. 599,40 L. R. A. 770. It must be presumed that the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its action in the passage of this act; that it knew it could not lawfully put a provision for an appropriation either in the title or the body of the act; that it knew to do so would render the whole act invalid. Su...