People v. Juniel, Docket No. 19860
Decision Date | 21 July 1975 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 19860 |
Citation | 233 N.W.2d 635,62 Mich.App. 529 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bessey Mae JUNIEL, Defendant-Appellant. 62 Mich.App. 529, 233 N.W.2d 635 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[62 MICHAPP 531] H. Rhett Pinsky, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James K. Miller, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Johnston, III, Chief Appellate Atty., Grand Rapids, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McGREGOR, P.J., and D. E. HOLBROOK and KAUFMAN, JJ.
On January 31, 1974, defendant was convicted of manslaughter, M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553, by a Kent County Circuit Court jury. She was sentenced to a term of 2 to 15 years and now appeals by right.
At trial, the three arresting officers testified that they went to defendant's house in response to a phone call from an individual who stated that a shooting had taken place there. Arriving at defendant's house, one of the officers, James Kuipers, went up to the front porch where he saw defendant[62 MICHAPP 532] standing with a rifle in her hand. He asked her if she had called the police. She responded, . The defendant then handed Officer Kuipers the rifle, two .22-caliber bullets and one spent cartridge. The officer proceeded to examine the porch for traces of blood or a struggle, but found none. Officer Kuipers then asked the defendant if she thought she had hit the victim. She said, 'Yes, I hope so'.
Another officer searched the vicinity of the house, and found the victim, John LaGrone, lying dead in the back yard. After the body was discovered, Officer Kuipers informed the defendant that she was under arrest and advised her of her Miranda 1 rights. Three or four minutes later, without further advising the defendant of her Miranda rights, Officer Horlings took an official statement from the defendant.
The victim, John LaGrone, had fathered an illegitimate child by defendant's daughter, Verna. At trial, several witnesses testified that LaGrone had, prior to his death, beaten Verna on several occasions, some of which occurred during her pregnancy. Because of this and other reasons, defendant had months earlier told the victim that he would not be allowed in defendant's house. It was shown that LaGrone had assaulted defendant's daughter three days before the alleged murder.
Defendant testified that, on the evening of the shooting, she was in the living room when she heard the victim come to the front door and talk to Verna through the screen door. She then went into the kitchen from which she heard her daughter[62 MICHAPP 533] and LaGrone begin to argue. When she heard a 'noise at the door like a scuffle' and the door slam, defendant went to get a rifle which she kept in a downstairs bedroom. She took the rifle and three shells and went into the living room. At that point, she saw Verna running away from the door and LaGrone standing at the front door. LaGrone had opened the front door, but the inside screen door was still closed. Defendant was pointing the rifle at the front door, and, when LaGrone began to enter the house, she fired it at him. He fell onto the gun barrel and then ran out of the house.
Robert Long, Jr., the son of the defendant, and Hunter Sykes, a nephew of the defendant, arrived at the defendant's home about the time that LaGrone was shot. Long testified at trial that the screen door was open and that LaGrone was partially inside when he heard the shot. Long further testified that, before he heard the shot fired, he heard the victim and the defendant speaking in low voices. Then he heard the gunshot and saw the defendant with the gun.
At trial, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the testimony of Robert Long, Jr. by means of a prior inconsistent statement. Defense counsel requested that the trial judge give a cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the purpose for which the impeachment could be used. The trial judge gave an instruction concerning the evidentiary value of the prior inconsistent statement. He also gave an additional instruction concerning the evidentiary value of the prior inconsistent statement in his charge to the jury before jury deliberation.
Before trial, a Walker 2 hearing was held on a [62 MICHAPP 534] defense motion to exclude the statements made by the defendant to Officer Kuipers prior to his advising defendant of her Miranda rights. The trial judge heard testimony and denied that motion. At trial, the court granted defendant a directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge.
On appeal, defendant raises four claims of error. First, defendant contends that the trial court's Walker hearing decision to admit the statements made by defendant prior to the giving of her Miranda rights was erroneous. In reviewing a trial court's Walker hearing decision, this Court is required to examine the record and make an independent determination of the voluntariness of the challenged statements, People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 557, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972), People v. Summers, 15 Mich.App. 346, 348, 166 N.W.2d 672 (1968). Having done so, we find that the trial court correctly admitted the challenged statements. An individual must be given the Miranda warnings at that point when the police investigation has passed from the investigatory to the accusatory stage. People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 357, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975), People v. Wasson, 31 Mich.App. 638, 642, 188 N.W.2d 55, 57 (1971). The crucial factor in determining if the investigation has become accusatory is whether at the time the challenged statements are made, asking if she had called the police. This was a volunteered statement prior to accusation, not within the Miranda rule, People v. Walsh, 27 Mich.App. 100, 105, 183 N.W.2d 360 [62 MICHAPP 535] (1970). When defendant stated that she hoped she had hit the individual, Officer Kuipers was still attempting to determine if such a shooting had occurred. He had not found any blood or signs of a struggle to verify such a crime, and LaGrone's body had not yet been found. The officer's question was prompted by defendant's own volunteered statement and was properly deemed admissible, People v. Leffew, 58 Mich.App. 533, 536, 228 N.W.2d 449 (1975).
Second, defendant contends that the district court judge abused his discretion in binding her over for trial on an open charge of murder. Defendant argues that the district court judge erroneously found that that was probable cause that the murder was premeditated and, thus, that defendant could be charged with murder in the first degree.
A magistrate's determination of probable cause will not be upset on appeal except in a case of a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Paille #2, 383 Mich. 621, 627, 178 N.W.2d 465 (1970), People v. Stinson, 58 Mich.App. 243, 259, 227 N.W.2d 303 (1975). To constitute murder in the first degree, the killing must have been 'deliberate and premeditated', M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, that is, characterized by:
'* * * a thought process undisturbed by hot blood. While the minimum time necessary to exercise this process is incapable of exact determination, the interval between initial thought and ultimate action should be long enough to afford a reasonable man time to subject the nature of his response to a 'second look."
People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.App. 301, 329--330, 187 N.W.2d 434, 449 (1971), Lv. den. 385 Mich. 775 (1971). See [62 MICHAPP 536] also People v. Vail, 393 Mich. 460, 227 N.W.2d 535 (1975).
In making a probable cause showing before the magistrate, proof of the corpus delicti of first-degree murder must be demonstrated Aliunde a defendant's confession, and the confession is inadmissible until the corpus delicti is shown, People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973), adopting dissent by Levin, J., in People v. Allen, 39 Mich.App. 483, 197 N.W.2d 874 (1972). Cf. People v. Sparks, 53 Mich.App. 452, 220 N.W.2d 153 (1974). 3 This rule applies to preliminary examinations. People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). People v. Randall, 42 Mich.App. 187, 201 N.W.2d 292 (1972). The corpus delicti is established when:
'* * * the people have introduced evidence from which the trier of fact may reasonably find that acts constituting All the essential elements of the offense have been committed and that someone's criminality was responsible for the commission of those acts.' (Emphasis in original.)
People v. Allen, 39 Mich.App. 483, 496, 197 N.W.2d 874, 881 (1972). Cf. People v. Meyer, 46 Mich.App. 357, 208 N.W.2d 230 (1973). 4 This Court has held that [62 MICHAPP 537] certain types of nonconfession statements, while classified as admissions, may be used to establish the corpus delicti: a statement itself an element of the offense, an excited utterance, a statement made before the crime's commission, a statement made contemporaneously with the...
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