People v. Kahler
| Decision Date | 02 December 1892 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. KAHLER. |
Error to circuit court, Hillsdale county; VICTOR H. LANE, Judge.
John Kahler was convicted of unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor, and brings error. Reversed.
Charles A. Shepard, for appellant.
A A. Ellis, Atty. Gen., and Spencer D. Bishopp Pros. Atty., for the People.
Respondent was convicted of selling liquor to a minor. In the complaint made to the justice the name of the county was left blank in the venue, but the complaint was made before a justice of the peace in the city of Hillsdale, and alleged the offense to have been committed in that city. Respondent relies upon People v. Gregory, 30 Mich. 371, but in that case there was the further objection that no mention was made of the year in which the offense was committed. In the later case of People v. Telford, 56 Mich. 541, 23 N.W 213, the court held that courts take judicial notice of municipalities within their jurisdiction, and that the justice was warranted in taking such notice that the village of Dansville was in Ingham county. In each of those cases the offense was triable by the justice. When a criminal complaint concerns an offense triable by a justice of the peace, the statute requires that it shall be in writing, and it must set forth and describe the alleged offense fully and correctly and must contain all the essentials of an information. But in a complaint not triable by a justice no such formality or particularity is necessary. In such case the statute does not require either the complaint or the examination of the complainant or the witnesses produced by him to be reduced to writing. People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 119; People v. Lynch, 29 Mich. 298. The examination which precedes the arrest is not even confined to any particular offense. As is said in Turner v. People, 33 Mich. 363, the law does not assume that the complaint must fix and control the after-proceedings. The examination, which immediately follows, and is required as a consequence of the complaint, is the proceeding which the statute looks upon as the one to guide the magistrate in deciding whether the warrant should issue, and for what. So far the proceeding is ex parte. The information is not predicated upon the complaint or the examination upon which the warrant issues, but it is presumed to have been framed with reference to the facts disclosed at the examination, which succeeds the arrest. The objections to the complaint were therefore without force. The warrant, in describing the offense, alleged that respondent "did then and there unlawfully sell, furnish, and deliver to one Albert R. Rogers, who was then and there a minor under the age of twenty-one years, to wit, of the age of eleven years, a large quantity of, to wit, spirituous liquors, to wit, beer." It is insisted that the material fact to be proved was the sale of spirituous and intoxicating liquors to a minor, and that the warrant is bad because of the use of the videlicet preceding the word "spirituous." This is a pure technicality. The offense need not be stated as in an indictment. It is enough if the warrant informs the accused of the nature of the accusation, if it recites the substance of the offense, and describes it with such certainty as to show that it is within the jurisdiction of the officer to take bail. Haskins v. Ralston, 69 Mich. 63, 37 N.W. 45.
Dr Werner, a physician, was called for the defense, and testified that he had been called by the boy's mother to visit him while he was recovering from the effects of the beer; that his mother told him that she had been in the habit of sending the boy to get beer when she had a hard washing to do; that she claimed that the boy got the beer on the south side of the railroad; that he saw the boy the next morning; that he asked the boy where he got the beer, and he said, "At a saloon on the south side of the railroad;" that respondent's saloon is on the north side. The first question asked upon cross-examination was: "You are in the habit of drinking, are you not?" This question was objected to as incompetent and irrelevant. The objection was overruled, and an exception taken. One O'Mara, called for the defense, stated that the boy's mother had pointed out the pail that the boy had, and said that she had smelled of it, and it smelled like cider; that he, the witness, had smelled of it, and that he couldn't say what had been in it. On cross-examination, the first question asked was: The boy had testified that respondent in person sold him the beer. Respondent was sworn in his own behalf. He denied that he had sold the boy the beer; said that he had a talk with the boy, and that the boy claimed that the bartender let him have the beer. In presenting the case to the jury the prosecuting attorney, referring to respondent, said: Counsel for respondent excepted. By the Prosecuting Attorney: "I have a right to reply, and state my theory of how much his evidence may be believed, or any other means." Counsel for respondent excepted. By the Court: ...
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