People v. Kaiser

• Decision Date: 15 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01SA58.,01SA58.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Angela KAISER, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

32 P.3d 480

484 Colo. 2001

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Angela KAISER, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 01SA58.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

October 15, 2001.

David J. Thomas, District Attorney, First Judicial District, Donna Skinner Reed, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Golden, CO, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Cynthia Sheehan, Denver, CO, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2000),¹ the People seek reversal of the trial court's suppression of statements made by Defendant to police during two interviews on February 4, 2000 and one interview on February 5, 2000. With respect to the first and second interviews on February 4, 2000, the trial court ruled that although Defendant voluntarily waived her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), she did not do so knowingly and intelligently. In addition, the trial court found that although the February 5, 2001 interview was otherwise lawful, it had been tainted by the unlawful interviews of February 4. Accordingly, the trial court suppressed all statements made by Defendant to police during these interviews.

The record does not support the trial court's finding that Defendant's waiver of her Miranda rights was not knowing and intelligent. Instead, we find that the record demonstrates that Defendant understood both the nature of her rights and the consequences of her waiver. Because we find that the questioning during the first and second interviews was lawful, we also hold that the third interview on February 5 was not tainted by a prior illegality. We therefore reverse the suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged with sexual exploitation of a child, § 18-6-403(3)(b), 6 C.R.S. (2000), sexual assault on a child, § 18-3-405(1), 6 C.R.S. (2000), and second degree sexual assault, § 18-3-403(1) 6 C.R.S. (2000). These charges arose out of a police search involving a co-defendant of Defendant, Timothy Stead, on February 4, 2000. During this search, police uncovered photographs depicting Defendant having sexual relations with a teenage boy. Later that day, three police officers visited Defendant's home to speak with her about the pictures. The officers were aware that Defendant is considered developmentally delayed. When Defendant answered the door, police officer Walt Parsons identified himself and the other officers, and Defendant invited them into her apartment. After Officer Parsons informed Defendant that he wished to talk to her about Timothy Stead, Defendant admitted to being in Stead's apartment; however, she denied observing Stead engage in sexual relations with children in his apartment. Officer Parsons showed Defendant the photographs found at Stead's apartment and orally advised Defendant of her Miranda rights. Parsons testified that he explained to Defendant that the "right to remain silent" means Defendant "didn't have to say anything." Defendant told the officers that she understood her rights, admitted that she was the person in the pictures, said she had witnessed Stead give underage boys alcohol and drugs for the photographs that were taken, and made other incriminating statements.

After the interview, Defendant was taken to a police station to be fingerprinted and photographed. While at the station, Officer Marcie Vermilye questioned Defendant a second time. Officer Vermilye gave Defendant a second Miranda advisement, which she read from a form. Defendant initialed each specific Miranda warning on the form. During this interview, Defendant again confessed. After being detained at the police station for about an hour, Defendant was driven home. On February 5, police uncovered photographs depicting Defendant having sexual relations with a second teenage boy. In order to follow up on this new information, Officer Vermilye visited Defendant's home. During the course of this third interview, Officer Vermilye did not read Defendant her Miranda rights. Again, Defendant made incriminating statements.

At trial, Defendant pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the statements she had made to police during the interviews on February 4 and February 5. At the suppression hearing, the state presented testimony from the police officers involved in the questioning of Defendant. Defendant presented expert testimony from a licensed psychologist regarding Defendant's mental condition. The expert testified that because of Defendant's mild mental retardation,² Defendant struggles with abstract concepts and tends to be acquiescent to authority figures. She also testified that Defendant has sufficient cognitive skills and abilities to live on her own, although at a marginal level, to make some daily living decisions for herself, and to lie or cover up wrongdoing. After a suppression hearing, the trial court issued a written order granting Defendant's motion, holding that Defendant's statements on February 4 were not knowing and intelligent and that the February 5 statements were tainted by this previous illegality. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court engages in both fact-finding and law application when it rules on a motion to suppress a confession or inculpatory statement. People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991) (citing People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo.1987)). In reviewing suppression appeals, we grant deference to a trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Colo.2000); People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo.1987) (trial court's findings of fact will not be overturned if supported by competent evidence in the record). Where, however, findings of fact are clearly erroneous or not supported by the record, we set them aside. People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 158 (Colo.1999); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo. 1991) (reversing a suppression order after ruling that the trial court's findings were not supported by competent evidence in the record). Thus, both a trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard in resolving a suppression motion and a trial court's ultimate legal conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported by evidentiary findings is subject to correction on review. Id.

We conclude that the trial court's ruling is not supported by the record and that Defendant's understanding of her rights and the consequences of relinquishing those rights was sufficient to make her waiver knowing and intelligent.

B. WAIVER OF MIRANDA RIGHTS

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court formulated procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the accused, including the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that where a person is subjected to police interrogation while in custody,³ the police must make an advisement regarding the accused's rights prior to questioning.⁴ Id. at 467, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602. If police fail to make this advisement prior to questioning, the court must exclude the defendant's statements from evidence in the prosecution's case. Id.; Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Once a person has been properly and timely informed of his Miranda rights, however, he may choose to waive them and make a statement to police. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,86 S.Ct. 1602. The validity of a defendant's waiver involves a two-part inquiry. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). The waiver must have been made: (1) voluntarily, "in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception;" and (2) the waiver must have been made knowingly and intelligently. Id. In this case, the issue of the voluntariness of Defendant's waiver is not before us.⁵ The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's waiver was invalid because it was not knowingly and intelligently made.

We have previously held that it is the prosecution's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1993)(citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). This determination, moreover, requires a finding that the person was "fully aware of the nature of the right to remain silent ... and the consequences of abandoning that right." Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984; accord People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo.1993)

.

The trial court must consider the waiver based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation. Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984; May, 859 P.2d at 883; People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo.1989) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) and Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)); (People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d 770, 775 (Colo. 1983)). We have previously held that simply because the defendant's decision to talk to the police might be ill-advised does not mean that the defendant's decision was not knowing and intelligent. People v. Jordan, 891 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Colo.1995). The police are not required to tell the defendant that it might be against his self-interest to confess to the police. Id.

In analyzing the totality of the circumstances, factors to consider include, but are not limited to: the time interval between the initial Miranda advisement and any subsequent interrogation; whether the defendant or the interrogating officer initiated the interview; whether and to what...