People v. Karriker

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Pollak
• Citation: People v. Karriker, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412, 149 Cal.App.4th 763 (Cal. App. 2007)
• Decision Date: 11 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. A114099.,A114099.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Michael KARRIKER, Defendant and Respondent; Jo Weber, as Public Conservator, etc., Objector and Appellant.

57 Cal.Rptr.3d 412

149 Cal.App.4th 763

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Michael KARRIKER, Defendant and Respondent Jo Weber, as Public Conservator, etc., Objector and Appellant.

No. A114099.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3.

April 11, 2007.

As Modified April 20, 2007.

No appearance for plaintiff and respondent.

Matthew Zwerling, Jeremy Price, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and respondent.

Jennifer B. Henning, Calif. State Assoc. of Counties, for amicus curiae for California State Association of Counties and the California Association of Public Admimstrators, Public Guardians, and Public Conservators on behalf of appellants.

Steven M. Woodside, County Counsel, William L. Adams, Deputy County Counsel, for objector and appellant.

POLLAK, J.

The Sonoma County Public Conservator (the Conservator) appeals from an order entered in criminal proceedings directing her to file a petition to establish a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare and Institutions Code sections 5000 et seq. (the LPS Act or Act),¹ for an incompetent defendant. The Conservator contends that while the court is authorized to refer the defendant to her office for a conservatorship investigation, the court lacks jurisdiction to order her to file the petition if, as occurred here, she determines that the individual does not meet the requirements for a conservatorship under the Act. We agree with the Conservator and shall reverse the trial court's order.

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 13, 2004, then 45-year-old James Michael Karriker was charged by complaint with one felony count of making a criminal threat (Pen.Code, § 422) and one misdemeanor count of battery (Pen. Code, § 242), apparently arising out of a dispute with his mother. Doubts concerning Karriker's competency to stand trial having arisen prior to the preliminary hearing, the court appointed Dr. John Watts Podboy to examine Karriker pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Dr. Podboy reported to the court that Karriker was "most assuredly not competent to stand trial" and that "it appears as though it would be a difficult matter to restore this individual to competence." On May 12, 2004, the court found Karriker mentally incompetent to stand trial and suspended the criminal proceedings. Karriker was committed to the Napa State Hospital "for care and treatment ... until he becomes mentally competent and able to assist in his own defense, with a maximum term of 3 (three) years," which is the maximum period of confinement permissible under the criminal competency statute.

On October 27, 2005, staff at the Napa State Hospital reported that "Mr. Karriker continues to manifest a mental illness, which would interfere with his ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner." The report advised that "there is no substantial likelihood that he will regain mental competence in the foreseeable future" and recommended that the defendant "be placed on an LPS Conservatorship as [he is] still not competent and [is] gravely disabled pursuant to Section 5350 of the Welfare and Institutions Code."

On November 28, 2005, the court ordered defendant to be examined by the Conservator. Pursuant to the court's order, Karriker was examined by a psychiatrist. Based on the psychiatrist's report, the Conservator concluded that there was "insufficient evidence to justify filing a petition for LPS conservatorship for Mr. Karriker. Currently he does not present as gravely disabled. The undersigned's conclusion is based on the lack of evidence that Mr. Karriker is unable to provide for his basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter as a result of a mental disorder or that he is presently unable or unwilling to accept treatment voluntarily." The Conservator explained that according to the investigating psychiatrist, "Mr. Karriker suffers from Amnestic Disorder due to a head injury and chronic alcoholism and alcohol dependence." The doctor found "no evidence of psychosis and [Mr. Karriker] does not have a primary psychiatric illness at this time." Finally, the letter states that the matter had "been referred to the Public Guardian program to determine if Mr. Karriker's situation is appropriate for a probate conservatorship." A subsequent letter to the court from the Office of the Public Guardian explains that because defendant suffers from alcohol-induced dementia he would require placement in a secured skilled nursing facility, but that neither of the two facilities contacted by the office had a bed available for Medi-Cal patients. The letter concludes that "[i]n the absence of an appropriate setting to meet Mr. Karriker's needs, establishment of a probate conservatorship would be inappropriate."

On March 13, 2006, Karriker filed a motion requesting the court to order the Conservator to file a petition to establish an LPS conservatorship. Karriker contended that based on the plain language of Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (c)(2), the court could order the Conservator to file the petition if it determined that he appears gravely disabled. In response, the Conservator argued that the court's authority is limited to requiring an evaluation of the defendant by the Conservator to determine the suitability of an LPS conservatorship. The ultimate decision to file a petition requesting conservatorship, she argued below and reasserts here, is vested in her sole discretion.

At the hearing, the court expressed its concern that if the Conservator refused to file a petition under the LPS Act and Karriker was not returned to competency before expiration of his three year commitment to the state hospital, the criminal proceedings would be dismissed and he would be "free to wander the streets with unresolved criminal matters, matters in which he threatened the life of other people." The Conservator acknowledged this concern but explained that a "conservatorship is not a mechanism for keeping dangerous people off the streets. The point of [the] conservatorship is to take care of people who can't take care of themselves. [¶] ... [¶] We just don't believe it's appropriate to place someone in an institute for mental disease perhaps ... for their lifetime when they can't be treated there." The Conservator suggested that the proper solution for Karriker because of his dementia would be a less-restrictive Probate Code conservatorship and placement in a secure skilled nursing facility.

On April 14, 2006, the court issued an order and statement of decision. The court explained, "The Public Conservator argues that Mr. Karriker does not qualify for LPS ... Conservatorship. If he could not be placed in some type of conservatorship, the court would be placed in a very peculiar position. It appears to be undisputed that Mr. Karriker suffers, at the very least, from alcohol-related dementia and is in need of a probate conservatorship in a `secured perimeter' facility. Unfortunately since there is none available, the probate conservator refuses to act. Assuming that Mr. Karriker is not conservatorized then since he clearly remains incompetent to stand trial, he must be released from any facility at the end of 3 years. His felony charges remain unresolved and he is virtually free to roam the streets and commit new felonies with the assurance that he cannot be tried. Such a state of affairs cannot be the intention of the Legislature." The court acknowledged that there may be conflicting evidence regarding whether Karriker meets the criteria for conservatorship under the LPS Act, but concluded that "[i]t is not the conservator's duty to be the final arbiter of the defendants or society's status and needs. That is a job for a judge who is able to dispassionately review the conflicting evidence and decide the case." Accordingly, the court directed the Conservator to file a petition to establish an LPS conservatorship for Karriker. The Conservator filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

1. Appealability of the Order

Initially, Karriker contends that this appeal should be dismissed because the trial court's order is not appealable. "`A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.' [Citations.] `A trial court's order is appealable when it is made so by statute.' [Citation.] `The theory is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.'" (Conlan v. Shewry (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1365, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 667.)

The trial court here noted, correctly we believe, that Karriker's motion to compel the Conservator to file a petition under the LPS Act was "in effect a request for review by mandate" of the Conservator's refusal to file the petition. The trial court treated the motion as such and ordered the Conservator to file the petition. A judgment granting a petition for writ of mandate is a final judgment appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). (E.g., Alliance for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 128, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 249.) The court's order is not interlocutory. The order finally disposes of the single issue raised in what the trial court treated as a petition for a writ of mandate—whether to require the Conservator to file the petition. Although compliance with the order would lead to conservatorship proceedings and a determination as to whether Karriker is conservable— which order would be final and appealable—the issue of whether Karriker should be conserved is in a real sense collateral to the question resolved by the present order. A determination that Karriker is not conservable, as the Conservator argues, would not vindicate her position that the court has no authority to...