People v. Karst, Docket No. 71415

• Decision Date: 07 January 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 71415
• Citation: 138 Mich.App. 413,360 N.W.2d 206
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Roger KARST, Defendant-Appellant. 138 Mich.App. 413, 360 N.W.2d 206
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 206

360 N.W.2d 206

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Danny Roger KARST, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 71415.

138 Mich.App. 413, 360 N.W.2d 206

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 11, 1984.

Decided Oct. 16, 1984.

Released for Publication Jan. 7, 1985.

[138 MICHAPP 414] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Frank R. Del Vero, Pros. Atty., and Daniel J. Garber, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

David M. Hartsook, Brighton, for defendant-appellant.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and MacKENZIE and BANKS ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit a larceny, M.C.L. Sec. 750.110; M.S.A. Sec. 28.305. Defendant's conviction rested on the prosecution theory that defendant acted as the driver of the getaway car for two other men who actually committed the offense and that defendant was therefore guilty of the offense as an aider and abettor under M.C.L. Sec. 767.39; M.S.A. Sec. 28.979.

[138 MICHAPP 415] To be convicted as an aider and abettor, the defendant either must have intended that the offense be committed or had knowledge that his coparticipant(s) had the requisite intent. People v. Karst, 118 Mich.App. 34, 39, 324 N.W.2d 526 (1982). If the offense is a specific intent crime, then the defendant either must have possessed the requisite specific intent or must have known his coparticipant(s) possessed the requisite intent. Breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit a larceny is a specific intent crime. People v. Blankenship, 108 Mich.App. 794, 798, 310 N.W.2d 880 (1981), lv. den. 412 Mich. 857 (1981).

At the trial, defendant raised the defense of voluntary intoxication. On appeal, defendant claims that the court erred in instructing the jury, over defendant's objection, that even if they found that defendant did not himself possess the requisite specific intent because of his intoxicated state, defendant could still be convicted as an aider and abettor if they found that defendant had knowledge that his coparticipants possessed the requisite specific intent and that "voluntary intoxication or drunkenness is not a defense to the crime of aiding and abetting with knowledge of the coparticipants' intent". We hold this instruction was proper.

There are two alternative types of aiding and abetting--one where the aider and abettor himself possesses the requisite intent and the other where the defendant has knowledge that his coparticipants possess the requisite intent. In other words, a finding of intent on the part of the defendant is not required for conviction as an aider and abettor if the prosecution in the alternative proves that the defendant acted with knowledge that his coparticipants possessed the requisite intent. People v. Olszewski, 119 Mich.App. 455, 459, 326 N.W.2d 394 (1982). Where the offense is a specific intent crime, [138 MICHAPP 416] as here, voluntary intoxication of the defendant would be a defense to the first type, aiding and abetting with intent. However, we agree with the trial court that voluntary intoxication of the defendant is not a defense to the second type, aiding and abetting with knowledge, because this knowledge element is only a general intent, not a specific intent, requirement.

In other cases, this Court has reasoned that where the knowledge element of an offense is necessary simply to prevent innocent acts from constituting crimes, the knowledge element is merely a general intent requirement and the offense is not a specific intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense. People v. Watts, 133 Mich.App. 80, 83, 348 N.W.2d 39 (1984); People v. Lane, 102 Mich.App. 11, 14-15, 300 N.W.2d 717 (1980). Applying that rationale to the present...