People v. Keizer

• Decision Date: 08 April 2003
• Citation: 100 N.Y.2d 114,790 N.E.2d 1149,760 N.Y.S.2d 720
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. MORGAN KEIZER, Appellant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. JOHNNIE PITTMAN, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

100 N.Y.2d 114

790 N.E.2d 1149

760 N.Y.S.2d 720

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. MORGAN KEIZER, Appellant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, v. JOHNNIE PITTMAN, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued February 20, 2003.

Decided April 8, 2003.

Legal Aid Society, New York City (Lawrence T. Hausman, Andrew C. Fine and Rosali Vazquez of counsel), for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Carol A. Remer-Smith and Gina Mignola of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action. Francis D. Phillips, II, District Attorney, Goshen (Andrew R. Kass of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Legal Aid Society, Goshen (Steven Brockett of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Chief Judge KAYE and Judges CIPARICK, WESLEY, ROSENBLATT, GRAFFEO and READ concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, J.

The issue common to both appeals is whether there is a jurisdictional defect that can be raised following defendants' pleas. In both cases, we conclude that there was no jurisdictional defect, and that defendants forfeited their claims by their pleas.

I.

People v Keizer

Defendant Morgan Keizer was charged by misdemeanor complaint with petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree after he allegedly attempted to leave a Barnes & Noble bookstore with two books that he had not purchased. The complaint was supported by an affidavit, in which a bookstore security guard averred that he had seen defendant steal the property. At arraignment before Criminal Court, defendant sought and was permitted to plead guilty to disorderly conduct in exchange for a sentence of a conditional discharge and two days of community service. Thereafter, defendant appealed, arguing that the plea was jurisdictionally defective because he pleaded to an offense that was neither charged in the complaint nor constituted a lesser included offense of the offenses charged.

Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The court reasoned that Criminal Court had correctly accepted defendant's plea to disorderly conduct, a violation of a lesser degree than the theft related misdemeanor charges. The court noted that the plea was voluntary and further determined that the plea was not inconsistent with the statutory rationale limiting guilty pleas to actual lesser included offenses or to crimes akin to such lesser included offenses. A Judge of this Court granted leave.

On this appeal, defendant argues that Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction to convict defendant on his plea of disorderly conduct because this offense was neither charged in the complaint nor included as a lesser included offense for purposes of plea bargaining. We disagree and affirm the order of Appellate Term.

A trial court's jurisdiction to commence a criminal action is obtained in the case of a misdemeanor offense by means of a complaint. "A `misdemeanor complaint' is a verified written accusation by a person, filed with a local criminal court, charging one or more other persons with the commission of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor and none of which is a felony" (see CPL 100.10 [4]).¹ A misdemeanor complaint may serve as the basis for prosecution where the defendant has waived prosecution by information. There is no dispute in the present case that the complaint was valid and that defendant waived prosecution by information and a formal allocution. The court thus had jurisdiction over defendant.

A court's authority to accept a plea agreement is a different matter, and that authority is conferred by statute and common law. Section 220.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that "[t]he only kinds of pleas which may be entered to an indictment are those specified in this section." Section 340.20 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that to the extent practicable, article 220 also governs the ability to enter a plea to a misdemeanor complaint or information.

A court's authority to accept a plea is additionally necessitated by specific policy goals. Plea bargaining is a valued component of the criminal justice system and when properly administered, can benefit both parties and save valuable judicial resources (see People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227 [1974], cert denied 419 US 1122 [1975]). A guilty plea, moreover, generally marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation (see People v Taylor, 65 NY2d 1, 5 [1985]).

In People v Ford (62 NY2d 275 [1984]), defendant was convicted after trial of a lesser offense that was not charged in the indictment or a lesser-included offense. Our Court addressed whether a jurisdictional defect arose based on the trial court's power under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution to try actions upon grand jury indictment (see People v Iannone, 45 NY2d 589, 593-595 [1978]). We concluded that "[a]n error by the trial court in submitting or considering a lesser crime arising out of the same transaction that is not a lesser included offense does not affect that court's competence to entertain the action or to convict of that crime, but only its authority to enter a judgment on the merits against defendant on that specific charge in particular facts of that case. Such an error is not jurisdictional" (62 NY2d at 282-283).²

Subsequently, in People v Johnson (89 NY2d 905, 907 [1996]), we considered the implications of article I, § 6 in the context of guilty pleas. We concluded that a jurisdictional defect was implicated when the defendant pleaded guilty to charges equal to or higher than those for which he was indicted. We have long acknowledged that the protection of article I, § 6 "is not a limitation directed to the courts, but rather to the State, and its function is to prevent prosecutorial excess by ensuring that `before an individual may be publicly accused of crime and put to the onerous task of defending himself from such accusations, the State must convince a Grand Jury composed of the accused's peers that there exists sufficient evidence and legal reason to believe the accused guilty'" (Ford, 62 NY2d at 282, quoting People v Iannone, 45 NY2d at 594). Thus, any attempt to abrogate that restriction through the plea process raises fundamental jurisdictional issues. A prosecutor cannot bring an indictment or felony complaint and then attempt to avoid the protections of article I, § 6 by soliciting a plea to alleged criminal activity that has no common element (in law or fact) to the crimes alleged in the indictment or felony complaint.

By contrast, the present case concerns misdemeanors, jurisdiction over which is grounded in the Criminal Procedure Law (see People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99-100 [1977]). The specific constitutional limitations, and their underlying policies, that restrict the plea process for felony charges are not present here. The question now before us is whether Criminal Court's jurisdiction, validly established, was subsequently abrogated by acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense not charged in the complaint. It was not.

We see no constitutional impediment to the plea. Nor, in the circumstances alleged here, was there any statutory noncompliance rising to the level of a jurisdictional defect (cf. People v Harper, 37 NY2d 96 [1975]) thwarting defendant's plea to a lesser crime not included in the accusatory instrument. Any claim of error that the disposition was not statutorily authorized is thus forfeited by his guilty plea.

II.

People v Pittman

Defendant Johnnie Pittman was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. In the accusatory instrument, the officer averred as follows:

"THE FACTS OF WHICH THIS ACCUSATION IS MADE ARE

OF MY OWN KNOWLEDGE [AND] ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF * * *.

"A. Of my own knowledge

"A person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree when he/she knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance.

"B. On information and belief

"The defendant, JOHNNIE PITTMAN, at 143 NORTH MILLER STREET in the City of Newburgh, County of Orange, New York on or about 12/23/99 at 11:22 AM, did knowingly and unlawfully possess a controlled substance, specifically CRACK-COCAINE; in that the defendant did knowingly and unlawfully possess in his left hand one plastic baggie containing an off white rock like substance which field tested positive for the presence of cocaine.

"This information is based on your deponent's direct observations and investigations as a police officer."

The officer's field test affidavit supported the information. The report stated that a test was conducted at 55 Broadway at 11:45 A.M., and that the substance tested was found to be cocaine, weighing .4 gram.

Defendant moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 170.30 (1); 170.35 and 100.40 (1). Specifically, defendant alleged:

"The accusatory instrument lodged against the defendant consists of a complaint signed by a police officer based on `my own [k]nowledge and o[n] information and belief.' It is impossible to determine which part of the allegations, if any, is based on the complain[an]t's own knowledge and which part is based on information and belief. While a complaint may be based on either personal knowledge or information and belief, a perfected information, by its very nature, must be based solely on personal knowledge. Compare C.P.L. Section 100.15 with C.P.L. Section 100.40 (1) (c)."

City Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the information, stating that it was insufficient on its face because it set forth only boilerplate conclusions. Thereafter, the court asked the People if they had an offer to convey. The People offered defendant a plea to disorderly conduct³ and payment of a fine. Defendant accepted the bargain. Defendant was convicted on his plea of disorderly...