People v. Keta

• Decision Date: 19 February 1991
• Citation: 567 N.Y.S.2d 738,165 A.D.2d 172
• Parties: , 59 USLW 2574 The PEOPLE, etc., appellant, v. George KETA, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 738

567 N.Y.S.2d 738

165 A.D.2d 172, 59 USLW 2574

The PEOPLE, etc., appellant, v. George KETA, respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Feb. 19, 1991.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Michael O'Brien, of counsel), for appellant.

Mahler & Harris, P.C., Kew Gardens (Stephen R. Mahler, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and BROWN, KOOPER, HARWOOD and MILLER, JJ.

KOOPER, Justice.

The issue before us is whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a), having previously withstood challenge on Federal constitutional grounds, is nevertheless unconstitutional under NY Constitution, article I, § 12. We conclude that it is not, and reverse the order appealed from.

I.

On February 17, 1988, at approximately 3:30 P.M., Police Officer Robert Baumert and other police officers arrived at the Jimmy-Son vehicle dismantling yard, which was owned by the defendant, George Keta. Officer Baumert, a member of the Automobile Crime Division of the New York City Police Department, testified that the defendant's yard, together with another nearby establishment, had been randomly selected for inspection that day. According to Officer Baumert, he and other members of the inspection team walked into the office, identified themselves as police officers and announced that they were present to perform an administrative inspection. Upon the officers' request, the defendant produced various New York City permits and his vehicle dismantler's license. The officers recorded the license and permit numbers and then entered the yard, randomly selecting vehicle identification numbers from several parts on the premises which were located in open sheds covered from above but with no doors or siding. After entering the numbers into a computer located in their patrol car, the officers discovered that some of the parts were from automobiles which had been reported stolen.

Since it was "not uncommon" to receive a "hit" on an automobile part (i.e., to learn that the part has been reported as stolen), Officer Baumert and a fellow officer returned to the office and requested that the defendant produce his so-called "police book", in which entries relating to the purchase of a vehicle part must be recorded by a vehicle dismantler pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a). ¹ After ascertaining that the defendant's "police book" did not contain the required entries pertaining to the stolen parts, the defendant was placed under arrest. Later that evening, Officer Baumert obtained a search warrant, and upon executing the warrant, discovered some 35 stolen automobile parts in the yard. The defendant was thereafter charged, inter alia, with criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree grand larceny and falsifying business records in the second and third degrees.

II.

The hearing court subsequently granted the defendant's motion to suppress, determining that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) was violative of NY Constitution, article I, § 12. The hearing court observed that in People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 493 N.E.2d 926, revd New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, the Court of Appeals struck down Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) on Federal constitutional grounds. In striking down the statute, the Court of Appeals determined that, while Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) permissibly authorized "inspectors to make unannounced visits to regulated premises to examine books and records" (People v. Burger, supra, 67 N.Y.2d at 344, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 493 N.E.2d 926) it nevertheless failed to satisfy the constitutional requisites for a valid comprehensive regulatory scheme since the statute permitted searches "notwithstanding the absence of any records against which the findings of such a search could be compared" (People v. Burger, supra, at 345, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 493 N.E.2d 926). The Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he fundamental defect [of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) ] * * * is that [it] authoriz[es] searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme" (People v. Burger, supra, at 344, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 493 N.E.2d 926). ²

In reversing the Court of Appeals' holding, the United States Supreme Court focused on the Court of Appeals' concern that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) was merely an expedient means of enforcing penal, rather than administrative violations, by observing that, "a State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions" (New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at 691, 712, 107 S.Ct., at 2649). The Supreme Court further explained that, "[a]dministrative statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and prescribe different methods of addressing the problem" (New York v. Burger, supra, at 712, 107 S.Ct., at 2649). The court found that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) served the legitimate regulatory goal of ensuring that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate businessmen and that the parts which they sell can be traced and identified (see, New York v. Burger, supra, at 714-715, 107 S.Ct., at 2650-2651). The statute was not unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reasoned, merely because its administrative objectives may coincide with those sought to be achieved by penal statutes or because in permissibly administering the regulatory scheme, an officer may uncover violations of the Penal Law (see, New York v. Burger, supra, at 716, 107 S.Ct., at 2651). The Supreme Court further determined that the vehicle dismantling business had been subjected to "pervasive" regulation (see, New York v. Burger, supra, at 702, 107 S.Ct., at 2643), and thereafter held that: (1) a substantial governmental interest "inform[ed] the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made" (New York v. Burger, supra, at 702, 107 S.Ct., at 2643), (2) the warrantless inspections were necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and (3) the statute reasonably limited

the discretion of the inspectors in time, place and scope (see, New York v. Burger, supra, at 709-714, 107 S.Ct., at 2647-2650). Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the warrantless inspection of commercial premises authorized under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

In considering the application of the identically-worded provision of the New York State Constitution, the hearing court declined to adopt the Supreme Court's holding in the Burger case. In support of its determination that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 415-a(5)(a) was violative of the New York State Constitution, the hearing court reasoned, inter alia, that in the past, the Court of Appeals had demonstrated its inclination to expand the right of citizens by "relying on State, rather than on more narrowly interpreted Federal grounds" (People v. Keta, 142 Misc.2d 986, 994, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417, Friedmann, J.), and that such an expansive interpretation was appropriate under the circumstances presented here. 142 Misc.2d 986, 538 N.Y.S.2d 417. We disagree and find no constitutional infirmity in the challenged statute.

III.

As a threshold matter, the hearing court's holding with respect to the scope of the State Constitution impinges upon the policy and rule-making function traditionally perceived as the exclusive domain of the Court of Appeals (see generally, Hopkins, The Role of An Intermediate Appellate Court, 41 Brooklyn L.Rev. 459, 460 [1974-75]. Where, as here, "noninterpretative", State-wide policy considerations govern, in part, any inquiry into the existence of enhanced protection by the State Constitution (see, People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375, 379, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 515 N.E.2d 898), we must temper our actions with restraint in deference to the Court of Appeals' role as the State's policy-making tribunal. This is particularly so where the hearing court discerns in the State Constitution rights which we ourselves have twice declined to recognize when examining the statute under the identically-worded provision of the Federal Constitution ( see, People v. Burger, 112 A.D.2d 1046, 493 N.Y.S.2d 34, revd. 67 N.Y.2d 338, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 493 N.E.2d 926, revd sub nom New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601; People v. Cusumano, 108 A.D.2d 752, 484 N.Y.S.2d 909). In short, the Court of Appeals is best suited to effectively weigh the policy concerns which must be considered in order to determine whether the recognition of a separate right under the State Constitution is, in fact, required.

IV.

Turning to the substantive issue at hand, a review of relevant holdings by the Court of Appeals discloses that a determination to depart from a recently-enunciated Federal constitutional standard is cautiously undertaken (see, People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 557, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 523 N.E.2d 291), and only after serious consideration of the competing interests involved. Although the court has, in the past, construed the New York State Constitution as providing greater protections than those afforded by the Federal Constitution (see, e.g., People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388, 564 N.E.2d 1054; People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555 N.E.2d 915; People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796, 543 N.E.2d 61; People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556, cert. denied 479 U.S. 1091, 107 S.Ct. 1301, 94 L.Ed.2d 156; Matter of Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford Union Free School Dist., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325), it does not "disregard the Supreme Court's decisions merely because it disagrees with them or dislikes the result reached" (People v. Vilardi, supra, 76 N.Y.2d at 80, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 555...