People v. Kibler

• Decision Date: 01 July 1887
• Citation: 106 N.Y. 321,12 N.E. 795
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KIBLER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

106 N.Y. 321

12 N.E. 795

PEOPLE

v.KIBLER.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 1, 1887.

Indictment for selling adulterated milk. The opinion states the case.

Giles Stilwell, for appellant.

Geo. T. Quinby, for respondent.

FINCH, J.

The appellant was convicted for selling adulterated milk under the provisions of chapter 183, Laws 1885, as amended by chapter 458 of that year. Section 1 provides that ‘no person or persons shall sell or exchange, or expose for sale or exchange, any unclean, impure, unhealthy, adulterated, or unwholesome milk.’ It was proved that one Vandenburg, on August 25, 1885, purchased at defendant's store one pint of milk, which was shown by a chemical analysis to have contained 89.04 per cent. of fluids and 7.78 per cent. of milk solids, and so, falling below the standard fixed by the act, came within its definition of adulterated milk. There was no dispute about these facts; but the contention of the defendant is that he was not allowed to show an absence of criminal intent, or go to the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was condemned under a charge which made his intent totally immaterial, and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article whether he knew it or not, and however carefully he had sought to keep on hand and sell the genuine article.

As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. That conclusion was necessarily involved in our decision of People v. Cipperly, 101 N. Y. 634, 4 N. E. Rep. 107, and 37 Hun, 323. On the trial of that case the question was directly presented. While the principal defense was the invalidity of the statute upon constiutional grounds, and that branch of the contest dwarfed all others in the discussion, it was nevertheless true that the defendant, by offers of evidence and exceptions to rulings and to the charge, insisted that there could be no conviction without proof of a criminal intent, and that he should be permitted to establish an innocent purpose. The point was presented at general term. If well taken, it was ground for a reversal; but, while that tribunal disagreed upon the constitutional question, it indicated no doubt about the other. The majority, who thought the law invalid, construed it as requiring a conviction upon proof of the sale of milk below the standard, ‘right or wrong,’ and said expressly that ‘the testimony that tended to show that he was careful, honest, and innocent in this transaction ought to have been considered, and, if believed, ought to have resulted in his acquittal; but under this statute such evidence can have no weight.’ The justice who dissented held that the law was constitutional, and the conviction should be affirmed,-a conclusion which he could not have reached if the question of intent had been erroneously excluded. That dissenting opinion we adopted on the appeal to this court, and, reversing the general term, affirmed the conviction. The wisdom or prudence of the law is not here in question. If there was any reasonable ground to doubt its meaning in the face of its plain language, that doubt was largely founded upon a possible inference from the terms of section 14 of the act of 1884, (chapter 202,) which made the prohibited omissions or commissions ‘presumptive evidence...