People v. Kidd
| Decision Date | 20 November 1947 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 30376,30377.,s. 30376 |
| Citation | 75 N.E.2d 851,398 Ill. 405 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. KIDD et al. SAME v. SWANK et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Stark County; John T. Culbertson, judge.
Quo warranto proceedings by State's Attorney of Stark County, one against individuals acting as members of the Board of Education of Toulon Community Consolidated District No. 31 and the other against individuals acting as members of the Board of Education of West Jersey Community Consolidated School District No. 5, questioning legality of the districts and rights of defendants to hold their offices. From judgments dismissing complaints, the People appeal.
Judgments affirmed.
L. M. Burkey, State's Atty., of Toulon, and Gregg A. Young and James B. Young, both of Kewanee, for appellant.
Brian & Wilson and J. E. Richards, all of Toulon, for appellees.
The State's Attorney of Stark County, on June 28, 1947, of his own accord, and not at the instance of any relator, filed two quo warranto proceedings in the circuit court of Stark County, one against the individuals acting as members of the board of education of Toulon Community Consolidated School District No. 31 and the other against the individuals acting as members of the board of education of West Jersey Community Consolidated School District No. 5. The complaints questioned the legality of the districts and the rights of the defendants to hold their offices. The defendants answered, denying generally the charges of usurpation and setting up the defense of res judicata. The answer also alleged that on July 1, 1947, the district was validated by the legislature. The People made a motion in each case to strike the answer, which motion was overruled by the court, except as to the general denial; and upon election of the People to abide by the motion, the complaints were dismissed. Appeals from both judgments were taken and the cases are here consolidated. The issues are identical and the allegations in each answer are substantially the same.
The pleadings disclose that within a short time after the organization of the district an action of quo warranto was instituted in the circuit court of Stark County in the name of the People by the State's Attorney, upon the relation of an individual voter, resident and taxpayer in the district, against the defendants, for the purpose of questioning the legality of the district and the right of the defendants to hold office as members of the board of education. An answer was interposed, setting out the organization of the district and alleging the election and qualification of the defendants as members of the school board, after its organization. Upon a hearing, the circuit court, on June 24, 1946, entered judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the district was legally organized and that the defendants were lawfully elected and entitled to hold office as members of the board of education. It is this judgment, holding the district legal and valid, which is relied upon by appellees as res judicata. The validity of the district, appellees claim, is not now open to question in this suit. To this contention appellant replies that there is a distinction between the former suit which was brought by the People on the relation of an individual and the present suit brought only on behalf of the public. It is further claimed that the points here raised upon which the legality of the district is attacked were ignored and not determined by the trial judge in the former case, and therefore the decision in the first quo warranto case cannot now be considered as red judicata.
Appellant's attack upon the legality of the districts is based in this case upon the theory that the elections, at which the proposition for the establishment of a community consolidated school district were voted upon, were void because the ballots used at such election did not have on the back thereof an official certificate of authentication bearing a facsimile of the signature of the county superintendent of schools, and as to the election as which the organization of Toulon Community Consolidated School District No. 31 was voted upon, that it was also void for the further reason that the county superintendent did not establish voting precincts and fix the boundaries thereof, as required by the statute. Appellant expressly states that there is no claim of any fraud or mischievous conduct in connection with the elections and that none was charged or proved in the former cases, but insists that the authentication of the ballots by a facsimile of the signature of the county superintendent of schools and the fixing by the superintendent of precinct boundaries are so essential, that in the absence thereof the election and all proceedings had as a result of such election are necessarily void.
The doctrine of res judicata, briefly stated, is that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. Harding Co. v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N.E. 152, 88 A.L.R. 563; 30 Am.Jur. 914, sec. 172. The doctrine of res judicata, in all cases where the second suit is upon the same cause of action and between the same parties or their privies as the former action, extends not only to the questions actually litigated and decided, but to all grounds of recovery or defense which might have been presented. Normal State Bank v. Killian, 386 Ill. 449, 54 N.E.2d 539;Barry v. Common-wealth Edison Co., 374 Ill. 473, 29 N.E.2d 1014;Harding Co. v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N.E. 152, 88 A.L.R. 563. When a former adjudication is relied upon as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the only questions to be determined are whether the cause of action is the same in both proceedings, whether the two actions are between the same parties or their privies, whether the former adjudication was a final judgment or decree upon the merits, and whether it was within the jurisdiction of the court rendering it.
Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine a cause. It is the power conferred by law to hear and determine controversies concerning certain subjects between parties who are properly before ...
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...to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408, 75 N.E.2d 851). Rotogravure Serv. v. R.W. Borrowdale Co., 77 Ill.App.3d 518, 524, 32 Ill.Dec. 762, 767, 395 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (1978) (......
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Kirk v. Board of Educ. of Bremen Community High School Dist., No. 228, Cook County, Ill.
...actually litigated and decided, but to all grounds of recovery or defense which might have been presented. People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 75 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (1947) (citations Thus, for res judicata to apply, there must be an identity of the cause of action in the two actions, and a final ......
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Mustfov v. Rice
...or defense which might have been presented. Kirk v. Board of Education, 811 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir.1987) (citing People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 75 N.E.2d 851, 853-54 (1947)). Thus, the doctrine of res judicata will bar all grounds of recovery or defenses that might have been presented. Becau......
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