People v. Kilborn

Decision Date22 May 1970
Docket NumberCr. 3796
Citation7 Cal.App.3d 998,87 Cal.Rptr. 189
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Scott KILBORN, Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION

AULT, Associate Justice.

By information, Appellant James Scott Kilborn was charged in Count I with possession of restricted dangerous drugs (Health & Saf. Code, sec. 11910), in Count II with possession of restricted dangerous drugs for sale (Health & Saf. Code, sec. 11911) and in Count III with transporting restricted dangerous drugs (Health & Saf. Code, sec. 11912). He entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and was convicted by a jury of all three counts. The trial judge sentenced him to prison for the term prescribed by law on each count and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Kilborn appeals from the judgment of conviction.

On March 10, 1969, at approximately 6 p.m., the San Diego County Sheriff's Office was notified Kilborn had been robbed in the back county area of San Diego and taken to Alpine where he was without transportation. We was picked up by a deputy sheriff and driven to the sheriff's substation in El Cajon. There he reported he had been robbed of more than $7,000 by two men from whom he had arranged to buy marijuana. He revealed he had flown from Seattle to San Diego a week earlier and purchased 30 kilos of marijuana from the same two men. On March 10, he had again flown to San Diego, rented a car and had registered at the Travelodge Motel located at 10th & 'A' Streets in San Diego. That afternoon he cashed a $7,000 cashier's check at the main office of the Bank of America and made contact by telephone with the two men, whom he identified as Terry and Mike. They came to the motel to meet Kilborn, stated it was a bad place to deliver the marijuana, but would take him to their place in the country to get it. He went with them in Terry's car to the rural area near Alpine where, at gun point, he was relieved of his wallet containing in excess of $7,000. He was later given a ride to Alpine by a passerby, who telephoned the sheriff's office.

Kilborn was questioned in the sheriff's substation for over an hour. At approximately 8:30 p.m., at his request, he was taken by two deputy sheriffs from El Cajon to his motel room in San Diego. They had been instructed by a superior officer to search the room for narcotics. The deputies entered the room, which had been left unlocked, with Kilborn. With his consent, they searched the room and its contents. Kilborn had brought three empty footlockers from Seattle in which to return the marijuana he hoped to buy. Nothing was found in the footlockers. However, when his small personal suitcase was opened, it contained a small box. The officer asked appellant if he might open the box and examine the contents. Appellant indicated he might do so, stating he had never seen the box before and that it had not been in his suitcase when he left the motel. When the deputy opened the box, he found two plastic bags which contained 196 pills. These later proved to be LSD. The officer asked Kilborn what the pills were, and he answered they 'looked like LSD.' He explained he knew nothing about the pills which were found, but they looked similar to LSD pills he had purchased another time in San Francisco. Appellant was then arrested and advised of his constitutional rights as required by Miranda. The charges filed against appellant all related to the LSD tablets found in his motel room.

Except for the transportation count, which will be discussed later, appellant makes no contention the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment. He claims the trial court erred in receiving into evidence his damaging statements to the police, admitting his serious involvement with narcotics, because he had not been advised of his constitutional rights under Miranda at the time he made them. We need not reach or discuss the contention on the merits. No objection was made to the statements at trial on Miranda, or other, grounds. The objection is deemed to have been waived, and appellant is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. (People v. Black, 260 Cal.App.2d 646, 648, 67 Cal.Rptr. 360; People v. Brown, 271 Cal.App.2d 391, 395--396, 76 Cal.Rptr. 568; In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 462, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296.)

Appellant's contention the trial court erred in admitting into evidence his statement the pills 'looked like LSD' before the prosecution established the corpus delicti of the crimes charged against him, is likewise without merit. Order of proof is a matter within the trial court's discretion (Evid.Code, sec. 320), and while it is better practice to require prima facie proof of the corpus delicti before admissions are received, failure to do so is not ground for reversal unless it clearly appears the defendant is prejudiced thereby. (People v. Bianchino, 5 Cal.App. 633, 637--638, 91 P. 112; People v. Hudson, 139 Cal.App. 543, 545, 34 P.2d 741.) In the instant case, the only proof lacking to establish the corpus delicti of the crimes of possession and possession for sale, when appellant's admission was received, was proof the pills were in fact LSD. That was supplied later by the uncontradicted testimony of a competent chemist. The variation in the order of proof cannot be said to have prejudiced appellant in any manner. Furthermore, ...

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  • People v. Ormiston, A094813.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 2003
    ......Meza (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1741, 1746 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 844]; see also People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal. App.4th 1313, 1315-1316 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 907].) "The crux of the crime of transporting is movement of the contraband from one place to another." ( People v. Kilborn (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003 [87 Cal.Rptr. 189]; see also People v. LaCross, supra, at p. 185, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 802; People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387, 398 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 415].) . 105 Cal.App.4th 683 .         The evidence indisputably establishes the movement of ......
  • People v. Nix, B200437 (Cal. App. 6/18/2008)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • June 18, 2008
    ...387, 398; People v. Emmal (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1318-1319; People v. Cortez (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 994, 998-999; People v. Kilborn (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003.) Here, defendant drove across the parking lot of the motel, turned onto 139th Street, and then on to Normandie Avenue. A rea......
  • People v. Penkov
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • August 22, 2011
    ...1741, 1746.) "The crux of the crime of transporting is movement of the contraband from one place to another." (People v. Kilborn (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003 (Kilborn); People v. LaCross (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 182, 185.) Here, defendant's cousin Vlasenko testified during the defense case. T......
  • People v. Hughes
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 1995
    ...P.2d 738.) "The crux of the crime of transporting is movement of the contraband from one place to another." (People v. Kilborn (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 998, 1003, 87 Cal.Rptr. 189.) Possession of contraband is not evidence of transportation. The prosecutor must show that contraband was moved fro......
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