People v. King

Decision Date28 March 2011
Docket NumberNo. 109581.,109581.
Citation350 Ill.Dec. 528,948 N.E.2d 1035,241 Ill.2d 374
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,v.Ricky KING, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

241 Ill.2d 374
948 N.E.2d 1035
350 Ill.Dec.
528

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Ricky KING, Appellee.

No. 109581.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 21, 2011.Rehearing Denied March 28, 2011.


[948 N.E.2d 1035]

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Robert J. Biderman and Anastacia R. Brooks, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Springfield, of counsel), for the People.Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson and Karen Munoz, Deputy Defenders, and Michael H. Vonnahmen, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellee.

[350 Ill.Dec. 528 , 241 Ill.2d 376] OPINION
Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
I. BACKGROUND

In 2002, defendant, Ricky King, was charged with five counts of first degree

[350 Ill.Dec. 529 , 948 N.E.2d 1036]

murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)), in connection with the August 8, 2002, beating death of Robert Nash. Defendant was 15 years of age at the time of the incident. On June 19, 2003, the State filed an additional count of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1(a) (West 2000)) arising out of the same incident. That same day, defendant entered a negotiated plea to the attempted murder charge in exchange for dismissal of the murder charges and a 15–year sentence in the Department of Corrections. The circuit court of Champaign County immediately entered judgment pursuant to the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon 15–year prison term, and dismissed the murder charges.

On October 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2006)), arguing that he was not properly admonished about mandatory supervised release. The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his sentence was void because the State failed to request [241 Ill.2d 377] a hearing under section 5–130(1) (c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(c) (ii) (West 2000)) to determine whether he should be sentenced as an adult. The appellate court agreed. 395 Ill.App.3d 985, 992, 336 Ill.Dec. 33, 919 N.E.2d 958. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to vacate defendant's criminal conviction, enter an adjudication of delinquency, and enter an order sentencing him under the Act to time served as of his twenty-first birthday. Id. at 994–95, 336 Ill.Dec. 33, 919 N.E.2d 958.

The State sought review in this court, arguing that (1) defendant should be estopped from arguing that the sentencing provision of the fully negotiated plea agreement is void because he enjoyed the benefits of the plea agreement, including the dismissal of first degree murder charges; and (2) if the sentencing provision of the fully negotiated plea agreement is void, the plea should be vacated in its entirety, the murder charges reinstated, and the parties returned to the status quo ante for further plea proceedings or trial.

On this court's own motion, the parties were given leave to file supplemental briefs addressing the following two issues of statutory interpretation involving sections 5–130(1)(a) through (1)(c) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) through (1)(c) (West 2000)): (1) whether an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes only those charges “specified in” that section or both charges “specified in” that section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident”; and (2) if an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes both charges “specified in” that section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident,” whether section 5–130(1)(c)(ii) required the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5–130(1)(c)(i). Both parties have filed supplemental briefs.

[241 Ill.2d 378] For the following reasons, we conclude that an offense “ covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes both charges “specified in” that section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident,” that section 5–130(1)(c)(ii) did not require the State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult, and that he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5–130(1)(c)(i). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

[350 Ill.Dec. 530 , 948 N.E.2d 1037]

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

II. ANALYSIS

The dispositive issues on appeal are issues of statutory construction, which are questions of law subject to de novo review. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, Inc., 236 Ill.2d 433, 439, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113 (2010).

Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. at 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113. The best indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it. Id.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the applicable statutory provision, section 5–130 of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section 5–120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated battery with a firearm committed in a school, on the real property comprising a school, within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a school, at a school related activity, or on, boarding, or departing from any conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school or school district to transport students [241 Ill.2d 379] to or from school or a school related activity regardless of the time of day or time of year that the offense was committed, armed robbery when the armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or aggravated vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a firearm.

These charges and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.

* * *

(b)(i) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that does not charge an offense specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) the State's Attorney may proceed on any lesser charge or charges, but only in Juvenile Court under the provisions of this Article. The State's Attorney may proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961 on a lesser charge if before trial the minor defendant knowingly and with advice of counsel waives, in writing, his or her right to have the matter proceed in Juvenile Court.

(ii) If before trial or plea an information or indictment is filed that includes one or more charges specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961.

(c)(i) If after trial or plea the minor is convicted of any offense covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), then, in sentencing the minor, the court shall have...

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18 cases
  • People v. Gipson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 27 Mayo 2015
    ...as charges arising out of the same incident must be criminally prosecuted, rather than decided in juvenile proceedings. People v. King, 241 Ill.2d 374, 384, 350 Ill.Dec. 528, 948 N.E.2d 1035 (2011). The charging instrument determines whether the minor has a right to be tried in juvenile cou......
  • People v. Fort
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 17 Febrero 2017
    ...charge. This court has recognized that the framework of the Act "turns on the offenses in the charging instrument." People v. King , 241 Ill.2d 374, 385–86, 350 Ill.Dec. 528, 948 N.E.2d 1035 (2011) (citing People v. J.S. , 103 Ill.2d 395, 403, 83 Ill.Dec. 156, 469 N.E.2d 1090 (1984) ). "Thu......
  • People v. Toney, 1–09–0933.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 19 Septiembre 2011
    ...and also contends that sentencing defendant as an adult was actually mandated by our supreme court's recent decision in People v. King, 241 Ill.2d 374, 350 Ill.Dec. 528, 948 N.E.2d 1035 (2011). We agree with the State that this issue is controlled by the relevant statutory language and the ......
  • People v. M.I. (In re M.I.), 1–10–0865.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 23 Diciembre 2011
    ...uses the word “must” as compared to the use of “shall” in section 5–810(2). Moreover, the supreme court's decision in People v. King, 241 Ill.2d 374, 381, 350 Ill.Dec. 528, 948 N.E.2d 1035 (2011), pointed out that all three cases made an erroneous assumption in interpreting section 5–130(1)......
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