People v. Kirkpatrick
| Decision Date | 22 January 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 32418,32418 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. KIRKPATRICK. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Senift & Myers, of Canton, and Londrigan & Londrigan, of Springfield, for plaintiff in error.
Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen., and Roger W. Hayes, State's Atty., of Macomb (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for defendant in error.
This case is a companion case of People v. Bennett, Ill.Sup., 110 N.E.2d 175, wherein we reversed the conviction in that case for the reasons assigned. The defendant in this case, Everett Kirkpatrick, was likewise found guilty of the crimes of burglary and larceny by a jury in the circuit court of McDonough County. To review this judgment, he prosecutes this writ of error.
Defendant was charged with the burglary of the Nation Wide Market in Macomb and with the theft of a quantity of food and a meat grinder therefrom. It was proved that the burglary occurred sometime between 8:00 P.M., March 19, 1951, and 8:15 A.M., March 20. Defendant and Lyle Bennett were arrested on March 23 and were later indicted, in separate indictments, for burglary and larceny. Bennett was tried first, resulting in a verdict of guilty and a sentence of not less than twelve nor more than twenty years. At that trial, Kirkpatrick was forced to take the witness stand as a witness for the State, at which time he refused to testify, claiming that his answers might tend to incriminate him. Thereafter, defendant was tried at the same term of court, in which the jury venire was the same as in the Bennett case. He moved for a continuance on the grounds that he could not obtain a fair trial before a jury which would be taken from the same venire from which the Bennett jury was chosen. This motion was denied, he was tried by jury, found guilty, and sentenced to not less than twelve nor more than twenty years.
Defendant charges that the court erroneously admitted into evidence a certified copy of the record of his former conviction, in a Federal court, of a violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 10, 2311-2313, prohibiting the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles. It is defendant's contention that this record was inadmissible since a violation of the Dyer Act is not an infamous crime as defined in the Illinois statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 38, par. 587.) It is indisputable that the only convictions which may be shown in impeachment are convictions of infamous crimes. People v. Halkens, 386 Ill. 167, 53 N.E.2d 923. The difficulty arises due to the fact that by Federal law all felonies are infamous crimes. Falconi v. United States, 6 Cir., 280 F. 766. Thus, this crime is infamous in the jurisdiction which rendered the judgment of conviction but is not among those crimes denominated infamous by the Illinois statute. This being a matter of evidence, the law of the forum controls, and since Illinois has not seen fit to classify this crime as infamous, we are of the opinion that the admission of this record was prejudicial error. We do not reach this result simply because the crime in the other jurisdiction bears a name different from any named in the statute. For example, a foreign jurisdiction might call the malicious 'murder' as described in our statute. Nevertheless, 'murder' as described in our statute. Novertheless, we would hold that a conviction of such crime, being identical with our crime of murder, renders the person convicted infamous. We look to the gist of the offense, which here is the transportation of stolen property, rather than its theft. If it is analagous to any crime in Illinois, it is the crime of receiving stolen property, which is not an infamous crime.
Plaintiff in error was taken into custody by police officers of the city of Canton about 10:30 P.M. on March 23, 1951. He was placed in the Canton jail and then removed to the Fulton County jail in Lewistown. He was awakened early the next morning by the chief of police of Macomb and taken to Macomb where he was housed in the city jail. During that day he was questioned by State's Attorney Hayes, and the Macomb chief of police, Eddie Setzer. That evening he requested of Hayes that he be permitted to see an attorney. The next day he saw only officers. The following day, March 26, he was taken to Springfield early in the morning, arriving there about 8:00 A.M. In Springfield he was housed in an 'interrogation room' in a building used for investigation. The record fails to disclose the reason or necessity for this trip, or to sufficiently identify the place wherein defendant was imprisoned. During the day he was questioned, and then returned to Macomb and again locked in jail. John Bliven, deputy sheriff of McDonough County, stated that while in Springfield the plaintiff in error requested to see an attorney three or four times, but no effort was made to contact his attorney. It is thus undisputed that plaintiff in error was kept in custody for slightly more than three days, without an opportunity to furnish bail or consult an attorney, during which time he was in several different jails in Canton, Lewistown and Macomb, and taken for one day to Springfield for questioning. On different occasions during these three days he requested to see an attorney to no avail. Such conduct on the part of the officers having custody of an accused person amounts to a denial of constitutional due process and is not to be tolerated in this State. People v Frugoli, 334 Ill. 324, 166 N.E. 129; People v. Crabb, 372 Ill. 347, 24 N.E.2d 46.
It is urged as error by plaintiff in error that the jury took People's exhibit B, a meat grinder claimed to have been stolen from the market, into the jury room with them when they ratired to consider their verdict. This court has said that, even when properly admitted into evidence, exhibits entrusted to a jury at times give the party producing them a distinct advantage, and this court has held it to be within the discretion of the trial judge to refuse to permit the jury to take them to the jury room....
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