People v. Knapp
| Decision Date | 29 November 1879 |
| Citation | 3 N.W. 927,42 Mich. 267 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE v. JOHN L. KNAPP. |
In a prosecution for adultery the only evidence offered for the prosecution was that of the female particeps criminis, who testified positively as to the offence. On cross-examination she was questioned as to obscene conversation and intercourse with others, which she denied. Held, that defendant could not call witnesses to show that her denial was false. The fact that a defendant, in an action of adultery, knows that his wife has made complaint against his particeps criminis is no evidence that she made such complaint with his assent, and that such assent is evidence of an admission of guilt. The officer in charge of a jury cannot be permitted to be present during the deliberations of such jury, though he may do nothing but listen, and it does not appear that a party has been prejudiced thereby.
Exceptions from Lenawee.
Otto Kirchner, Attorney General, for the people.
Millerd & Bean, for respondent.
1. The prosecution in this case was for adultery. Harriet Ashdown the alleged particeps criminis, was the only witness testifying to the offence, and she gave positive evidence that it was committed. On cross-examination she was asked whether she had not had a certain obscene conversation with a man named, and whether she had not had criminal intercourse with another person named; and, when she denied both witnesses were called to prove the denial false. The circuit court rejected the evidence, and this rejection presents the first question for our consideration.
The defence had a right to put the questions to Mrs. Ashdown, but when she answered in the negative they could not push the investigation further. The questions related to matters foreign to the issue then being tried, and the witness could not be supposed to come prepared with evidence to disprove such charges. But, if the witness were prepared, it would not be conducive to justice to permit the investigation to be gone into. It would necessarily lead the attention of the jury to some extent away from the main controversy, and they would lose sight of the main issue while trying those merely collateral. Dunn v. Dunn, 11 Mich. 287; Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 40, 44. The case is not like that of seduction, in which the chastity of the woman previous to the alleged seduction is necessarily in issue. People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 113.
2. The defendant having made his statement to the jury, the prosecution was permitted to ask him, on cross-examination, whether his wife had not made a complaint against Mrs. Ashdown for the alleged adultery. He replied, under the objection, that he had heard so; and this reply was allowed to go to the jury as evidence. If this were admissible, it must be on the assumption that his wife would not prosecute unless he assented, and that his assent would be an admission of his guilt. There is no legal basis for such an assumption. The wife might very properly and justly have instituted prosecution on Mrs. Ashdown's confession, whether her husband was consenting or protesting, and whether she believed the confession or disbelieved it; and the statute, which allows to the injured wife and husband the exclusive privilege of prosecuting the guilty parties, (Comp.L. � 7693,) contemplates that the injured wife will proceed irrespective of the husband's consent, and in spite of him. The evidence should, therefore, not have been received. If it influenced the jury in any way, it must have been injurious to defendant.
3. When the jury retired to consider their verdict, an officer accompanied them and remained in the room during their deliberations. The attention of the court was called to the fact on a motion for a new trial, but on its being made to appear that the officer did not converse with the jury in their room, the court denied the motion. This was on the assumption that under the circumstances the defendant could not have been injured by the officer's presence in the room.
It is not claimed that the officer can with propriety be allowed to be within...
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...having been sworn in "to try an issue or case." Empanel , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).5 Mattox explains that People v. Knapp , 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927 (1879), "held" the above-mentioned proposition. 146 U.S. at 150, 13 S.Ct. 50. But the phrase does not appear in that opinion. In......
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