People v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 07 November 1872
• Citation: 26 Mich. 112
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People v. William Knapp

26 Mich. 112

The People v. William Knapp

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 7, 1872

Submitted on Briefs October 11, 1872.

Error to Livingston circuit.

Verdict set aside, and a new trial awarded.

Dwight May, Attorney General, for the people.

O Hawkins, for the respondent.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

Knapp was tried separately on an information charging him and others with the murder of Cloetha Perkins, and was convicted of manslaughter. The death of the deceased was caused by a broken leg, the result of accident, or else of her being thrown, or pushed, from a window by some one or more persons. The verdict of the jury can only rest upon the finding that she was thrown, or in some way ejected, from the window, and that defendant was responsible. But, as there was no testimony which could justify the conclusion that the defendant himself did this act, he must have been convicted on the ground that he was responsible for the conduct of those who did. And the principal questions in the cause bear upon this theory as allowed to go to the jury.

The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that the deceased was, before the accident, in the upper story of a building belonging to defendant, and used as a paint shop, in Howell, in company with him and several other young men, and that they had sexual intercourse with her; and this was claimed by the prosecution to have been forcible, and against her will, and that she had been forcibly taken there for that purpose, and that the whole transaction was essentially one combined grievance. On the part of the defense, it was claimed that her death was not the result of any common purpose or offense, and was either accidental, or caused by some act in which Knapp had no part.

The verdict of the jury amounts in law to an acquittal of any more serious charge than manslaughter, and therefore is a denial of the charge that her death was the result of any other felony. This disposes of some otherwise serious questions, and reduces the number of exceptions which would have required attention had there been a verdict of murder.

A plea in abatement was interposed to the second count of the information--which differs from the rest only in charging the homicide to have been done in connection with rape--which, if found at all, would have made it murder. The ground of the plea was, that there had been no examination on that charge. The court overruled this plea. But, as the jury did not find Knapp guilty of this offense, nor of any act not charged in the other counts, to which no objection was interposed, the ruling became immaterial, and need not be discussed.

The defendant having been convicted of an offense which, under the verdict, could only be attributed to his complicity with others who actually did the act which led to the death of Miss Perkins it becomes necessary to consider on what basis any such verdict rests, in order to determine the exact legal position of the case.

The conviction of manslaughter could only have been under certain portions of the charge, permitting the jury to find it in case the injury was caused in an attempt of the various persons assembled in the paint shop to avoid an arrest. The language of the court, repeated nearly in the same terms twice, was as follows:

"In this case, if the jury should be satisfied (beyond the doubt that I have spoken of) that these defendants combined for the purpose of inducing this girl to go to that shop for the purpose of prostitution, and that they did induce her to go, and while at the shop all had connection with her, and, in order to avoid arrest or exposure, threw her out of the window, without the intention of killing her, but by it she received injuries which caused her death, it would be manslaughter, because they were engaged in an act against public morals, and unlawful."

And the court refused to charge that, if the act was done under these circumstances without the concurrence of Knapp, he should not be convicted. Also refused to charge, that if the parties attempted to escape, and one of them, without the knowledge or...