People v. Knight

• Decision Date: 28 May 1991
• Citation: 173 A.D.2d 736,570 N.Y.S.2d 617
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Reginald KNIGHT, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 617

570 N.Y.S.2d 617

173 A.D.2d 736

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v.Reginald KNIGHT, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

May 28, 1991.

Philip L. Weinstein, New York City(Abigail Everett, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles J. Hynes, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Jay M. Cohen, Amy S. Griffin and Katherine M. Choo, of counsel), for respondent.

Before KUNZEMAN, J.P., and SULLIVAN, LAWRENCE and O'BRIEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Grajales, J.), rendered July 5, 1989, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People(see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5].The testimony of a single eyewitness can be sufficient to support a judgment of conviction (see, People v. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567, 446 N.Y.S.2d 910, 431 N.E.2d 271, cert. denied456 U.S. 979, 102 S.Ct. 2248, 72 L.Ed.2d 855;People v. Hooper, 112 A.D.2d 317, 491 N.Y.S.2d 766).Matters of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 68 N.E. 112).Here, the jury was entitled to give great weight to the testimony of the complaining witness and to reject the testimony of the defendant's alibi witnesses.

We also reject the defendant's contention that the introduction of certain rebuttal testimony deprived him of a fair trial.The record reveals that the defense strategy was to convince the jury of the truthfulness of the alibi defense by offering testimony that the police had been informed of the defendant's alibi on the day that he was arrested.Prior to the testimony of the first defense witness, the defense counsel advised the court that, since the witnesses had promptly notified the police of the alibi, the court need not consider imposing limitations on the People's cross-examination of the witnesses concerning any delay in reporting the alibi to the police (see, People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914, 406 N.E.2d 771).The defense counsel then elicited testimony from the alibi witnesses regarding conversations that they had with the police when the defendant was arrested, and no objection was made on Dawson grounds to the prosecutor's subsequent cross-examination of those witnesses on the issue.On rebuttal, the People offered the testimony of a police officer who denied that the statements regarding the defendant's alibi were made to him.The defense counsel objected to this testimony solely on the ground that it was collateral.On appeal, the defendant argues that the testimony was collateral in that it was offered to impeach the witnesses's general credibility, and furthermore, that testimony regarding a witness's failure to promptly inform the police of a defendant's alibi is generally considered of little probative value (see, People v. Dawson, supra ).

We conclude that the rebuttal testimony...