People v. Knight, No. 03CA1526.
| Decision Date | 30 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03CA1526. |
| Citation | 167 P.3d 147 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bryson KNIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Roger G. Billotte, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Elizabeth Griffin, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge RUSSEL.
Defendant, Bryson Knight, appeals the trial court's judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of second degree murder and first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. We affirm.
The victim challenged Knight to a fistfight. Knight later confronted the victim and shot and killed him. Knight drove a stolen car to and from the homicide.
Knight was charged with one count of first degree murder after deliberation and one count of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft. At trial, Knight testified that he shot the victim in self-defense. He admitted that he had been driving a stolen car.
The jury found Knight guilty of second degree murder and aggravated motor vehicle theft. The trial court sentenced him to thirty-three years in prison, plus a five-year period of mandatory parole.
Knight contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress a statement that he made to detectives after invoking his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. We disagree.
In reviewing a trial court's suppression ruling, we accord deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact and review de novo its application of the legal standards to those facts. People v. Adkins, 113 P.3d 788, 791 (Colo.2005).
A criminal suspect has the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect invokes the right to an attorney, all interrogation in the absence of counsel must cease. If interrogation continues, even voluntary statements made by the suspect will be inadmissible during the prosecution's case-in-chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28.
A statement is the product of interrogation if it is made in response to direct questioning or to words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). A statement is not the product of interrogation merely because it is made after the suspect has been informed of the charges against him. People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 319 (Colo.2000). To constitute interrogation, the officer's words or actions must "be such that he should know they will be perceived by the suspect as provocative rather than merely informative or permissive." People v. Rivas, supra, 13 P.3d at 320.
Here, one of the detectives who interviewed Knight testified that Knight requested a lawyer immediately after being advised of his Miranda rights. Knight then asked, "What am I charged with exactly?" Another detective told Knight that he had been charged with first degree murder. When Knight asked whether he could be charged with "something less," the other detective answered that "there are several types of murder charges such as manslaughter or self-defense ... such as in this case the victim had a gun on him." Knight responded, "He did?"
Knight sought to suppress the response, "He did?" The trial court ruled that this statement was admissible because it was volunteered and not the product of interrogation.
We agree with the trial court's ruling. The detective's answer to Knight's question was merely informative and was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Thus, Knight's statement was not the product of interrogation.
Knight contends that the trial court erroneously refused to order separate trials on the charges of first degree murder and aggravated motor vehicle theft. We reject this contention.
Criminal offenses may be tried together if they "are of the same or similar character or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." Crim. P. 8(a)(2). If a joinder of offenses will prejudice a defendant, "the court may order an election or separate trials of counts." Crim. P. 14.
We will disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to sever counts only if the defendant shows an abuse of discretion. People v. Aalbu, 696 P.2d 796, 806 (Colo.1985). To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) the joinder caused actual prejudice, and (2) the trier of fact was unable to separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense. People v. Rosa, 928 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Colo.App.1996).
Here, the trial court denied Knight's request for separate trials because the two charges involved interrelated proof and because Knight failed to demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by a joint trial. We conclude that this ruling was within the bounds of the trial court's discretion.
The record supports the trial court's determination that the two charges involved interrelated proof. Evidence that Knight drove the stolen vehicle to and from the scene of the homicide was relevant in the prosecution of both offenses: (1) it satisfied an element of aggravated motor theft under § 18-4-409(2)(d), C.R.S.2006; and (2) it was relevant to the culpable mental state element of first degree murder because it supported an inference that Knight had consciously acted to avoid detection (which in turn supported an inference that Knight had acted after deliberation).
Knight has not shown that he was prejudiced by the joint trial. The trial court instructed the jury not to let its decision on one count influence its decision on any other, and there is no indication that the jury was unable to separate the facts and legal principles applicable to each offense.
We therefore uphold the trial court's ruling.
Before trial, the Denver Police Department began an internal investigation to determine whether certain officers had moonlighted at second jobs during on-duty hours. Defense counsel learned that a prosecution witness — a detective who was endorsed as an expert in crime scene reconstruction — was one of the officers under investigation.
Defense counsel subpoenaed records of the investigation and asked the court to review those records in camera to determine whether any documents could be used to impeach the detective's testimony. In response, the prosecution asked the court to quash the subpoenas and to preclude the defense from cross-examining the detective about the moonlighting allegations.
The trial court granted the prosecution's requests. It declined to conduct an in camera review on the ground that defense counsel's request was untimely. It also ruled that the alleged moonlighting, even if admitted by the detective, would be inadmissible under CRE 403.
Knight challenges both of these rulings. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing the evidence under CRE 403. Because this conclusion renders harmless any error in failing to conduct an in camera review, we do not address the issue of timeliness.
The right of a criminal defendant to confront adverse witnesses is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by article II, § 16 of the Colorado Constitution. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); People v. Thurman, 787 P.2d 646, 651 (Colo.1990). The defendant must be given an opportunity for effective cross-examination. Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162, 166 (Colo.1992).
Effective cross-examination does not mean unlimited cross-examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo.1982). A trial court has wide latitude to place reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about prejudice, confusion of the issues, undue delay or waste of time, and marginal relevance. Merritt v. People, supra, 842 P.2d at 166; People v. Crawford, 191 Colo. 504, 553 P.2d 827 (1976).
Unless the trial court restricts cross-examination to such an extent as to constitute a denial of the right of confrontation, the scope and limits of cross-examination are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Merritt v. People, supra; People v. Crawford, supra, 191 Colo. at 506, 553 P.2d at 829.
Knight argues that the moonlighting allegations were admissible to show (1) the detective's motive to testify for the prosecution and (2) the detective's character for untruthfulness. We address and reject these arguments as follows.
Relying on Davis v. Alaska, supra, Knight argues that evidence of the moonlighting investigation was admissible to show that the detective had a motive to testify favorably for the prosecution. According to Knight, the detective could have thought that, by favoring the prosecution, he might avoid potential criminal charges and disciplinary action for moonlighting. We conclude that the trial court properly excluded this line of inquiry.
The record shows that, at the time of trial, the police department had not yet concluded its internal investigation of the moonlighting allegations. It also shows that, once the internal investigation was concluded, the Adams County District Attorney would act as special prosecutor.
Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in ruling that this was "not a Davis v. Alaska situation." The detective had no motive to favor Denver...
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