People v. Knox

• Decision Date: 21 July 1982
• Docket Number: 59561,Docket Nos. 57927
• Citation: People v. Knox, 321 N.W.2d 713, 115 Mich.App. 508 (Mich. App. 1982)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Lee KNOX, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 713

321 N.W.2d 713

115 Mich.App. 508

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry Lee KNOX, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 57927, 59561.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 16, 1982.

Decided April 22, 1982.

Released for Publication July 21, 1982.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., Appeals, and Janice M. Joyce, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Norman R. Robiner, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before MacKENZIE, P. J., and BRONSON, and THOMAS, ^* JJ.

BRONSON, Judge.

Following a probation violation hearing in Detroit Recorder's Court, defendant's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to serve time in prison. Defendant now appeals as of right.

Defendant originally pled guilty in Detroit Recorder's Court to attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.92; M.S.A. Sec. 28.287 and M.C.L. Sec. 750.520d; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(4), and two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 3), M.C.L. Sec. 750.520d; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(4). The trial court sentenced defendant to five years' probation. Defendant's first year of probation was to be spent residing in a Recorder's Court halfway house where he would receive alcohol abuse and group therapy. Following the revocation of probation, defendant was sentenced to 3 to 5 years' imprisonment for the attempt conviction and to concurrent 10 to 15 year terms for the CSC 3 convictions.

The prosecution offered the testimony of two probation officers who stated that defendant had been granted permission to work for Extra Temporary Employment Service but that he failed to return to the halfway house from his employment. Due to this failure, defendant was considered AWOL or an escapee from the program.

Defendant acknowledged that he had left the halfway house without approval. He stated that he wanted to obtain full-time employment. Defendant did, in fact, obtain such a position. Some five months after taking this job, defendant called the halfway house and was informed that he could not return. Defendant stated that he had no intention of staying away from the halfway house forever.

Defendant first asserts that the revocation of probation must be reversed because the two probation officers who spoke against him were not required to take an oath or make an affirmation before testifying. The Revised Judicature Act of 1961 mandates that witnesses in court proceedings take an oath or make an affirmation that their testimony will be true. M.C.L. Sec. 600.1432; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1432, M.C.L. Sec. 600.1434; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1434. See also, MRE 603. In this case, however, defense counsel did not object to the failure of the trial court to insist upon an oath of affirmation. Accordingly, this issue is not preserved for appeal. People v. Kemmis, 153 Mich. 117, 118, 116 N.W. 554 (1908); Mettetal v. Hall, 288 Mich. 200, 207-208, 284 N.W. 698 (1939). In any case, defendant's own testimony established that there had been a violation of probation. Consequently, this presents no basis for reversal.

Although we do not reverse on the oath or affirmation issue, we specifically reject the prosecution's argument that M.C.L. Sec. 771.4; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1134 allows the trial court to decline to require an oath or affirmation. The prosecution relies on the following two excerpts from M.C.L. Sec. 771.4; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1134, as support for its position:

"Hearings on such revocation shall be summary and informal and not subject to the rules of evidence or of pleadings applicable in criminal trials.

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"The method of hearing and presentation of charges accorded shall lie entirely within the discretion of the court which granted probation: Provided however, That the probationer shall be entitled to a written copy of the charges against him which constitute the claim that he violated his probation, and shall be entitled to a hearing thereon."

We summarily reject the second excerpt as a basis for allowing the court to dispose with the oath formality. It is our opinion that the requirement of an oath or affirmation is outside the purview of "the method of hearing and presentation of charges". ¹

Whether the first quoted excerpt allows the trial courts to dispense with the oath or affirmation requirements of M.C.L. Sec. 600.1432; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1432 and M.C.L. Sec. 600.1434; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1434 poses a more interesting question. The foremost obligation of any court in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the will of the Legislature. Melia v. Employment Security Comm., 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956); People v. Ingram, 99 Mich.App. 410, 414, 297 N.W.2d 684 (1980). The prosecution here basically asserts that the language in M.C.L. Sec. 771.4; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1134, stating that the rules of evidence need not be followed in probation revocation hearings, conflicts with and supersedes the statutory provisions related to oaths and affirmations.

We do not believe the Legislature intended for the probation statute to eliminate the oath or affirmation requirement. It is a settled principle of construction that where a statute can be construed as consistent or inconsistent with other statutory provisions the courts should construe the provisions as consistent with one another. In re Petition of State Highway Comm., 383 Mich. 709, 714-715, 178 N.W.2d 923 (1970); People v. Griffes, 13 Mich.App. 299, 302, 164 N.W.2d 426 (1968).

We do not believe that there exists any irreconcilable difference between the statutory provisions mandating that witnesses take an oath or make an affirmation and that portion of M.C.L. Sec. 771.4; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1134 allowing the courts to dispense with the formal rules of evidence in revocation hearings. We note that the evidence chapter of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961, or any of the earlier judicature acts, does not include the requirement that an oath be taken or affirmation be made by a testifying witness. Rather, this statutory requirement is, and historically has been, located in the "general provisions" chapter of the judicature acts. As such, it is our belief that when the Legislature indicated that the "rules of evidence" need not be followed in conducting probation revocation hearings, it did not mean to dispense with the oath or affirmation requirement of M.C.L. Sec. 600.1432; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1432 and M.C.L. Sec. 600.1434; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.1434. Rather, it meant only to authorize the lower courts to conduct probation revocation hearings without following the statutory rules of evidence. While the court-mandated Michigan Rules of Evidence include an oath or affirmation provision, MRE 603, those rules did not exist at the time the language at issue in the probation statute was adopted. Accordingly, the Legislature could not have had them in mind.

In our opinion, one on probation has the right to insist that any witness who testifies against him take an oath or affirm to tell the truth. To hold to the contrary would allow witnesses to lie without fear of criminal sanctions since the crime of perjury is not established unless falsehoods have been made under oath. M.C.L. Sec. 750.423; M.S.A. Sec. 28.665, People v. Fox, 25 Mich. 492, 496 (1872). It strikes us as fundamentally unfair to revoke the probation of a defendant on unsworn testimony where said defendant has demanded that all witnesses against him take an oath. In light of the foregoing, we cannot believe that the Legislature intended to dispense with the oath or affirmation requirement in probation revocation proceedings.

Defendant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. While a trial court must consider evidence presented in mitigation of the probation violation, it need not determine that mitigating circumstances justify allowing the defendant to remain on probation. See, People v. Rocha, 86 Mich.App. 497, 502, 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978), lv. den. 406 Mich. 944 (1979). While we may have acted differently had we sat in the position of the trial court, it did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation since the violation was clearly established. People v. Rocha (After Remand), 99 Mich.App. 654, 656-657, 299 N.W.2d 16 (1980), lv. den. 411 Mich. 915 (1981).

Defendant lastly argues that the court's failure to inform him that he had a right to a...