People v. Koch

• Decision Date: 30 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 12060,12060
• Citation: 304 N.E.2d 482,15 Ill.App.3d 386
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold KOCH, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 482

304 N.E.2d 482

15 Ill.App.3d 386

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold KOCH, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12060.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Nov. 30, 1973.

Basil G. Greanias, State's Atty., Macon County, Decatur, James R. Coryell, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.

Frederick P. Erickson, Decatur, for defendant-appellee.

SIMKINS, Justice.

This is an interlocutory appeal by the State from an order of the circuit court of Macon County sustaining objection to the admissibility of certain in-custody oral statements made by defendant. It is contended that the order in question is appealable as either a de facto dismissal of an indictment or a suppression of evidence under Supreme Court Rule 604, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, sec. 604, or as a confession under Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, sec. 114--11(g).

On May 22, 1972, defendant, Harold Koch, was charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 95 1/2, sec. 11--501. A jury trial was commenced on September 18, 1972, at which time the State presented two witnesses who testified that on the evening in question they noticed defendant's vehicle to be in a ditch close to their homes, that they tried to push the car from the ditch but were unsuccessful because of defendant's lack of cooperation, and that defendant left the car and stumbled toward a nearby service station. Both stated that defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. The arresting officer testified that on the same evening he observed defendant returning to his vehicle in a staggering fashion, that he found a six pack of beer on the floorboard of defendant's car, and that he was likewise of the opinion that defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating beverage.

Defendant then moved, outside the presence of the jury, to suppress certain incustody oral statements made by defendant, contending that defendant was too intoxicated to have intelligently waived the rights granted him by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. At the hearing on said motion the two interrogating officers testified that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and that defendant acknowledged that he was aware of them. In essence, both officers testified that they were of the belief that although the effects of the alcohol on defendant were extreme, i.e. too extreme for driving purposes, defendant was sufficiently sober to understand the rights he was waiving. It was further stated that defendant subsequently failed the breathalyzer test administered to him. The court sustained defendant's objection to the introduction of the statements finding defendant to have been too intoxicated to have intelligently waived his rights. The State then moved and the trial judge granted a motion to recess the trial for the purpose of perfecting this appeal from that ruling.

It has previously been the settled law of this State that the prosecution had no right to appeal in a criminal case. The historical evolution and eventual partial demise of this proposition is aptly chronicled by the court in People v. Petropoulos, 59 Ill.App.2d 298, 208 N.E.2d 323, aff'd 34 Ill.2d 179, 214 N.E.2d 765. The 1970 Ill.Const.art. 6, sec. 6 now provides that in a criminal case there is no appeal from a judgment of acquittal, but 'The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Court.' Pursuant to this rule making authority our Supreme Court has promulgated Rule 604(a)(1) which contains the following language:

In criminal cases the state may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; uashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.

When it is apparent to the trial judge that an order of the court sustaining objection to the State's evidence is likely to block prosecution entirely, thereby creating an effect similar to dismissing an indictment, he may then properly suspend the trial and permit the State to seek review. People v. Shipp, 96 Ill.App.2d 364, 239 N.E.2d 296. Appellant contends that the order in this case has the substantive effect of dismissing or quashing an indictment in that the...