People v. Koontzy

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Simons, J.
• Citation: People v. Koontzy, 320 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 (Cal. App. 2024)
• Docket Number: A167703
• Decision Date: 25 April 2024
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Takeya Lashay KOONTZY, Defendant and Appellant.

320 Cal.Rptr.3d 532

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Takeya Lashay KOONTZY, Defendant and Appellant.

A167703

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5.

Filed April 25, 2024

Trial Court: Napa County Superior Court, Trial Judge: Hon. Mark S. Boessenecker (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR183615)

The Law Office of Kaiya Pirolo and Kaiya R. Pirolo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Simons, J.

Defendant and appellant Takeya Lashay Koontzy (appellant) pled no contest to fleeing the scene of an injury accident (Veh. Code § 20001, subd. (a)) and was placed on probation with the condition that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined. Due in large part to the victim’s delay in providing documentation of her damages and the victim’s failure to appear on multiple dates set for restitution hearings, the trial court did not determine the amount of restitution before termination of appellant’s probation. More than two years post-termination, the court entered an order directing appellant to pay $86,306.12 in victim restitution.

Appellant contends the trial court was without authority to modify the amount of restitution owed to the victim following termination of probation. Appellant relies on People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 (Martinez) to argue that the court’s jurisdiction to do so was not extended by Penal Code section 1202.46¹ because the restitution was not for losses incurred "as a result of the commission of a crime." (§ 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) We agree, and distinguish the present case from our decision in People v. McCune (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 648, 651–652, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, review granted Oct. 26, 2022, S276303 (McCune), in which there was no dispute that the restitution was properly imposed under section 1202.4.²

BACKGROUND

In June 2017, the Napa County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint charging appellant with fleeing the scene of an injury accident (Veh. Code § 20001, subd. (a); count one) and with reckless driving (Veh. Code § 23103, subd. (a); count two).³

In November 2017, pursuant to an agreement, appellant pleaded no contest to count one and count two was dismissed. She agreed to pay "full restitution for all losses & expenses incurred due to this collision."⁴ In January 2018, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on formal probation for three years subject to various terms and conditions, including that she pay victim restitution in an amount to be determined.

In April 2019, the probation department filed a restitution investigation report indicating that the victim had requested $86,347.77 in restitution for "medical bills, ambulance fees, and prescription costs." A contested restitution hearing was set and continued numerous times. Hearings in May, July, and August were continued because the parties were awaiting supporting documentation from the victim. At the August hearing, the prosecutor stated, "it appears through the notes that our victim hasn’t always responded in a timely manner, which has led to some of the delays." At an October hearing, the prosecutor stated that she received the supporting documentation but mistakenly never provided it to the defense. December 2019 and January 2020 hearings were continued because the victim failed to appear, and the prosecution asked that the matter be taken off calendar when the victim again failed to appear in February 2020, despite receiving a subpoena for her appearance.

Appellant completed the three-year term of probation on January 31, 2021.⁵ In February 2022, appellant filed a petition for dismissal pursuant to section 1203.4. In April 2022, the prosecution sought a determination of restitution, and, in July 2022, over appellant’s objection, the trial court concluded it retained jurisdiction to modify the victim restitution order.

In April 2023, the trial court conducted a contested restitution hearing. The prosecution opted to rely solely on the medical documentation and presented a packet of documents including two hospital bills, an ambulance bill, bills for prescriptions, and additional medical bills, totaling $86,306.12. The court ordered victim restitution in that amount, plus 10 percent annual interest. The present appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[1] Appellant argues the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the restitution order following termination of probation. She acknowledges this court held in McCune, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 648, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, that section 1202.46 extends a trial court’s jurisdiction to modify a section 1202.4 restitution order. However, she argues that, in the present case, the trial court was not authorized to order restitution under section 1202.4 for losses due to the collision, because her criminal conduct in fleeing the scene of the accident was not the cause of those losses.⁶ (See Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal. Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 [defendant who pled guilty only to leaving scene of an injury accident may not be ordered to pay restitution for damages caused by the collision].) She contends the governing statutes are sections 1203.1 and 1203.3, relating to conditions of probation generally, and those statutes do not permit modification of a condition after termination of probation. Reviewing de novo the question of the scope of the trial court’s statutory authority (McCune, at pp. 651–652, 297 Cal. Rptr.3d 392), we conclude the trial court erred in modifying the restitution order after termination of appellant’s probation.

"Proposition 8, adopted by the voters in 1982, marked a sharp change in the state’s policy toward restitution. Formerly, trial courts had discretion to impose victim restitution as a condition of probation. [Citation.] Proposition 8 granted crime victims a constitutional right to receive restitution from the convicted person in nearly all cases …. [¶] Consistent with this mandate, the Legislature expanded victims’ access to restitution in the 1990’s by enacting section 1202.4…. Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 [provides]: ‘[i]f the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing, the restitution order shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court. The court shall order full restitution.’ [¶] In that situation—where the court defers setting the amount of restitution until the victim’s loss becomes clear—section 1202.46 extends the court’s jurisdiction to set the amount: ‘Notwithstanding Section 1170, when the economic losses of a victim cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4, the court shall retain jurisdiction over a person subject to a restitution order for purposes of imposing or modify- ing restitution until such time as the losses may be determined.’ (§ 1202.46.) [¶] … [¶] Section 1202.46 expressly preserves the court’s jurisdiction to follow the process in section 1202.4, which serves the constitutional mandate to ensure full victim restitution." (McCune, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 652–653, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 392.)

McCune discussed the relationship between sections 1202.4, 1202.46, and 1203.3. The court concluded that the trial court’s authority to set restitution after termination of probation was not "implicitly circumscribed by other statutes that generally authorize a court to revoke, modify, or change probation conditions only during the probationary period. (See, e.g., § 1203.3, subds. (a) [court may revoke, modify, or change a probation order ‘during the term of probation’], (b)(4) [court may modify terms of probation to ensure timely payment of restitution ‘while on probation’], (b)(5) [nothing prohibits court from modifying amount of restitution ‘during the term of probation’]; [citation].)" (McCune, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 653–654, 297 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, italics added.) McCune declined to follow the decisions in Hilton v. Superior Court (2014) 239 Cal.App.4th 766, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 309 (Hilton) and People v. Waters (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 822, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (Waters), which construed section 1203.3 to constrain a trial court’s authority to modify a section 1202.4 restitution order after termination of probation. McCune reasoned, "There is no disharmony between sections 1203.3, 1202.4, and 1202.46. Section 1203.3 grants courts authority and jurisdiction to revoke, modify, or change probation conditions generally, including restitution orders, during the term of probation. (§ 1203.3, subds. (a), (b)(4) [&] (5).) Section 1202.4 grants additional authority to address the specific situation in which ‘the amount of loss cannot be ascertained at the time of sentencing,’ and it mandates that the restitution order ‘shall include a provision that the amount shall be determined at the direction of the court.’ (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) When a court follows this process, section 1202.46 grants the court jurisdiction ‘for purposes of imposing or modifying restitution until such time as the losses may be determined’ (§ 1202.46), even if that occurs after probation has ended." (McCune, at pp. 654–655, 297 Cal. Rptr.3d 392.)

[2, 3] Appellant argues McCune is distinguishable because the restitution order in the present case could not have been made pursuant to section 1202.4, because the victim’s damages were not due to her criminal conduct. We agree. The California Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066, which also involved a conviction under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a), is directly on point. Martinez explained that, "[A]lthough the Vehicle Code section 20001(a) offense is commonly...