People v. Koval, 27
| Decision Date | 04 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 27,27 |
| Citation | 371 Mich. 453,124 N.W.2d 274 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael P. KOVAL, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Raubolt, MacDonald & Dodge, by Don F. Dodge, Trenton, for plaintiff and appellee.
Richard E. Valois, River Rouge, for defendant and appellant.
Before the Entire Bench.
At the session of 1960, Pub.Acts 1960, No. 148, the legislature amended the motor vehicle code* of the State by adding thereto a new section to stand as section 625a thereof. Stat.Ann.1961 Cum.Supp. § 9.2325(1). Said added section, the interpretation and application of which are involved in this case, reads as follows:
'(1) In any criminal prosecution relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor where a person who, after being first advised and acknowledging in writing that he is not required by law to give his consent to a chemical test, shall have given his written consent to a chemical test of his blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, the amount of alcohol in such person's blood at the time alleged as shown by such chemical analysis of the person's blood, shall be admissible and shall give rise to the following presumptions, and in the event any such tests are given, the results of such tests shall be made available to the person so charged or his attorney prior to the day of the trial and must be introduced into evidence by the prosecution upon the demand of the defendant:
'(a) If there was at that time 0.05% or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
'(b) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05% but less than 0.15% by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant;
'(c) If there was at that time 0.15% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor; however, such presumption shall be subject to rebuttal.
'(2) Only a duly licensed physician or duly registered nurse, under the supervision of a licensed physician, acting at the request of a police officer, can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein under the provisions of this act.
'(4) The refusal on the part of any person to submit to any such test shall not be admissible in any criminal prosecution relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
'(5) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.'
At approximately 2 o'clock in the morning of August 27, 1961, defendant was arrested by police officers of the city of Trenton and was charged under the ordinance of said city with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. On trial in justice court defendant was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine and costs, or to serve 30 days in the Wayne county jail. The conviction was appealed to the circuit court where a trial de novo was had before a circuit judge of Wayne county, who found defendant guilty as charged and placed him on probation for a period of one year. From that conviction defendant, on leave granted, has appealed to this Court, said appeal being based on...
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People v. Green
...him. The purpose of the statute was explained in People v. Dicks, 190 Mich.App. 694, 699, 476 N.W.2d 500 (1991): In People v. Koval, 371 Mich. 453, 458, 124 N.W.2d 274 (1963), our Supreme Court found that the then existing statute, which does not significantly differ from the current one, w......
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People v. Anstey
...proper remedy for the denial of an independent chemical test in violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) ; and (2) whether People v. Koval, 371 Mich. 453, 124 N.W.2d 274 (1963), was correctly decided. 474 Mich. 886, 705 N.W.2d 29 We conclude that because the statute does not specify a remedy, dism......
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Victorson v. Department of Treasury
...follows, then, that failure to comply with the statutory requirement renders the affirmative action plan void. See People v. Koval, 371 Mich. 453, 459, 124 N.W.2d 274 (1963). See also Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Bd., 112 Ill.App.3d 926, 929-930, 68 Ill.Dec. 522, 446 N.E.2d 256 (19......
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State v. Myers
...Gallagher, 3 Pa.Cmwlth. 371, 283 A.2d 508 (1971); People v. Burton, 13 Mich.App. 203, 163 N.W.2d 823 (Ct.App.1968); People v. Koval, 371 Mich. 453, 124 N.W.2d 274 (1963); Application of Newbern, 175 Cal.App.2d 862, 1 Cal.Rptr. 80 (Ct.App.2nd Dist. Full and free access to evidence is fundame......