People v. Krouse
| Citation | 7 Ill.App.3d 754,288 N.E.2d 543 |
| Decision Date | 16 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 71--192 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry KROUSE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Kenneth L. Jones, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, Mt. Vernon, Robert E. Farrell, Asst. District Defender, Mt. Vernon, of counsel, for defendant-appellant.
John H. Ward, State's Atty. of Christian County, Taylorville; Brenda Sweeney, Taylorville, of counsel for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant Larry Krouse pled guilty to the charges of burglary and theft and made an application for probation. The trial court of Christian County, after a hearing on defendant's application for probation, denied probation and sentenced the defendant to a term of not less than four nor more than ten years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.
Defendant raises issues for review in three categories: (1) Whether Count I of the complaint properly charged the offense of burglary; (2) whether defendant was properly admonished prior to pleading guilty; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying probation.
Count I of the complaint charged burglary and stated, in pertinent part that:
'Larry Krouse did * * * commit the offense of burglary in that he did knowingly and without authority enter a building, to-wit: DLR Supply Co., occupied by J. R. White, with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft * * *.'
The complaint went on to state the date, approximate time, village and county in which the alleged offense occurred. Defendant contends there is no allegation of ownership of the building which was entered by defendant.
There are generally three reasons for requiring the possession and occupancy of the premises to be stated in an indictment for burglary: (1) for the purpose of allowing the defendant to adequately prepare his defense; (2) for the purpose of so identifying on the record that the premises alleged to have been broken into did not belong to the accused; and (3) for the purpose of so identifying the offense as to protect the accused from a second prosecution for the same offense. There is in the present case sufficient identification of legal possession and of the wrongful acts charged to enable the defendant to prepare his defense and to plead former conviction in bar of another prosecution for the same offense, whether or not DRL Supply Co. or J. R. White held legal title. People v. Foster, 30 Ill.2d 106, 195 N.E.2d 700; People v. Collins, 123 Ill.App.2d 138, 260 N.E.2d 30.
Defendant contends that the trial court failed to fulfill the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule No. 402, Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, c. 110A, § 402 (50 Ill.2d R. 402) by
(1) not informing defendant of the nature of the charge as required by Rule 402(a)(1);
(2) not advising defendant of the minimum and maximum sentence which might be imposed and not advising defendant that such sentences could be imposed consecutively;
(3) failing to inform defendant that he had the right to plead not guilty;
(4) failing to advise defendnat that he was waiving a right to trial and to confront witnesses against him, and
(5) failing to determine that the plea was voluntary in nature.
The trial court attempted to determine that Krouse understood the nature of the charge by stating, 'This case is a charge of burblary and theft' and asking the defendant, 'You have been furnished a copy of the complaint in this case, have you not?' to which the defendant answered, 'Yes, sir,' and asking, 'You have read the complaint * * * and do you understand what you are charged with, do you?' to which the defendant again answered, 'Yes, sir.'
We do not want to contribute to confusion over distinctions between Rule 402(a)(1) and 402(c), but in this case when the trial court apparently was attempting to determine a factual basis for the plea by requiring the state's attorney to state the facts upon which the complaint was predicated, it also elicited a reasonably clear and hard-to-misunderstand restatement of the nature of the charge. The state's attorney stated, briefly, but adequately, 'Your Honor, this defendant in the company of two other individuals did enter without authority business establishments, two of them, in the Village of Morrisonville and from the establishment DRL Supply Company owned by J. R. White and obtain control over property in this business and did steal and carry away quantities of merchandise from this store in excess of the value of $150.00.' The court then asked the defendant, and Krouse answered, 'Yes, sir.' This is substantial compliance.
Defendant's argument that the trial court failed in its duty to inform and determine that the defendant understood the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, fails in view of the following colloquy between the trial court and defendant:
Court: 'Do you know what the penalty could be if you were found guilty or if you entered a plea of guilty?'
Defendant: 'It could be up to life.'
Court: 'On the burglary it could be any number of years in the penitentiary, not less than one year and up to and including your natural life--an indeterminate period of one year to life in the penitentiary--do you understand that?'
Defendant: 'Yes.'
There being a second charge, the court continued:
Court: 'And as to the charge of theft, under this complaint it could be an indeterminate period of one year and a maximum of 10 years in the penitentiary--an indeterminate sentence of one to 10 years--do you understand that?'
Defendant: 'Yes.'
There were two charges, but the cases were consolidated and the trial court imposed identical sentences, four to 10, to be served concurrently.
Continuing his arguments premised on Rule 402, defendant contends he was not admonished regarding his right to plead not...
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People v. Robinson
...... Some cases hold that it is fulfilled where the defendant recites to the court his own understanding of the nature of the offense with which he is charged or his own account of his conduct and intent. People v. Krouse (1972, 5th Dist.), 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543; People v. Hudson (1972, 5th Dist.), 7 Ill.App.3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533; People v. Ingeneri (1972, 5th Dist.), 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550; People v. Bauswell (1973, 4th Dist.), 12 Ill.App.3d 35, 297 N.E.2d 389; People v. Horne (1974, 5th ......
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People v. Billops
...... Finally, appellee cites our case of People v. Krouse, 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543, as indicating that a recital of the facts of a burglary charge by the State's Attorney in the presence of defendant is sufficient to comply with the rule. However, as distinguished from the case now before us, it must be noted that after the recitation of such ......
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People v. House
...... Under similar circumstances penitentiary sentences have been approved on appeal. (People v. Kail (1975), 28 Ill.App.3d 244, 328 N.E.2d 33; People v. Krouse (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543.) We cannot conclude that the sentence here was an abuse of discretion. We also cannot consider the sentence improper in view of the treatment given defendant's two companions. It is . Page 415. [53 Ill.Dec. 780] well recognized that ......
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People v. Abel
...... It is true that the defendant was not explicitly advised that he had a right to plead not guilty. We agree with our colleagues in the Fifth District as stated by them in the case of People v. Krouse, 7 Ill.App.3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543 that the object and purpose of the requirement found in Rule 402 that the defendant be advised of his right to plead not guilty is to ascertain that the defendant be aware of the alternatives available to him. In this case as in Krouse the defendant was advised of ......