People v. Krugman

• Decision Date: 01 October 1965
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Citation: 141 N.W.2d 33,377 Mich. 559
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Dorothy KRUGMAN, Defendant and Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 33

141 N.W.2d 33

377 Mich. 559

The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Dorothy KRUGMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 2, Oct. Term, 1965.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 5, 1966.

Rehearing Denied June 8, 1966.

Bruce O. Wilson, Birmingham, for defendant and appellant.

S. Jerome Bronson, Pros. Atty., Thomas G. Plunkett, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Pontiac, for plaintiff and appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

SOURIS, Justice.

Defendant appeals from her conviction by an Oakland county circuit court jury, in October, 1963, of an armed robbery ¹ allegedly committed December 1, 1962. Three questions are raised on this appeal.

I.

Defendant pleaded not guilty and also raised the defense of insanity. She argues that the circuit judge erred in refusing to give this requested instruction:

'10. I further instruct you that the two tests used in determining the legal insanity of an accused, namely, that of knowing the difference between right and wrong and that of the irresistible impulse to commit a wrongful act are legal tests that have been known to the law for many years, but now that science has more recently enlarged and expanded its knowledge of the diseases of the mind, the more enlightened viewpoint is expressed in a new and more modern rule of law called 'The Durham Rule of Law on Legal Insanity', and I instruct you that if you find in this case that the defendant, Dorothy Krugman, is, in fact, suffering from a mental disease, then you must find her not guilty by reason of insanity, even though you find that she may be able to distinguish between right and wrong, or that she did not have an irresistible impulse to commit the act in question, because under this viewpoint the test is that an accused is not criminally responsible if her unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or mental defect.'

The Durham rule was announced in the case of Durham v. United States (1954), 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862, 874--875, 45 A.L.R.2d 1439, in these terms:

'The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in future cases is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870. (See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399.) It is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.

'* * * (A jury's) task would not be completed upon finding * * * that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental abnormality and the act. * * *'

A comparison of defendant's requested instruction with the language of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals makes it readily apparent that defendant's statement of the Durham rule is inaccurate and misleading, insofar as it tells the jury that 'if you find in this case that the defendant, Dorothy Krugman, is, in fact, suffering from a mental disease, then you must find her not guilty by reason of insanity'. What is lacking, of course, is the Durham Caveat that there must also be a causal connection between the mental abnormality and the criminal act. Since there is no authority for the charge as requested by defendant, the circuit judge did not err in refusing to give it. See Hakkers v. Hansen (1953), 337 Mich. 620, 625, 60 N.W.2d 487, and cases there cited.

Had defendant properly requested a charge in accordance with the Durham rule, our task would have been somewhat different. Then we would have been obliged to decide whether this Court in the exercise of its common law authority should adopt a new test for determining criminal responsibility or continue to adhere to the venerable, if not venerated, right-wrong test and the irresistible impulse test. See People v. Durfee (1886), 62 Mich. 487, 29 N.W. 109. When, and if, such a choice is squarely presented to us, we shall have to review the desirability of changing the law in Michigan with regard to criminal responsibility not only in light of decisions like Durham and United States v. Freeman (2d Cir., 1966), 357 F.2d 190, ² but also with regard to the principle announced, and thence seemingly overlooked, in People v. Garbutt (1868), 17 Mich. 9, 23:

'* * * if it appeared from the evidence that defendant was afflicted with insanity, and such affliction was the efficient cause of the act, he ought to be acquitted by the jury. * * *'

II.

A criminal defendant is presumptively sane. However, once there is any evidence introduced of insanity, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Garbutt, supra; People v. Eggleston (1915), 186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944.

A psychiatrist called in defendant's behalf testified that in his opinion defendant did not know, at the time of the alleged crime, the difference between right and wrong with respect to the criminal act charged against her. At the close of proofs defendant moved for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, alleging that the doctor's testimony was uncontroverted. Defendant assigns as error the circuit judge's denial of this motion.

However valid defendant's contention might be had there been no record basis for the jury to discount the doctor's testimony, as this case of Krugman is presented to us for...