People v. Kuczynski
| Decision Date | 30 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 36213,36213 |
| Citation | 23 Ill.2d 320,178 N.E.2d 294 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error. v. Stanley KUCZYNSKI, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Ray H. Greenblatt and George Bobrinskoy, Jr., Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John T. Gallagher and Rudolph L. Janega, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.
After trial without a jury in the criminal court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of the crime of armed robbery. The court sentenced him to the penitentiary for life after the prosecutor filed a written statement concerning former convictions under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 603.1 et seq.) From his conviction and sentence defendant prosecutes this writ of error.
Francis Haggerty, William J. Gossett, and Stanley Kuczynski, the defendant herein, were indicted for the armed robbery of William Schewe. Haggerty and defendant were granted a severance from Gossett for trial. They were found guilty, and, after a hearing under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act, defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Schewe testified that his insurance office was robbed by three men, one having a gun and another being masked. His hands were tied and he was placed in a washroom. He worked his hands free, took a gun which he kept in the washroom and came out shooting. He testified that he could then observe defendant because he was no longer wearing the mask. At the trial he positively identified defendant. Mrs. Adrienne Latocha testified that as she started to enter Schewe's office, she was shoved aside by the first of three men who came out of the door. Although Mrs. Latocha was unable to identify the first two men who rushed past her, she identified the third as the defendant.
Codefendant Haggerty testified that he did not commit the robbery and that he did not see defendant on that day. He further testified that, at the preliminary hearing before a police magistrate, Schewe said he 'could not absolutely identify' defendant because the third man was masked. At the trial both Schewe and Franklin Park chief of police Bondlow said Schewe identified defendant at the hearing.
Defendant argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow defendant's attorney to testify and in denying defendant's motion for a continuance to secure additional witnesses who could testify as to what took place at the preliminary hearing. Defendant's attorney asked leave to withdraw as counsel in order to testify that Schewe was unable to identify defendant at the preliminary hearing. When his motion was denied, he asked for a continuance on the grounds of surprise to secure other persons who were at the hearing, which motion was also denied. As it is apparent that Schewe's testimony surprised defendant, the trial judge should have allowed defendant's attorney to testify and should have granted him a continuance to procure witnesses to explain what occurred at the preliminary hearing.
Although we remand for a new trial, we deem it advisable to discuss whether defendant was properly sentenced under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 38, par. 603.1 et seq.) in order to avoid a possible error in sentencing in a subsequent trial.
The act governing principal offenses committed prior to the effective date (July 1, 1957), of the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act provided for a mandatory sentence equal to the maximum term of...
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...v. Smith, 13 Cal.App.3d 897, 91 Cal.Rptr. 786 (1970); Fish v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 761, 160 S.E.2d 576 (1968); People v. Kuczynski, 23 Ill.2d 320, 178 N.E.2d 294 (1961); State v. Bechtelheimer, 151 Kan. 582, 100 P.2d 657 (1940); People v. Attaway, 41 Ill.App.3d 837, 354 N.E.2d 448 (1976); ......
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...as a result of "surprise" testimony. (See People v. Lott (1977), 66 Ill.2d 290, 5 Ill.Dec. 841, 362 N.E.2d 312; People v. Kuczynski (1961), 23 Ill.2d 320, 178 N.E.2d 294.) Both possible rebuttal witnesses here were present in court. Further, unlike Kuczynski, the circuit court here offered ......
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