People v. Kuhns
| Decision Date | 08 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC: 163686,COA: 352179 |
| Citation | 976 N.W.2d 660 (Mem) |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Bryan KUHNS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 16, 2021 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
I concur in the Court's denial but write separately because I believe that had the defendant raised a challenge to his competency at sentencing , he may have been entitled to resentencing.
The defendant, James Kuhns, admitted to the police that he murdered Leonard Hempel and was charged with open murder. He was originally represented by attorney Louis Willford. The parties agreed that Kuhns's competency should be evaluated, and he was found to be competent. Shortly after, Willford moved to withdraw as counsel and the defendant was represented by attorney Dwight Carpenter moving forward.
Eleven months after the competency evaluation, Kuhns pled guilty to the open-murder charge. The record from the plea hearing suggests that Kuhns understood what was happening. He stated his name clearly and indicated that he understood the charge and the possible penalties associated with it. And after the judge described each of the rights Kuhns was giving up, Kuhns again said he understood. Kuhns's responses suggested he pled guilty to open murder knowingly and voluntarily. The only possible indication that Kuhns didn't appreciate the rights he was waiving was the plea deal itself, which wasn't much of a deal at all. Kuhns pled guilty to the charge of open murder, with no benefit in exchange for the rights he was waiving. At a later evidentiary hearing to determine the degree of murder, the court found Kuhns guilty of first-degree murder.
Almost a year after the plea hearing, Kuhns was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the sentencing hearing, it appears Kuhns's mental state had deteriorated significantly. He was confused about who his lawyer was and asked what his own name was. Speaking to the judge, he said: But the judge was unconcerned, and accused Kuhns of putting on an act: he told Kuhns he was "not going to go through theatrics here where you pretend not to understand what is going on."
With the aid of appellate counsel, Kuhns filed a motion to withdraw his plea, hold a second competency evaluation, and conduct a Ginther hearing. His appellate counsel attached an "offer of proof" to the motion, which was unsworn. In the offer of proof, appellate counsel describes a meeting with Kuhns from about five months after the sentencing hearing where his speech was nonsensical. She also spoke to both of his trial attorneys, Willford and Carpenter, and learned that they had been concerned about Kuhns's mental state but failed to take action. Carpenter, who represented the defendant from before the plea hearing through sentencing, recalled asking the prosecutor for a second competency evaluation at some unspecified point. But Kuhns's appellate counsel also spoke with the prosecutor and she had no memory of this. In fact, she said she would have supported a second evaluation if asked. The "offer of proof" also mentioned letters Kuhns sent to the sheriff and to Willford—one sent before the plea hearing, another sent after the sentencing hearing—both containing erratic statements indicative of declining mental health.
The trial court denied the motion, including the requests for a new competency evaluation and Ginther hearing. The defendant appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed. People v Kuhns , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 16, 2021 (Docket No. 352179), 2021 WL 4238026.
On appeal, Kuhns raised two arguments about his competency. First, his plea wasn't knowing and voluntary because he wasn't competent at the plea hearing. Second, his two trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request a new competency evaluation before his plea hearing.
Because his appellate counsel framed both arguments around Kuhns's plea, I agree with the Court of Appeals that his arguments lack merit. The record of the plea hearing indicates that Kuhns understood the charge against him, the possible penalties, and the rights he was waiving. I agree with the Court of Appeals that his plea was "understanding and voluntary" and therefore "no error in the plea-taking process" can be shown. Kuhns , unpub. op. at 5. The transcript of this hearing doesn't indicate a lack of understanding. And therefore, even if his trial attorneys were objectively unreasonable for failing to request a reevaluation before his plea hearing, I also agree with the Court of Appeals that the defendant hasn't demonstrated prejudice from such an error.
In contrast, at the sentencing hearing, the record suggests that Kuhns's mental state had declined significantly. A claim that Kuhns was not competent at sentencing would warrant factual development at an evidentiary hearing.
If Kuhns was incompetent at sentencing, I believe this would have entitled him to resentencing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that if the trial court "has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant may not have a level of awareness sufficient to understand the nature of the proceeding or to exercise his right of allocution, the judge should not proceed...." Saddler v United States , 531 F.2d 83, 86 (CA 2, 1976). Our court rules provide an analogous allocution right: a court must "give the defendant ... an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence[.]" MCR 6.425(D)(1)(c). This opportunity is meaningless if a defendant is incompetent.
If a trial court fails to provide an opportunity for allocution, resentencing is required. People v Wells , 238 Mich App 383, 392, 605 NW2d 374 (1999), citing People v Berry , 409 Mich 774, 781, 298 NW2d 434 (1980), overruled on other grounds by People v Petit , 466 Mich 624, 633, 648 NW2d 193 (2002). And that opportunity must be "meaningful." People v Bailey , 330 Mich App 41, 67, 944 NW2d 370 (2019) (). If a defendant is incompetent at sentencing, they do not have a meaningful opportunity for allocution.
Because Kuhns has not argued that he is entitled to resentencing, I can't say that the Court of Appeals erred.
I dissent from the Court's denial order because I believe the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v Ginther , 390 Mich 436, 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
If defendant's representations are accurate, a lot seems to have gone wrong in this case. After defendant was charged with open murder, defense counsel and the prosecution stipulated to the need for a forensic examination. On August 8, 2017, the trial court entered an order, finding defendant competent to stand trial. Defendant, however, did not plead guilty until almost a year later in June 2018.1 I agree with Chief Justice MCCORMACK in her concurring statement that, on its face, the transcript of the plea hearing does not reveal that defendant was incompetent.2 However, defendant's appellate attorney now claims that defendant's trial attorneys have expressed to her that defendant was showing signs of serious mental illness between the competency finding and the plea proceeding. The record does not suggest that the trial court was made privy to this information, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not further inquiring into defendant's competence. People v Kammeraad , 307 Mich App 98, 138, 858 NW2d 490 (2014). Further, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's request for a second competency examination. That request was not made until August 2019 as part of defendant's attempt to withdraw his plea. Any information about defendant's competency at that point in time would have little bearing on the state of defendant's competency 14 months earlier because competency is not a static state of being. See Drope v Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) ; People v Blocker , 393 Mich 501,...
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