People v. L.A.S.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 61900,61900
• Citation: 111 Ill.2d 539,490 N.E.2d 1271,96 Ill.Dec. 66
• Parties: , 96 Ill.Dec. 66 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. L.A.S., a Minor, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1271

490 N.E.2d 1271

111 Ill.2d 539, 96 Ill.Dec. 66

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. L.A.S., a Minor, Appellee.

No. 61900.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 19, 1986.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Robert J. Biderman,Deputy

Director, Gwendolyn W. Klingler, Staff Atty., Springfield, for appellant; Jeffrey K. Davison, State's Atty., Decatur, of counsel.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Springfield, Karen Munoz, Asst. Defender, for appellee.

Justice MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from a decision of the appellate court reversing a judgment of the circuit court of Macon County which summarily found respondent, a minor, guilty of direct criminal contempt for failing to return to court at the conclusion of a short recess. A majority of the appellate court held that respondent's failure to return to court could constitute only indirect criminal comtempt and could not be punished summarily but required notice and hearing. (132 Ill.App.3d 811, 87 Ill.Dec. 601, 477 N.E.2d 727.) We allowed the State's appeal, which presents a single question for review: Did the respondent's failure to reappear for her probation-revocation hearing, after a brief recess declared by the court, constitute direct criminal contempt?

On April 30, 1984, respondent was found guilty of retail theft under $150 in violation of section 16A-3(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 16A-3(a)). Pursuant to the terms of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 37, par. 701-1 et seq.), respondent was adjudged a delinquent minor, made a ward of the court, and placed on probation for 18 months. Among the terms of her probation, respondent was to reside with her parents, be home every evening by 10 p.m. unless accompanied by one of her parents, remain in Macon County unless consent to leave the county was given by her probation officer, and not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction.

On May 31, 1984, respondent was taken into custody for violating the terms of her probation. She was alleged to have been absent from her home for 3 1/2 weeks without authorization. Respondent was released into the custody of her mother pending a hearing set for June 8. However, on June 2, respondent was taken into custody for allegedly committing the offense of armed robbery in violation of section 18-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)).

The hearing convened as scheduled on June 8 to consider the State's allegations that respondent had violated the terms of her probation. Respondent denied the alleged violations. The circuit court then ordered a full hearing on the matter for July 24, 1984. Prior to the date of this hearing, respondent again left her home without authorization and also left the State of Illinois. A warrant was issued, and respondent was taken into custody in the State of Kansas on July 3, 1984. She was returned to Illinois, where she was remanded into the custody of the sheriff until July 24, the date of her probation-revocation hearing. On that date, the hearing was continued to August 2, 1984, because material witnesses were not present. Respondent was once more released into her mother's custody.

Respondent's probation-revocation hearing convened as scheduled on the August date. After the State completed its case in chief, the circuit court recessed for 10 minutes. At the conclusion of the recess, respondent had not returned to court. Neither her mother nor her attorney knew of respondent's whereabouts or any reason why she had not returned.

The State asked the court to issue another warrant. The warrant issued, and respondent was taken into custody on August 12, 1984. On August 14, prior to proceeding with the probation-revocation hearing, the court summarily found respondent in direct criminal contempt for failing to return after recess of the court on August 2. The court found "[that] the minor wilfully absented herself from the courtroom, [c]ourt[h]ouse and was later detained pursuant to warrant issued." It was the further finding of the court "that such conduct was calculated to, and in fact did embarrass, hinder and obstruct the [c]ourt in its administration of justice and did derogate from its authority and dignity, and did bring the administration of justice into disrepute." The court then sentenced respondent to 30 days' confinement at the Logan County Safety Complex. The court denied respondent's motion to delay imposition of sentence pending appeal.

Respondent filed notice of appeal from the contempt order. While her appeal was pending, respondent's probation-revocation hearing resumed and she was found guilty of armed robbery. Her probation was revoked, and respondent was remanded into the custody of the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division.

This court has defined criminal contempt of court "as conduct which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct a court in its administration of justice or derogate from its authority or dignity, thereby bringing the administration of law into disrepute." (People v. Javaras (1972), 51 Ill.2d 296, 299, 281 N.E.2d 670; People v. Siegel (1983), 94 Ill.2d 167, 171, 68 Ill.Dec. 118, 445 N.E.2d 762.) Further, the court has recognized two forms of criminal contempt: direct and indirect.

Direct criminal contempt is contemptuous conduct occurring "in the very presence of the judge, making all of the elements of the offense matters within his own personal knowledge." (People v. Harrison (1949), 403 Ill. 320, 323-24, 86 N.E.2d 208.) Direct contempt is "strictly restricted to acts and facts seen and known by the court, and no matter resting upon opinions, conclusions, presumptions or inferences should be considered." People v. Loughran (1954), 2 Ill.2d 258, 263, 118 N.E.2d 310.

Indirect criminal contempt is contemptuous conduct "which in whole or in an essential part occurred out of the presence of the court, is not admitted, and which is therefore dependent for its proof upon evidence of some kind. [Citation.] Where the judge does not have full personal knowledge of every element of the contempt and its demonstration depends on the...