People v. LaBree

• Decision Date: 13 June 1974
• Citation: 357 N.Y.S.2d 412,313 N.E.2d 730,34 N.Y.2d 257
• Parties: , 313 N.E.2d 730 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Nathaniel LaBREE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 412

357 N.Y.S.2d 412

34 N.Y.2d 257, 313 N.E.2d 730

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v.Nathaniel LaBREE, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Enw York.

June 13, 1974.

Steven B. Mendelsohn and William E. Hellerstein, New York City, for appellant.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Richard D. Carruthers, Asst. Dist. Atty., of counsel), for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The case before us for decision presents yet another of those situations wherein the defendant stoutly maintains that his Sixth Amendment right to representation by counsel was violated because his assigned lawyer was so inadequate and ineffective as to deprive him of a fair trial.Such a claim is often advanced following a protracted period of imprisonment during which the convicted person develops a penetrating hindsight as to how his counsel should have conducted the trial.This case, however, does not concern an allegation of incompetence made only after the conviction, nor is it one of the more ordinary remote postconviction attacks which has been developed following keen disappointment in the lack of adroitness on the part of counsel.

Defendant was indicted for the murder of Clifford Van Putten, it being charged that he shot him in the presence of one Amos Grant.Before the commencement of the trial and again after the prosecution's first witness had testified, the defendant made application to the Trial Judge to have his assigned lawyer be relieved and for the appointment of another attorney to represent him, stating as his reasons that counsel failed to understand him, that his lawyer had not prepared the case for trial, that he could not discuss the facts intelligently with him, and that he was not being properly represented.In denying the applications the Trial Judge advised defendant that if necessary he should write notes to his counsel suggesting questions to be asked of witnesses and that if he(the Trial Judge) discovered the need for any help he would 'come into the case'.

Following what may be considered to be an ineffective and confusing opening by defense counsel, the prosecution produced the witness Grant.Defendant's attorney proceeded to conduct a brief and fruitless cross-examination following which the Trial Judge, obviously recognizing the apparent inadequacies, inquired of the District Attorney whether any prior statements had been made by the witness; and, in response, the prosecutor delivered statements made by Grant on two separate occasions.Nonetheless, counsel declined to even examine the statements until prompted by the court, following which the Trial Judge proceeded to 'cross-examine' the witness, eliciting certain discrepancies and other information favorable to the defendant, including Grant's prior criminal record of convictions for drug possession.

The record further discloses that in his opening, counsel outlined a defense claim of an accidental shooting, a theory which he abandoned on summation wherein he theorized that the shooting was done in self-defense, despite the lack of substantiation therefor.Additionally, the Trial Judge found it necessary to conduct an inordinate amount of questioning of witnesses, to the point that in colloquy with defense counsel regarding the conduct of the trial, he felt impelled to comment 'I can't argue with a gentleman who does not understand me'.And, finally, we note that the ultimate facet of his representation of the defendant is epitomized by his unexplained failure to appear at sentencing at which time defendant received the maximum sentence following a guilty verdict of manslaughter first degree.In sum, it may be said that the Trial Judge himself was dissatisfied with the defense accorded the accused which is further evidenced by his explanation to the jury that his participation in the questioning of witnesses was necessitated by counsel's omissions.This is also indicated by his Sua sponte curative instruction to the jury when no defense objection was interposed to the prosecutor's suggestion in summation that an inference of guilt might be drawn from defendant's silence, and his virtual taking control of the 'cross-examination' of the main prosecution witness.Clearly, then, where as here demonstrated, in light of all the inadequacies taken together, the record reveals a complete lack of investigation and preparation,...