People v. Laiwa
| Decision Date | 29 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 21900 |
| Citation | 175 Cal.Rptr. 840,122 Cal.App.3d 190 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Raymond LAIWA III, Defendant and Respondent. |
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., John T. Murphy, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.
Sheldon Portman, Public Defender, Barbara B. Fargo, Rosemary S. Morrison, Deputy Public Defenders, County of Santa Clara, San Jose, for defendant and respondent.
The People appeal the granting of a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (o).
The facts are not in dispute. At approximately noon on July 8, 1980, San Jose Police Officer Harry Sanchez and his partner were on routine patrol southbound on South 2nd Street in San Jose when they saw respondent Raymond Laiwa in the parking lot. Respondent appeared to be under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP); his movements were very stiff and "robot like." Officer Sanchez approached Laiwa and gave him a test for nystagmus (jerky eye movement) which confirmed his belief the respondent was under the influence of PCP. Officer Sanchez took respondent's handbag from him.
Laiwa was placed under arrest for violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f), a misdemeanor, for being under the influence of PCP. He was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car. The officer's usual procedure in such an arrest was to book the arrestee, who would then be strip-searched and his belongings removed; the officer intended to book respondent. He then searched the handbag, and found one hand-rolled cigarette which he believed to be PCP. Laiwa was then transported to the police station, where he was booked and charged with possession of PCP. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).)
The trial court granted Laiwa's motion to suppress the evidence seized by the police in the warrantless search of his handbag at the scene of the arrest. The People contend that the search was an incident to a lawful arrest wherein respondent was to be taken into custody and as such no warrant was required. We agree and reverse the order.
We initially acknowledge that searches conducted without warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290; People v. Minjares (1979) 24 Cal.3d 410, 416, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514.) Moreover, if a warrantless search is to be upheld, it is the People's burden to show that the search falls within one of those exceptions. (People v. Maher (1976) 17 Cal.3d 196, 203, 130 Cal.Rptr. 508, 550 P.2d 1044.)
Among those exceptions is the warrantless search incident to arrest. It is well settled that a warrantless search, limited both as to time and place, may be made (1) for instrumentalities of the crime, its fruits, and other evidence which will aid in the apprehension or conviction of the criminal; (2) for articles of contraband the possession of which is unlawful, such as controlled substances or goods known to be stolen; and (3) for weapons which can be used to assault the arresting officer or to effect an escape. (People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970) 3 Cal.3d 807, 812-813, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449, citing generally Warden v. Hayden, (1967) 387 U.S. 294, 300-310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1646-52, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 and Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.)
In United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 the Supreme Court (hewed to a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced: '(I)n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement, but it is also a "reasonable" search under (the Fourth) amendment.' " (New York v. Belton, (1981) -- U.S. --, --, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2863, 69 L.Ed.2d 728.)
In Belton the Supreme Court acknowledged that there existed confusion in the application of its holding articulated in Robinson. (See Belton, ibid. p. --, 101 S.Ct. p. 2863.) The court opined that no straightforward rule had in fact emerged after Robinson. In fact there had developed a series of conflicting federal cases based upon similar facts and furthermore "(t)he state court cases are in similar disarray." (Id., p. --, fn. 1, 101 S.Ct. p. 2863, fn. 1.) To remedy that confusion, the court clarified what may be searched incident to a lawful custodial arrest other than the person of the arrestee. At issue was the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to the lawful arrest of its occupants, in light of Chimel's directive that such a search may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control of the arrestee. Emphasizing the need for a standard workable rule, easily applied and predictably enforced, the court held that the arresting officer could search the car's passenger compartment and any containers within the passenger compartment, whether open or closed. The justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of that privacy interest. (Id., p. --, 101 S.Ct. p. 2864.)
We recognize that the decision of this division in People v. Pace (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 199, 154 Cal.Rptr. 811, reflects that confusion. In this case the trial court relied on Pace in granting respondent's motion to suppress. The Pace panel relied on United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 to hold that after an individual was arrested for being under the influence of drugs, and the lunchbox which he carried was removed from his immediate control, the warrantless search of that container was unlawful. Chadwick involved the validity of the warrantless search of a padlocked footlocker seized at a train station. After arresting three individuals, federal officers took the locker to a government garage, where they searched it over an hour and a half later. Disapproving that search, the Supreme Court stated, (Id., p. 15, 97 S.Ct. p. 2485.) It was that language upon which this division relied in Pace to hold that after police seized the lunchbox, its warrantless search was unlawful. However, Belton points out that Chadwick does not involve a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest and makes clear that Chadwick simply does not prohibit the seizure and prompt search of a container within the immediate control of an arrestee incident to his lawful arrest. (Belton, supra, -- U.S. at p. --, 101 S.Ct. at p. 2865.) 1 For that reason, Pace can no longer be considered persuasive authority.
Other courts have apparently also read Chadwick too broadly. In People v. Minjares, supra, 24 Cal.3d 410, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514, our Supreme Court considered the validity of the search of a tote bag seized from the trunk of a car. In dictum, the court stated, "It is clear from Chadwick itself that the tote bag would not have been subject to a warrantless search if appellant had been arrested on the street and the bag taken from his possession...." (At pp. 419-420, 153 Cal.Rptr. 224, 591 P.2d 514.) However, in light of Belton, it is apparent that Chadwick simply does not declare the standard against which to assess the validity of a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Although in Belton the search was of an automobile, the court made clear that its holding applied to all custodial arrest searches. The court cited Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 wherein it held that a lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area. In Belton the court clarified the application of that holding as it applied to automobile searches. It is clear therefore that the search here did not offend the federal constitutional provisions against warrantless searches.
We recognize, however, that the California Constitution is a document of independent force, which may require a more exacting standard for cases arising within the state. (People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 115, 127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 545, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099.) Therefore, we must also consider whether this search violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.
As has been stated, in United States v. Robinson, supra, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 the Supreme Court held that because a custodial arrest based upon probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, a full search of the person for weapons and evidence incident to that arrest requires no additional justification and is a "reasonable" search under that Amendment. (Id., p. 235, 94 S.Ct. p. 477.)
In People v. Brisendine, supra, 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 the California Supreme Court disagreed with Robinson insofar as it declared a flat rule that the fact of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. Superior Court
...of what the majority accurately describes as the "seemingly endlessly recurring" issue presented in this case. (People v. Laiwa (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 190, 175 Cal.Rptr. 840, hg. granted Oct. 2, 1981.) Since our Supreme Court has granted a hearing in Laiwa, we may reasonably hope that the co......
-
People v. Johnson
...on the subject. Simply stated, I urge the California Supreme Court to settle the question once and for all. 1 People v. Laiwa (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 190, 175 Cal.Rptr. 840 (hg. granted) is presently before the Supreme Court. In that case, however, the search was not of an automobile incident......