People v. Lamson, Docket No. 13642
| Decision Date | 18 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,Docket No. 13642,3 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bruce LAMSON, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Donald A. Burge, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and TARGONSKI, * JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny 1 and was sentenced to a term of 6 to 10 years in prison.
The complaint and information on which the defendant was charged alleged that 'on or about 7--21--71' defendant 'did then and there break and enter a certain building' which building was identified as the Black Ram Tavern.
The prosecutor, during his opening statement, indicated that the evidence would show that five persons planned and executed the theft. He further stated that the evidence would prove that the defendant and another man 'broke through a large window, went inside * * * (and) stole liquor, a television set, and an amount of money.'
One of the defendant's accomplices testified at trial that five men, including the defendant, planned the crime and divided the contraband. He further testified that he did not actually see the defendant enter the building, but heard the sound of breaking glass and saw the defendant make two or three trips from the building.
Following the prosecutor's summation, counsel for the defendant argued that since no one actually saw the defendant break and enter, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant had actually done so. The prosecutor, during rebuttal, stated that the defendant could also be convicted if he aided and abetted the one who actually committed the crime.
Prior to the instructions, defense counsel objected to the instructions on aiding and abetting but the trial court gave the instruction as requested by the prosecution.
The sole issue raised by the defendant can be stated as follows:
Was defendant denied due process by the failure of the information to specify the exact nature of the charges against him and the prosecutor's failure, at trial, to raise the theory of aiding and abetting until after all the proofs were in?
Thus, the first complaint of the defendant is addressed to the fact that the information only charged him with breaking and entering and not aiding and abetting.
M.C.L.A. § 767.39; M.S.A. § 28.979 states:
'Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction punished as if he had directly committed such offense.'
This statute has been held to authorize the type of information used in the instant case. In People v. Dockery, 20 Mich.App. 201, 207, 173 N.W.2d 726, 729 (1969), this Court rejected the exact contention presently before this Court using the following reasoning:
'Dockery argues that since the information filed by the people never included a charge of aiding and abetting, the charge was erroneous. He also asserts that no evidence was ever offered on that point. We disagree.
The distinction between accessories and principals has been abolished by statute, M.C.L.A. 767.39 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.979). The statute makes an aider and abettor into a principal and it is unnecessary to charge the defendant in any form other than as a principal. People v. Smith (1935), 271 Mich. 553, 260 N.W. 911; People v. McKeighan (1919), 205 Mich. 367, 171 N.W. 500. Therefore, the fact that the information failed to charge aiding and abetting is not relevant to the issue raised.' See also People v. Weatherspoon, 6 Mich.App. 233, 148 N.W.2d 891 (1967).
We find this line of authority to control the case before us and accordingly find no error with respect to the information.
The second argument raised by the defendant is that he was misled by the prosecution's opening statement and that this denied him a fair trial since he could have used certain 'accessorial defenses' if he had known that he would be convicted as an aider and abettor.
The prosecutor in his opening statement advised the jury that he would prove that five persons,...
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State v. Miller
...punished as a principal and no denial of due process results from charging an aider and abettor as a principal. People v. Lamson, 44 Mich.App. 447, 205 N.W.2d 189 (1972); People v. Palmer, 42 Mich.App. 549, 202 N.W.2d 536 (1972); People v. Dockery, 20 Mich.App. 201, 173 N.W.2d 726 (1969); P......
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People v. Hooper
...punished as a principal and no denial of due process results from charging an aider and abettor as a principal. People v. Lamson, 44 Mich.App. 447, 205 N.W.2d 189 (1972); People v. Palmer, 42 Mich.App. 549, 202 N.W.2d 536 (1972); People v. Dockery, 20 Mich.App. 201, 173 N.W.2d 726 (1969); P......
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People v. Battle
...in the information. People v. Hooper, 50 Mich.App. 186, 212 N.W.2d 786 (1973), Lv. den., 391 Mich. 808 (1974), People v. Lamson, 44 Mich.App. 447, 205 N.W.2d 189 (1973), Lv. den., 389 Mich. 783 (1973). Next, defendant argues that the evidence adduced at trial did not support an aiding and a......
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People v. Swindlehurst
...name in the information on which he was convicted, on a theory of aiding and abetting, requires reversal. See People v. Lamson, 44 Mich.App. 447, 205 N.W.2d 189 (1973), lv. den. 389 Mich. 783 (1973). The distinction between an aider and abettor and a principal has been abolished in this sta......