People v. Lane

• Decision Date: 23 December 1942
• Docket Number: No. 103.,103.
• Citation: 7 N.W.2d 210,304 Mich. 29
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LANE.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

304 Mich. 29

7 N.W.2d 210

PEOPLE

v.LANE.

No. 103.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 23, 1942.

James Wilson Lane was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals.

Conviction and sentence set aside and new trial granted.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Genesee County; Paul V. Gadola, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

Ralph M. Freeman, of Flint, for appellant.

Stephen J. Roth, of Flint, Pros. Atty. for appellee.

BOYLES, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by jury of the crime of murder of the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment in Southern Michigan State prison at Jackson. A recital of the facts is not essential to decision. The refusal of the court to charge the jury as to the importance and effect of character testimony requires reversal.

Several witnesses testified as to the reputation of the defendant (who testified in his own behalf) for truth and veracity in the vicinity where he resided, and also as to his general reputations as a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Some of this testimony was received without objection, and some of it was otherwise admissible. The defendant filed with the court, in writing, a request to instruct the jury as to the importance and effect of character testimony. The request as filed was lengthy and to some extent would now be considered argumentative, although approved verbatim by this court in People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95. The court refused to give the requested instruction, and failed entirely to charge the jury as to the importance or effect of such testimony. Defendant was charged with murder of the first degree, involving the element of malice aforethought. The verdict was based largely on circumstantial evidence. We have repeatedly held that failure to charge the jury upon the effect of testimony to show character and good reputation is reversible error.

In People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Am.Dec. 162, where the defendant was convicted upon an information for murder, the trial court, although so requested, refused to charge the jury that as to good reputation it is for the jury to consider whether such reputation tends to rebut the presumption of malice. The court said:

‘Good character is an important fact with every man; and never more so than when he is put on trial charged with an offense which is rendered improbable in the last degree by a uniform course of life wholly inconsistent with any such crime. There are cases where it becomes a man's sole dependence, and yet may prove sufficient to outweight evidence of the most positive character. The most clear and convincing cases are sometimes satisfactorily rebutted by it, and a life of unblemished integrity becomes a complete shield of protection against the most skillful web of suspicion and falsehood which conspirators have been able to weave. Good character may not only raise a doubt of guilt which would not otherwise exist, but it may bring conviction of innocence.’

In People v. Jassino, 100 Mich. 536, 59 N.W. 230, it was held error to charge the jury ‘when there is positive proof of the commission of an offense, then good character cannot avail to overthrow that proof.’ This court said: ‘We think the charge as given by the court on its own motion is erroneous. By the instruction above quoted the defendant was denied the benefit of proof of good character if the jury should find positive evidence tending to show the commission of the offense. Evidence of good character is admissible not only in a case where doubt otherwise exists, but may be offered for the purpose of creating a doubt.’

In People v. Humphrey, 194 Mich. 10, 160 N.W. 445, 448, the defendant introduced testimony as to his reputation for honesty and integrity. The court, as in the Jassino case, supra, charged the jury that where there is positive proof of the commission of an offense, the good character cannot avail to overthrow that proof. In holding that this was reversible error, the court said:

‘It must be always regarded as a miscarriage of justice when the trial court affirmatively denies to a respondent the benefit of an elementary rule favorable to him, upon which, by the giving of testimony which invokes the application of the rule, he relies. This case and People v. Jassino [supra], cannot be distinguished. See, also, People v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135, and note, 60 N.W. 457;People v. Van Dam, 107 Mich. 425,67 N.W. 277;People v. Parker, 166 Mich. 587, 131 N.W. 1120;People v. Wilson, 170 Mich. 669, 137 N.W. 92, 41 L.R.A.,N.S., 216.’

In People v. McKeighan, 205 Mich. 367, 171 N.W. 500, 502, the court said:

‘With reference to good character the court charged the jury as follows:

“In doubtful cases good character has been used, or in circumstantial cases, to surround and assist and aid a man.'

‘The limitation by the court of evidence of good character to doubtful and circumstantial cases is an improper limitation, as good character is a proper element to be considered by the jury in every criminal case where an attempt is made to show good character. * * * We think that this failure to clearly instruct the jury upon this question was error prejudicial to the defendant, and for this reason...