People v. Langston

Citation226 N.W.2d 686,57 Mich.App. 666
Decision Date27 January 1975
Docket NumberDocket No. 17201,No. 1,1
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Erskine LANGSTON, Defendant-Appellee
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Patricia J. Boyle, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Neal Bush, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, P.J., and BRONSON and O'HARA, * JJ.

DANHOF, Presiding Judge.

Defendant was charged with first degree murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.316, M.S.A. § 28,548. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress both a confession and certain physical evidence obtained from him by the police following his arrest. An evidentiary hearing on these motions was held, and findings were made. An order was entered suppressing the confession and the other physical evidence, and quashing the information. Upon leave granted, the people appeal these findings and order. We affirm in part and remand.

On October 5, 1972, Mary Fotion, a 69-year-old woman who lived alone, was found murdered in the kitchen of her home. She died of multiple stab wounds to the chest and abdomen. A nylon stocking was tied around her neck, and her feet were bound with an electric wire. Blood was found in various rooms of the house. The victim's dress had been pulled above her knees, but there was no evidence of rape.

On October 6, 1972, the defendant, Erskine Langston, was arrested without a warrant by members of the homicide section of the Detroit Police Department. Detective Roffey of the homicide section testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had been assigned to the Fotion murder investigation at about 8:00 a.m. on the day of the defendant's arrest. Accompanying the file was a note from a superior officer indicating that there existed some similarities between the Fotion murder and the murder of Martion George in 1967.

Sergeant Roffey compared information from the file on the George murder to the information he had concerning the Fotion murder. He testified that he detected a number of common factors: both victims were elderly white women; both lived alone; both were found with something tied around their necks; both were bound and stabbed; both were found with their dresses pulled above their knees; and blood was found in several rooms indicating a struggle in both cases. In addition, in neither case was there any evidence of forced entry or of rape, nor were the homes ransacked, although robbery apparently occurred in both instances. The defendant's father lived within one-half mile of both murder scenes.

The defendant had been arrested and charged with the George murder in 1967. He was committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health until May 1970 at which time a sanity hearing was held. Reports from various authorities indicated that defendant suffered a 'mild mental deficiency'; his intelligence quotient was listed at 60; and he could neither read nor write. He was found competent to stand trial, but the charges against him in connection with the George murder were dismissed on motion of the prosecution because of insufficient evidence.

Detective Roffey investigated further and discovered that defendant Langston had been in the area at approximately the time that Mrs. Fotion was murdered. He decided not to seek a warrant, but rather he and members of the homicide section went to the Langston house to arrest the defendant. They encountered him on the sidewalk near his father's house and they arrested him for the murder of Mrs. Fotion.

Accompanied by his brother, James, defendant was taken to the homicide bureau at about 5 p.m. on Friday, October 6, 1972. His clothing was seized, and subsequent tests revealed that blood found on his jacket was the same type as that of the murder victim. Defendant asked that his father be present, and his father was brought to the police station where he remained until about 8:30 p.m. At that time the interrogation was suspended because the defendant indicated he was tired and that 'he would tell us about the crime in the morning'.

Questioning continued at 10:30 a.m. Saturday, October 7. Sergeant Roffey again read the defendant his Miranda 1 rights. Although he believed that the defendant was 'retarded', and he knew that the defendant had been committed to the Wayne County Training School for seven and one-half years, and that he spent over three years in the Wayne County Jail and in the Ionia State Hospital in connection with the George murder, Sergeant Roffey made no attempt to elaborate or explain these rights. He candidly conceded at the hearing that the defendant did not completely comprehend what was happening and that 'there were many things that I don't believe he understood'. At about 1:30 p.m., defendant made a statement in which he confessed to the murder of Mrs. Fotion. (This statement was tape recorded, but the recording was of such poor quality that it was virtually unintelligible and it was not accepted as evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Hence, the tape recording has not been considered by this Court.)

At approximately 4:15 p.m., Sergeant Roffey read a typed statement based on the confession to the defendant because he knew that the defendant could not read it for himself. In response to the officer's request, the defendant signed the statement. A warrant was issued and arraignment was held on Monday, October 9, 1972. A preliminary examination was held on October 19, 1972 and defendant was bound over for trial on the charge of first-degree murder.

Prior to trial, a combined hearing on the motions to suppress the confession and the jacket was held. The trial court ruled that the prosecution had not satisfied its burden of proving that the statement was voluntary, and that the defendant did not understand his Miranda rights. Also, the Court ruled that the confession was a result of an unlawful arrest and detetion designed to obtain evidence from the defendant rather than to bring him promptly before a magistrate. The motion to suppress the bloodstained jacket was also granted; the lower court ruled that it was seized incident to an unlawful arrest made without probable cause. The trial court then ruled that the remaining evidence was unsubstantial and the motion to quash the information was granted.

On appeal the people contend that the trial court erred in granting both motions to suppress. They argued that the arrest was lawful because it was supported by probable cause based on the likenesses between the two murders. According to this argument, the prior arrest of the defendant for the George murder, even though the charges were later dismissed, coupled with the similarities, was sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest without a warrant.

Authority for a police officer to arrest without a warrant is grounded in statute. In relevant part, M.C.L.A. § 764.15(c), M.S.A. § 28.874(c) provides that 'Any peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person * * * When a felony in fact has been committed and he has reasonable cause to believe that such persons has committed it'. Reasonable or probable cause stems from some fact, circumstance, or information which creates an honest belief in the mind of a reasonable and prudent man; that is, there must be good reason to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony. People v. Napolitano, 2 Mich.App. 601, 141 N.W.2d 356 (1966); lv. den., People v. Kedzierski, 378 Mich. 729. The facts upon which the belief is based must exist at the time of the arrest. People v. Major, 34 Mich.App. 405, 191 N.W.2d 494 (1971). Information subsequently acquired can have no bearing upon this determination. People v. Gwinn, 47 Mich.App. 134, 209 N.W.2d 297 (1973).

Actual facts creating an actual belief can alone give rise to probable cause. People v. Panknin, 4 Mich.App. 19, 143 N.W.2d 806 (1966). An officer may not arrest on mere suspicion. People v. Griffin, 33 Mich.App. 474, 190 N.W.2d 266 (1971); lv. den., 385 Mich. 775. Rather, the officer must entertain an honest, actual belief, based on reasonable grounds, that the arrested individual committed a felony. People v. Herrara, 19 Mich.App. 216, 172 N.W.2d 529 (1969). People v. Jones, 12 Mich.App. 369, 163 N.W.2d 22 (1968). A vague and general belief is not enough. People v. Reeves, 23 Mich.App. 183, 178 N.W.2d 115 (1970).

The prosecution has the burden of establishing that an arrest without a warrant is supported by probable cause, and in so doing, the standard is at least as stringent as that applied where an arrest warrant is sought. People v. Dogans, 26 Mich.App. 411, 182 N.W.2d 585 (1970). In the present case, the trial court indicated that the prosecution had not met this burden, and had arrested the defendant as a means of obtaining additional evidence. An arrest made as subterfuge for a search and seizure may be considered unlawful on that basis alone. People v. Wolfe, 5 Mich.App. 543, 147 N.W.2d 447 (1967); lv. den., 379 Mich. 756.

A prior record of criminal conduct can contribute to a finding of probable cause. Hammitt v. Straley, 338 Mich. 587, 61 N.W.2d 641 (1953). However, even a prior conviction for a similar crime is not enough, in and of itself, to provide probable cause to arrest without a warrant. Odinetz v. Budds, 315 Mich. 512, 24 N.W.2d 193 (1946). The United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964), held invalid an arrest without a warrant based on the fact that the...

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