People v. Lanphear

Citation608 P.2d 689,26 Cal.3d 814,163 Cal.Rptr. 601
Decision Date10 April 1980
Docket NumberCr. 20934,C
Parties, 608 P.2d 689 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Eugene LANPHEAR, Defendant and Appellant. In re Ronald Eugene LANPHEAR, on Habeas Corpus. r. 21167.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
[26 Cal.3d 820] Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Harold E. Shabo and Edward H. Schulman, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Meth, Jay M. Bloom and Harley D. Mayfield, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MANUEL, Justice.

Defendant Ronald Eugene Lanphear appeals from a judgment imposing the death penalty following his conviction of first degree murder. He also seeks a writ of habeas corpus based on allegations of ineffective representation by appointed trial counsel. The proceedings have been consolidated. We find no reversible error affecting the verdict of guilt or the finding of special circumstance. Challenged actions of trial counsel appear to be the product of informed tactical choices within the range of reasonable competence, and the trial court committed no prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings or instructions to the jury. We conclude, however, that the part of the judgment imposing the death penalty must be reversed. The trial court improperly excluded prospective jurors where the voir dire failed to make it "unmistakenly clear" that the jurors "would automatically vote In November 1978 defendant was charged by information with the murder of Robert Unger in San Bernardino County on July 4, 1978. (Pen.Code, § 187.) 1 The information alleged the use of a firearm in the commission of the offense ( § 12022.5) and that the murder was committed under "special circumstances" in that it was willful, deliberate and premeditated, and personally committed during the commission of a robbery. (See former § 190.2, subd. (c)(3)(i).) 2 It also included "aggravation allegations" 3 of two other murders, an escape, and two prior robbery convictions. 4

against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial," or that the [608 P.2d 692] jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty "would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522-523, fn. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 fn. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.)

At the guilt phase of the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty as charged and the special circumstance and use allegations to be true. No new evidence was introduced by either party at the penalty phase, and the jury returned a verdict of death. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial and an application for reduction of sentence ( § 190.4, subd. (e)). Defendant was sentenced to death; this appeal is automatic ( § 1239).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant escaped from jail in Elk Point, South Dakota in the night of July 8-9, 1978. He joined a friend, Diana Geisinger, in Sioux City, Iowa, and the two made plans to go to Texas and eventually to marry in Las Vegas. Diana "borrowed" an automobile, a 1967 Camaro, from a friend, and with $30 between them defendant and Diana left Sioux City. Defendant had a gun which he had taken from the guard in the escape. At the time, Diana was seven months pregnant.

Diana was the prosecution's chief witness. She testified to the events of the five-day journey which culminated in the murder of Unger on July 14. She related that defendant committed other crimes during the trip, that they spent two days in Glendale, Arizona with her brother, and that, with about $60, they went to Las Vegas on July 13.

After gambling in the casinos, they left Las Vegas heading toward California and stopped at a rest area on the Nevada side of the border. Having only a few cents between them, their intention was "to find some credit cards and some more money." They slept on picnic tables that night and on the following morning, July 14, still at the rest stop, continued to discuss ways in which to obtain money. Diana was told to ask a lady for a ride. When the woman refused, defendant asked a couple for a ride. The man said yes, but the woman declined. Unger then came to a nearby water fountain; defendant asked him for a ride "up the road" for gas. When Unger agreed, defendant and Diana got into Unger's vehicle, a green Matador with Ohio plates. Defendant sat in the front passenger seat with the revolver lying beside him wrapped in an orange towel. Diana sat in the back.

As they drove defendant kept asking Diana if she was all right. That was a cue to stop the vehicle so she could get out: "I just told him that I didn't want to be around . . . (w)hen he killed him." Diana announced that she felt sick and wanted out. She got out, went down a ditch, and feigned illness. She heard a shot, looked back, and saw defendant close the passenger door; he walked around to the driver's side, told her to stay put and that he would be back. Defendant drove off, but returned moments later. When Diana got in the back seat, Unger was still in the car. They drove down a dirt road and stopped in an area where defendant removed Unger from the car and placed him behind some bushes. Defendant then removed some coveralls from the trunk which he used to muzzle the gun and shot Unger two or three more times. Portions of Unger's personal effects were left by the body. Defendant went through the victim's pockets and took a wallet and watch. The two then drove back to the rest stop in Unger's car.

Blood from the Matador was removed and Unger's suitcases examined. Defendant transferred the license plates from the Camaro to the Matador. The couple returned to Las Vegas in the Matador. That night they gambled and stayed at the El Sombrero Motel. They sorted out Unger's property, including $200 in cash. The couple then drove back to Arizona where they lived with Diana's brother until late August or early September. Defendant obtained employment as a roofer.

In the weeks that followed their return to Arizona, the couple's relationship deteriorated and on October 8, 1978, Diana called the local police complaining that defendant had assaulted her. No charges were filed, but defendant moved out. On October 10, when he returned with Carolyn Williams to demand his "stuff," Diana informed him that she had thrown it away. Defendant told her that he would be back, that "I'd better dig myself a hole," and that "I'd be number four." After the incident Patsy Hall (Diana's neighbor) asked Diana what "all that" meant and Diana told her. Patsy and her son, a police cadet, persuaded Diana to talk to the police.

Detectives Adler and Stodell of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's office testified that they took Diana from Arizona to California on October 11, 1978. Enroute she pointed out the rest stop where she and defendant met Unger and, south of the state line in San Bernardino County, the location of his body.

Carolyn Williams testified that she first became aware that defendant may have been involved in murders when the police contacted her on October 12. By then defendant had left town. He contacted her that evening and stated "that some things had happened that he wasn't proud of and someday we would sit down and have a long talk about it." He also stated "that in a couple of hours it was all going to be over with and that he was sending me a letter and would I do what he asked in the letter." He was crying and Carolyn believed he was going to commit suicide. On the following day defendant called again and stated he was in Las Vegas. He asked Carolyn to burn the letters if she received them because he had changed his mind about committing suicide and now "the letters did not mean anything."

Carolyn received a letter from defendant which contained envelopes addressed to Diana, the Peoria, Arizona Police Department and Linda Balyeat of Sioux City, Iowa. Carolyn turned the letters over to the police. The letter to the police contained defendant's statement that he was guilty of three murders one in Kansas, one in California and one in New Mexico and that Diana had nothing to do with participation in the crimes.

Defendant was arrested in Las Vegas on October 14, 1978. At the time of his arrest defendant had Robert Unger's watch and was wearing a pair of his shoes.

Deputy Sheriff Michael Stodell and Sergeant Adler took defendant from Las Vegas to San Bernardino County on October 17, 1978. During the trip, defendant volunteered the statement "You know, Diana is innocent. She'd have turned me in a lot sooner, if she hadn't been so scared."

Defendant took the stand and denied committing the offense. He testified that, enroute to Las Vegas on July 13, he and Diana discussed the possibility of trading the Camaro, and sometime around 9 p. m. Diana left the casino to trade or sell the automobile. She returned about three hours later with "quite a bit of money." She said she had traded the car but refused to discuss the details of the trade. She had a 1971 Matador. He first saw Unger's clothing in the morning at the El Sombrero Motel. Two or three weeks later he found the pants with the name inside and finally learned from Diana what had happened. She did not go into details but said that she had killed a girl hitchhiker and Unger. He took the Matador to a car wash and washed the blood out of the inside. He spray painted the car shortly after returning to Arizona because Diana told him she had stolen the car.

In regard to the events of the journey leading up to the homicide in California, defendant admitted the escape and a Kansas gas station robbery, but denied the murders. He testified he had escaped from Elk Point, stolen the pistol, and robbed a service station attendant in Emporia,...

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