People v. Larson

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BIRD
• Citation: People v. Larson, 225 Mich. 355, 196 N.W. 412 (Mich. 1923)
• Decision Date: 19 December 1923
• Docket Number: No. 131.,131.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LARSON.

225 Mich. 355

196 N.W. 412

PEOPLE

v.LARSON.

No. 131.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 19, 1923.

Error to Circuit Court, Manistee County; Hal L. Cutler, Judge.

Lauritz A. Larson was convicted of obtaining signatures to partnership agreement by false pretenses, and he brings error. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, McDONALD, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ. A. B. Lovejoy, of Waterloo, Iowa, and Howard L. Campbell, of Manistee, for appellant.

A. W. Penny, of Cadillac, and P. T. Glassmire, of Manistee, Sp. Pros. Attys., for the People.

BIRD, J.

In 1917 defendant was a member of the banking firm of Brewster, Larson & Co., operating private banks at Copemish and Arcadia, in Manistee county, and Mesick, in Wexford county. By reason of losses occasioned by bad and worthless paper, the banks of Copemish and Mesick, in the latter part of the year 1917, were hard pressed for funds. In order to relieve this situation and restore confidence in the banks, defendant induced four farmers and one merchant living in the vicinity to become partners in the banks of Copemish and Mesick, and induced each of them to advance $1,000 to the banks. This help for a time steadied the situation, but the banks were so badly involved that within two years thereafter they were obliged to go into the hands of a receiver, and have their affairs wound up. The investment by the five men resulted disastrously to them, and they caused defendant and Charles W. Beatty, who managed the Mesick bank, to be arrested for obtaining money from them and obtaining their signatures to the partnership agreement by false pretenses, in violation of C. L. 1915, § 15320. Defendant Larson demanded a separate trial. This was given him, and he was convicted and sentenced to prison.

1. A motion was made to quash the information on the grounds: (a) That no offense is set forth in the complaint; (b) that the information is bad for duplicity.

(a) The statute under which the information is filed provides that:

‘Every person who, with intent to defraud or cheat, shall designedly, by color of any false token or writing or by any false or bogus check or other written, printed or engraved instrument, by spurious coin or metal in the similitude of coin, or by any other false pretense, cause any person, natural or corporate, to grant, convey, assign, demise, lease or mortgage any land or interest in land, or obtain the signature of any person, natural or corporate, to any written instrument, the making whereof would be punishable as forgery, or obtain from any person, natural or corporate, any money or personal property or the use of any instrument, facility or article or other valuable thing or service, or by means of any false weights or measures obtain a larger amount or quantity of property than was bargained for, or by means of any false weights or measures sell or dispose of a less amount or quantity of property than was bargained for, if such land or interest in land, money, personal property, use of such instrument, facility or article, valuable thing, service, larger amount obtained or less amount disposed of, shall be of the value of twenty-five dollars or less, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding three months, and if such land, interest in land, money, personal property, use of such instrument, facility or article, valuable thing, service, larger amount obtained or less amount disposed of shall be of the value of more than twenty-five dollars, such person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than ten years or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not more than one year.’ C. L. 1915, § 15320.

Counsel make the point that the copartnership agreement is not such a written instrument ‘the making whereof would be punishable as forgery,’ and they argue that partnership agreements are not expressly mentioned in the forgery statute (section 15432), and, unless they can be found therein, no prosecution could be maintained under section 15320. They also contend the articles of copartnership could have no legal efficacy in aiding any one to defraud a third party.

While the general statute authorizing prosecutions for forgery does not expressly mention partnership agreements, we think the forging of names to a partnership agreement, if it creates a liability, is, in the law, forgery, and under section 15320 is open to prosecution as such. Commonwealth v. Hutchison, 114 Mass. 325. In the case cited the same question is raised on a similar statute. The question involved was as to whether a copartnership agreement could be the subject of forgery, and the court held that a prosecution for forgery of such an instrument could be maintained. Forgery includes any act which fraudulently makes an instrument purport to be that which it is not. People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 35. There is no statutory definition of forgery. At the common law it is defined to be the making of a false document with intent to defraud. People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich. 73, 23 N. W. 594. The articles of corpartnership in the instant case, when signed by the five men, were recorded in the office of the county clerk, and filed away in the vault of the bank. The moment these five men placed their signature to the paper they became liable for the debts of the copartnership, and, at that moment, if their testimony is to be believed, they were defrauded.

(b) Under this head counsel contend that the information was duplicitous; that there were five different offenses charged in one count. This contention is based upon the fact that five men were injuriously affected by the false representations. The information charged a single unlawful act which injuriously affected five men. This does not charge five different offenses any more than charging larceny of property belonging to several different persons in one count. People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 N. W. 1119. The rule of pleading in this regard is stated as follows:

‘A single act or transaction in violation of law may, as a general rule, be charged in one count as a single offense, although the act involves several similar violations of law with respect to several different persons. Thus, when committed in the same act, larceny from different individuals may be joined, or robberies of several persons at the same time and place, or the reception of stolen goods belonging to different ones, or a libel concerning several persons uttered by one publication, or a slander, or the publication of several obscene songs.’ 22 Cyc. 383.

We are of the opinion that the trial court was in no error in refusing to quash the information for the reasons alleged.

2. Counsel complain that the books of several banks were improperly admitted in evidence because not sufficiently identified. It was shown that the books of the banks of Copemish and Mesick were directly under defendant's direction and control. That defendant represented to the five men that the banks were solvent, and offered an inspection of the books of the bank to prove his assertion, although at the same time he suggested it would be unnecessary to have them examined. Bearing upon the question, the court asked one of the experts, who had examined the books, the following questions:

‘The Court: I want to ask the witness a question. These books which you have referred to here as being the books of the Arcadia bank and the bank of Mesick and Copemish bank, were the books kept in the ordinary course of the business of these banks, were they? A. The books run continuously, before and after both these dates-the dates mentioned here.

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