People v. Latham

Decision Date17 December 1997
Citation666 N.Y.S.2d 557,90 N.Y.2d 795,689 N.E.2d 527
Parties, 689 N.E.2d 527, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 10,920 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Ronald LATHAM, Respondent.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

WESLEY, Judge.

On May 18, 1990, after Marie Shambeau informed defendant that she intended to end their relationship, defendant assaulted her by stabbing and strangling her. After defendant was indicted, defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted murder in the second degree. On January 22, 1991, defendant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 7 1/2 to 22 1/2 years. Seven weeks later, Marie Shambeau died.

An indictment was thereafter returned charging defendant with second degree murder. Defendant successfully moved to dismiss that indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding that "[n]either defendant's asserted belief that his plea would end all criminal exposure stemming from his conduct nor the fact that Shambeau's death was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the plea can prevent as a matter of double jeopardy a subsequent prosecution for murder in the second degree" (People v Latham, 83 N.Y.2d 233, 239, 609 N.Y.S.2d 141, 631 N.E.2d 83). We distinguished cases from other jurisdictions cited by defendant in which it was established that, "at the time of plea both the defendant and the prosecution intended the plea to close the matter forever," noting "[t]hat is not the case before us" (id.).

At trial, the People introduced factual admissions made by defendant during the attempted murder plea allocution. Defendant was found guilty of first degree manslaughter, and sentenced to a term of 8 1/3 to 25 years' incarceration.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that defendant had not effectively waived his privilege against self-incrimination at the time of his plea colloquy because he had not been advised that, should Marie Shambeau die, he would be indicted for murder and that his colloquy could then be used against him (234 A.D.2d 864, 652 N.Y.S.2d 328). We now reverse.

"A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences" (People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 402-403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265). Nevertheless, because a court could not possibly advise a defendant on all the particular ramifications of a guilty plea, we have drawn a distinction between "direct" consequences which have "a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment," and "collateral" consequences which "are peculiar to the individual and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control" (People v. Ford, supra, 86 N.Y.2d, at 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265). Although a defendant must be advised of direct consequences, a defendant need not be advised of collateral consequences before it can be said that the defendant's plea " 'represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant' " (People v. Ford, supra, at 403, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265, quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162).

It is important to note that the defendant in Ford attacked the voluntariness of his plea by a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, which was treated as a motion under CPL 440.10. The voluntariness of a plea is challenged prior to sentencing by a motion to withdraw the plea under CPL 220.60, or after sentencing by a motion to set aside the plea under CPL 440.10. * If defendant had successfully moved to withdraw or to set aside the plea to attempted murder as involuntary, the allocution could not have been used against defendant in the later trial (People v. Moore, 66 N.Y.2d 1028, 499 N.Y.S.2d 393, 489 N.E.2d 1295; see also, People v. Curdgel, 83 N.Y.2d 862, 864-865, 611 N.Y.S.2d 827, 634 N.E.2d 199; cf., People v. Evans, ...

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9 cases
  • People v. Tiger
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • June 14, 2018
    ...conviction ... are presumptively voluntary, valid and not otherwise subject to collateral attack" ( People v. Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 799, 666 N.Y.S.2d 557, 689 N.E.2d 527 [1997] ). The plea process is integral to the criminal justice system and we have observed that there are significant pu......
  • Murden v. Artuz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
    • September 7, 2001
    ...novel legal argument, which, in any event, would be unlikely to succeed if raised in state court today. See Latham, 90 N.Y.2d at 798-99, 666 N.Y.S.2d 557, 689 N.E.2d 527, rev'g, 234 A.D.2d 864, 652 N.Y.S.2d 328; see also Dixon v. Miller, 56 F.Supp.2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (rejecting inef......
  • People v. Mathurine
    • United States
    • New York Criminal Court
    • July 31, 2013
    ...and resulting conviction are presumptively voluntary, valid and not otherwise subject to collateral attack” (People v. Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 666 N.Y.S.2d 557, 689 N.E.2d 527 [1997]; see also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 [1989] “it is well settled th......
  • People v. Goss
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • November 29, 2001
    ...'direct', and those of which the defendant need not be advised, 'collateral consequences'" (People v Ford, supra, at 403; see, People v Latham, 90 N.Y.2d 795, 798). A direct consequence has a "definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment" (People v Ford, supra,......
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