People v. Laughlin

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Vartabedian
• Citation: People v. Laughlin, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737, 137 Cal.App.4th 1020 (Cal. App. 2006)
• Decision Date: 21 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. F047242.,F047242.
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnny Howard LAUGHLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737

137 Cal.App.4th 1020

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Johnny Howard LAUGHLIN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. F047242.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District.

March 21, 2006.

Matthew Alger, Fresno, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon, Harry Joseph Colombo and Alison Elle Aleman,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J.

Defendant Johnny Howard Laughlin was convicted by jury of driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from pursuing peace officers in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2.¹ In addition, the trial court found that defendant had suffered three prior prison terms. He appeals, claiming the Legislature's addition of subdivision (b) to section 2800.2 created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption by allowing a finding of willful or wanton disregard based solely on a finding the defendant committed three traffic offenses resulting in violation points, thus relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving willful or wanton disregard. We determine that subdivision (b) does not create an impermissible mandatory presumption. Instead, the statute provides a definition of substantive law.

FACTS

California Highway Patrol officer Jose Meza was on duty, in uniform, driving his marked patrol car when he saw defendant driving a vehicle without wearing his seatbelt. Officer Meza positioned himself behind defendant's vehicle and activated his lights. Instead of stopping, defendant drove away.

Officer Meza activated more lights and put his siren on. Defendant continued to evade Meza. Defendant failed to stop at numerous stop signs, drove through a red traffic light, and exceeded the speed limit. At the stop lights, drivers in the area were forced to take evasive action.

Defendant drove his vehicle off the road onto a private dirt road. Meza had a difficult time following him because of reduced visibility and the roughness of the terrain. California Highway Patrol officer Joseph Janzen joined in the pursuit of defendant. Defendant returned to the public road. He drove through another intersection with a stop sign without stopping. There were children in the area.

Defendant again drove off the public road into a dirt area. Neither Janzen nor Meza was able to follow him. Deputy Sheriff Mark Skidmore was driving a four-wheel-drive vehicle and began looking Skidmore found defendant's truck. A police dog found defendant hiding in the bushes near his vehicle, where officers arrested him. for defendant and his vehicle.

DISCUSSION

I. Characterization of Section 2800.2, Subdivision (b)

Section 2800.2 defines the crime of driving in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer. In 1996, subdivision (b) was added to this section.

Section 2800.2 provides: "(a) If a person flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or by confinement in the county jail for not less than six months nor more than one year. The court may also impose a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or may impose both that imprisonment or confinement and fine.

"(b) For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage to property occurs."

Defendant contends that subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 creates an improper mandatory presumption because it relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving the ultimate fact of willful or wanton disregard. Because the finding that defendant committed three or more violations that are assigned a traffic point count does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the defendant acted with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, defendant claims that subdivision (b) creates an impermissible mandatory presumption.

"A mandatory presumption tells the trier of fact that if a specified predicate fact has been proved, the trier of fact must find that a specified factual element of the charge has been proved, unless the defendant has come forward with evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. [Citations.] In criminal cases, a mandatory presumption offends constitutional principles of due process of law because it relieves the prosecutor from having to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1444-1445, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909.) "The prosecution `may not rest its case entirely on a [mandatory rebuttable] presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" (People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351, brackets in original.)

An example of an impermissible mandatory presumption is contained in Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218. Carella was convicted of grand theft for failure to return a rented car. At the time of his conviction, section 10855 provided "[w]henever any person who has leased or rented a vehicle wilfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle to its owner within five days after the lease or rental agreement has expired, that person shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle." Penal Code section 484, subdivision (b) provided in part that "intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased or rented the personal property of another pursuant to a written contract fails to return the personal property to its owner within 20 days after the owner has made written demand...."

The jury was instructed that if the conditions of section 10855 were met, the person "`shall be presumed to have embezzled the vehicle.'" (Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 264, 109 S.Ct. 2419.) The jury was also instructed that if the conditions of section 484, subdivision (b) were met "`Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed....'" (Carella, supra, at p. 264, 109 S.Ct. 2419.)

The United States Supreme Court found these instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment. "These mandatory directions directly foreclosed independent jury consideration of whether the facts proved established certain elements of the offenses with which Carella was charged. The instructions also relieved the State of its burden of proof articulated in Winship [In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368], namely proving by evidence every essential element of Carella's crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Carella v. California, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 266, 109 S.Ct. 2419.)

In People v. Howard (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1129, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107, the California Supreme Court recognized that the addition of subdivision (b) to section 2800.2 greatly expanded the meaning of the phrase "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" to include conduct that ordinarily would not be considered particularly dangerous. (Howard, supra, at p. 1138, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107.) While the court in Howard was concerned with whether a violation of section 2800.2 is an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of the second degree felony-murder rule, it found subdivision (b) to be expansive and listed violations that fell under the description contained in subdivision (b) that could be committed without endangering human life. These violations include "driving an unregistered vehicle owned by the driver (§§ 40001, 12810, subds.(e), (g)(1)), driving with a suspended license (§§ 14601, 12810, subd. (i)), driving on a highway at slightly more than 55 miles per hour when a higher speed limit has not been posted (§§ 22349, subd. (a), 12810, subd. (e)), failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign (§§ 22450, 12810, subd. (e)), and making a right turn without signaling for 100 feet before turning (§§ 22108, 12810, subd. (e))." (Howard, supra, at pp. 1137-1138, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107.)

As the above list illustrates, and as defendant argues, three or more violations that are assigned a traffic point count may not necessarily compel the conclusion that the defendant acted with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, as that term has traditionally been defined. Thus, if subdivision (b) is a presumption, it could be strongly argued that it would be error to advise a jury that a defendant who commits three of the enumerated traffic violations has acted with a willful or wanton disregard. We need not determine this question because we find that subdivision (b) is not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but is instead a rule of substantive law.

Although Evidence Code section 601 classifies presumptions as "either conclusive or rebuttable," as explained in People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at page 185, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351, a conclusive presumption is not really a presumption at all.² It is a rule of substantive law. "`[A] conclusive or indisputable presumption is entirely different from the ordinary rebuttable presumption: [N]o evidence may be received to contradict it. Hence, it is more accurately described as a rule of substantive law rather than of evidence. [Citations.]' [Citation.]

"Wigmore took a dim view of the term ...